

Historical Narratives

Max Scivetti

Celina DeCordova



THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN SAILOR WASHED UP ON THE BEACH. THIS UNFORTUNATE WAS JUST ONE OF 3,478 MILITARY PERSONNEL KILLED OR WOUNDED IN THE DISASTER AT PEARL HARBOR, THE VAST MAJORITY OF THEM US NAVY AND US MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL.

PUBLISHED ON DECEMBER 8, 1941, THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH RELEASES A NEWSLETTER RECAPPING THE SPEECH OF PRESIDENT FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT. THE PRESIDENT HAD DECLARED WAR, IN RESPONSE THE ENTIRE COUNTRY FEARED THE NEXT ATTACK ON AMERICAN SOIL.



『焼き場に立つ少年』は何処へ

ジョー・オグネル撮影『焼き場に立つ少年』調査報告

The image portrays a young boy from Nagasaki who remains stoic and resolute despite witnessing the cremation of his younger brother's body. The boy's unwavering gaze suggests that he possesses a remarkable degree of emotional fortitude in the face of profound trauma.



1945

2023

The atomic bomb exploded almost directly above the Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall on the right. This building is now registered on the World Trade Organization list as the Atomic Bomb Dome. (1945, courtesy of the Association for the Creation of a Peace Museum)

	HIROSHIMA	NAGASAKI
Dead	118,661 people	73,884 people
Missing	3,677 people	n/a
Injured	n/a	74,909 people
Seriously Injured	35,524 people	n/a
Slightly Injured	48,606 people	n/a
Population	Aprox. 350,000 people	Aprox. 270,000 people

The statistics provided depict the deaths and casualties of America's atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The statistics are provided by the Nijon Bunkyo textbook.

	US	Japan
Personnel Killed Navy	1998 people	64 people
Personnel Killed Marine Corps	109 people	n/a
Personnel Killed Army	233 people	n/a
Personnel Killed Civilian	48 people	n/a
Personnel Wounded Navy	710 people	Unknown
Personnel Wounded Marine Corps	69 people	n/a
Personnel Wounded Army	364 people	n/a
Personnel Wounded Civilian	35 people	n/a

THE STATISTICS PROVIDED DEPICT THE DEATHS AND CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM JAPAN'S ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THE STATISTICS ARE PROVIDED BY THE CENSUS BUREAU.



A MOTOR LAUNCH MOVES IN TO RESCUE SURVIVORS FROM THE WATER ALONGSIDE THE WEST VIRGINIA, WHICH SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AMIDSHIPS FROM TORPEDO HITS AND THEN SETTLED ON THE BOTTOM. INSHORE OF HER, THE TENNESSEE SUFFERED LESS DAMAGE.

Perl Harbor America Receipt

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***** December 7, 1941 *****

“Tora, Tora, Tora”

This receipt transcribes the work of Thomas C. Hone, who details the events taking place December of 1941. This excerpt is in the middle school textbook “Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific”, published by Salamander Books Ltd, Published on January 1, 2001,

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Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor should situations were quite different. Japan not have surprised senior officers of the was Asia's Britain - an island kingdom United States Navy. Not since England vulnerable to blockade and starvation. And France had fought for control of the To make matters potentially even worse, seas in their colonial wars of the eight-Japan's merchant fleet was not as large tenth century had two nations planned as Britain's, and her industrial output was so assiduously for a clash at sea as Japan not quite the equal of Italy, let alone the and the United States in the years before World War II. Once the United States became a colonial power in Asia, after was very far away. It is just over 4,500the Spanish-American War, the US Navy nautical miles (8,100km) from San Fran-had to plan to hold the Philippines in the cisco to Yokohama. The distance from face of threats from foreign powers. San Diego, a major American naval base After World War I, the only nation with on the Pacific coast, to Manila is 6,500a navy able to challenge the US Navy in nautical miles (11,700km). From the Pacific and with any reason to do so Yokohama to Manila, on the other hand, was Japan, Japan controlled resources is just about 1,750 nautical miles in Korea and wanted control over Man- (3,150km). Pearl Harbor is

