Voting fluidity is a common occurrence with its own dynamics during the judicial decision making on the U. S. Supreme Court. This article approaches this issue with a spatial model. Supreme Court justices arc assumed to be rational decision makers pursuing a Court decision that is as close as possible to their ideal points on the ideological continuum. The process of opinion circulation is construed as a bargaining game over the formation of a majority opinion coalition (MOC). Justices interact with each other over the specific contents of the majority opinion until an equilibrium MOC is built. A spatial analysis of all these equilibrium coalitions generates insights into the causes and features of voting fluidity. It also offers a spatial explanation for the empirical observations in past studies.
Ye, Min and Luse, Jennifer K.
"A Spatial Model of Voting Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court,"
Journal of Political Science: Vol. 38
, Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol38/iss1/4
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