Institutional Design and Agenda Setting Behavior: The Case of the U.S. Supreme Court

Authors

Quan Li, Wuhan University
Udi Sommer, Tel Aviv University

Volume Number

49

Issue Number

1

Abstract

Agenda setting in political institutions plays a critical role in determining policy output. Rules governing agenda setting in turn help shape the ultimate policy choice. Using the United States Supreme Court as a case in point, we develop a voting game that takes into consideration the Court's sequential voting process. As illustrated in this paper, justices' position in the voting sequence—determined by seniority in the U.S. Court—influences their likelihood of voting to grant review. Our three-level mixed-effects empirical analysis demonstrates that the order of voting significantly influences the likelihood of voting to support judicial review. More importantly, contrary to the existing literature's conclusion, we find that six, rather than two, of the nine justices may cast the fourth and pivotal vote for certiorari. The findings suggest that besides the usual suspects such as ideology, institutional design with respect to voting rules should be accorded an independent role in future analysis of decision making in general and judicial agenda setting in particular.

Recommended Citation

Li, Quan and Sommer, Udi (2021) "Institutional Design and Agenda Setting Behavior: The Case of the U.S. Supreme Court," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 49: No. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol49/iss1/1