The professionalization of state legislatures fosters both added legislative resources and legislator careerism. Resources bolster legislative policymaking ability, but emerging research suggests careerists may misallocate resources towards reelection. We argue that organized interests take advantage of this resource misallocation to increase their informational advantage and influence in slate legislatures. We contend this effect is mitigated in the most professional legislatures, where resources rise to very high levels and free-up adequate resources to facilitate careerism and legislative expertise. Analysis demonstrates that careerism increases interest group influence, but the effect is mitigated in highly professional legislatures.
Ozymy, Joshua and Rey, Denis
"Legislative Ambition, Resources, and Lobbyist Influence in U.S. State Legislatures,"
Journal of Political Science: Vol. 39
, Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol39/iss1/2
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