nearly 4,700churia and, eventually, China. The nautical miles (8,460km) from the United States consistently opposed Panama Canal, 2,200 (3,960km) from Japanese policy. The real question was San Diego, 3,300 (5,940km) from Guam, not whether the navies of the two na-in the Marianas, and 1,970 (3,546km)tions would fight, but when from Wotje, the Japanese anchorage in Between the end of the World War I the Marshall Islands. These great Pacific and the termination, by the government distances dominated both Japanese and of the United States in July 1939, of the commercial treaty linking the two na-America renovad Wana' Wanetween thetions, both navies planned carefully for Given the industrial power of thea trans-Pacific war. Their strategic United States, Japan's only hope was towage a war of attrition, wearing down American strength until the government of the United States accepted a compromise peace. A more aggressive strategy was blocked by Japan's signing of the five-power naval limitation agreement when the Washington Conference ended in 1922. That agreement set ratio sand limits to the warship tonnages allowed the signatories (Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy).The ratio of battleship tonnage for Great Britain, the United States, and Japan was5:5:3, which meant, in practice, that the United States Fleet would have 15 battleships to the Imperial Japanese Navy' ten, Japan did somewhat better on cruiser tonnage, when the ratio among the three major navies was adjusted to10:10:7. For aircraft carriers, then largely experimental, the ratio was the same as for battleships, with a cap of 135,000tons for the United States and Great Bri-tain and 81,000 tons for Japan. These limits forced the Imperial

Navy develop a defensive strategy for war with the United States, The Versailles conference, which end-ed World War I, gave Japan jurisdiction over several former German possession shove: kob WaS d Miao or Japanese tradina lacked machine shops, a trained laborin the Pacific, including the Marianas Port and diso the home of the kawasaki force, and adequate supplies of fuel to(ented Siaten; Whe Carolnes, and the shipyards Where many of Japans malor support a fleet thrust westward, Ships Warships were bulli of the involved in the Pear l harbor tack the damaged by torpedoes and bombs would Marshalls. Soon afterward, the newly Zulkaku was bull here have to return to San Diego for repair, formed League of Nations affirmed the and replacement aircraft would have to Japanese mandate over these islands, example, is a magnificent anchorage) but be shuttled out in cargo ships to the ad-which stood athwart the direct route to also a problem: they had to be supplied, vancing force across thousands of miles the Philippines from Hawaii. Though In wartime, they might be isolated and Of open water, under constant threat of Japan controlled them, successive Japanese governments pledged not to fine imperial 'HeeTi race dinger to nalack, fortify them in exchange for a committingents of an attacking American force. Planners in the two navies wrest ledment by the United States not to moder-Distances were, as usual, everything, with these, problems for years. Their nize its defenses in the Philippines. From Yokohama to Truk is over 1,800conclusions shaped the characteristics Possession of these islands was a two-nautical miles (3,240km); Yokohama to of the ships built in peacetime for the edged sword. On the one hand, Japanese Saipan, in the

Marianas, is almost 1,300 coming trans-Pacific war the United forces could use them to block any thrust nautical miles (2,340km), Yokohama to States Navy's "treaty" cruisers, for ex-by the United States Navy to the Philip-Wotje, in the Marshalls, is more than ample, built to the limits (10,000 tons and pines. On the other, the United States 2,300 nautical miles (4,140km), which 8-inch guns) set by the naval arms con-could seize bases there in the event of meant that an American task force could trol agreement signed in 1922, had great war and then use those bases as way-reach the Marshalls from Hawaii faster endurance and guns of great range, but stations on the road Dack Othe than reinforcements from Japan, they were lightly armored until the NewPhoR? Dapanese and American naval Japanese Navy planners faced a dilem-Orleans class of 1930, Their Japaneseema, If they dispersed their smaller fleet, counterparts, such as the Furutakas andp lanners believed that the Philippines it might be defeated piecemeal by a conAobas, could not be held in the face of a concentrated and larger American force. If were built for speed, so they certed Japanese attack. The best the limited number of United States troops might do was to hold the island forts in could decline battle if out numbered moreover. The latter were eventually equipped with very large, (24-inch might not be able to reach the scene of Manila Bay, denying that anchorage to the Imperial Fleet. It was not clear, conquering a base that, properly re inof which was - for a destroyer or light jor issues of United States Navy war plan-forced, could serve as the next stepping cruiser a ship killer. The reason was simple: the United States Navy had the ning. Should the United

States try tore inforce the Philippines quickly, aiming advantage in the daytime, and the for a quick, decisive confrontation with Japanese at night. On clear, central Pacific days, the US Navy's advantage in the Japanese fleet? Or, should the US blems. The naval agreements which kept battleship and cruiser broadside weight Unicora States Navy a to Wintrud the HIM would eventually tell. To counter it, Japanese planners designed fast surlace Carolines, gradually building up its mediate wartime potential of the latter, ships and an anti-ship torpedo which strength until it could fight the imperial American interwar fleet exercises fleet in a showdown in Philippine always showed that the United States could wreak havoc by night upon Navy needed more ships and aircraft if American forces steaming in defensive it were to overcome Japanese forces at formations. Dasesareat distances from secure American Both navies were spurred by the need bases. In the 1920s and 30s, Pearl Harbor to overcome great distances and the limits on numbers and sizes of ships which put a premium on packing as the number of carriers that could be much fighting power into a ship as possi-built under treaty limits. Exercises hadble. These pressures also affected air, shown air-minded officers in both fleet scraft carrier design. At the Washington that, in battle, the side with the most (and conference of 1921-2, for example, the most effective) planes in the air usually US Navy and the Imperial Navy were won. Accordingly, aviators pressed for allowed to convert two battlecruisers or more carriers; since more decks meant more planes in the air more quicklv. However, the size of carriers dependeded as carriers Lexington, Saratoga, Kaga, upon the size and weight

