Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-3-2025
Abstract
The prevalence of shareholder activism has resulted in the placement of activist-appointed directors onto the boards of firms. Extant research on this phenomenon has taken a rational approach in examining how such directors bring about change but has not accounted for the behavioral implications associated with their placement on boards. Building on theory involving alignment and legitimacy at the team level, this paper adopts a behavioral approach in theorizing how the placement of activist shareholders themselves as directors onto the boards of firms brings about firm change. The study finds that such activists lead to less firm change. Further, it finds support for the effects of demographic similarity between such activists and incumbent directors in causing change.
This article was published Open Access through the CCU Libraries Open Access Publishing Fund. The article was first published in Journal of General Management: https://doi.org/10.1177/03063070251332036
Recommended Citation
See, E. (2025). Activists on board: Shareholder activists and their influence on firm strategic change. Journal of General Management, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/03063070251332036. Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/management/6/