of the aircraft and Akagi. The former US Navy battle- They carried, and planes kept getting cruisers were especially useful because larger and heavier in the years just of their great steaming ranges 10,500before 1941. The Boeing F3B-1 biplane nautical miles (18,900km) at 15 knots, fighter of 1928, for example, weighed and the ability to survive damage (Lexington was torpedoed twice at Coral Seain May 1942 and still steamed at 25at 7,975 pounds (3,190kg). The Nakajimaknots). Their Japanese counterparts hadA2N1 of 1931 weighed 3,416 pounds less range 8,000 (14,400km) nautical(1,366kg).-The Mitsubishi A 6M2 Zero of miles at 14 knots but were otherwise1939 was up to 5,139 pounds (2,055kg), similar. All four ships, though not design- Like the fighters, dive bombers anded as carriers from the keel up and therefore less than ideal, had the size to accept the increasingly large and heavy planes which their respective industries supplied as the interwar years passed. Carriers commissioned after the con-versions tended to be much smaller. The American Ranger, laid down in 1931, was only 14,500 tons standard displacement (the treaty measure). Ryujo, Rangers Japanese was even lighter: 8,000 temp standard" dis piacetent. Both navies wanted to maximize torpedo planes grew larger and heavier, also improved. In Fleet Problem IX, stag-1930s, carriers had to rely almost ex. Carriers had to increase in tonnage toed in 1929 near the Panama Canal, clusively on their own antiaircraft guns operate larger, faster, more potent Saratoga proved that a large carrier and those of their escorts to shield themplanes. Ranger was followed by Enter-could strike effectively and in depen-from an enelny's air

attack. This was not prize (laid down in 1934), of 19,800 tons; a really effective defense. As a result, in exercises, the carrier which found its opdown in 1934), of 15,900 tons.- both navies worked to invent the best ponent first usually delivered the As carriers and their planes grew ways of deploying, maneuvering, and knockout blow. Carriers were fragile larger and more powerful, carrier tactics defending their aircraft carriers. In the Their power was in their air groups, usually two or three squadrons of attack carriers and other ships. Attacks could and (sometimes) damaged planes. By the aircraft (dive bombers and torpedo be mounted quickly, and planes often end of the 1930s, the striking power of piar ships° men selves were holt it practiced predawn takeoffs, using carriers was acknowledged in both short-range radio once airborne to navies. Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, later magazines, filled with munitions and tighten their formations. After 1937, commander-in-chief of Japan's Comb in-highly volatile aviation gas for their Japanese carrier aircraft battelled Fleet, made his reputation as an in-planes. By 1939, carrier aircraft could conduct Chinese air units, gaining wartime ex-novative leader in naval aviation. He highly coordinated strikes on enemy firmly believed that long range and offensive power were the keys to victory in carrier-on-carrier battles, and he forced Japan's aircraft manufacturers to build planes that flew farther and carried at least equivalent ordnance loads when compared with their US Navy counter-parts. He helped mold a force well suited to taking the initiative at the beginning of

a conflict. Supporting the carriers were other forms of naval aviation. The US Navy had agreed with the US Army in 1931 not to develop land-based bombers, but the Navy had built up a force of long-range 1-B-2seaplanes, including, by 1941, pressive numbers of the PBY Catalina, tion bombing raids like those conducted by B-17s. The Imperial Japanese Navy had its own similar seaplanes, as well as an impressive land-based bomber force. As with its cruiser and destroyer designs, its land-based bombers reflected Japanese battle tactics. Assuming that the US Navy would launch an offensive to rescue the defenders of the Philip-pines, the Japanese navy planned tow hittle American numbers down through submarine attacks, night raids conducted by land-based bombers, and torpedo assaults launched during the dark by groups of cruisers and destroyers. After wearing the United States Fleet down equalizing the strength in battleships and carriers the imperial fleet would wade in for the Above: Introduced in 1928 as the primary (ypeol carrier borne liachter until les?, theBoeingF3B-1 came in the middle ola line of evolutionarv Boeina fianters This machine served with BIB itechnicallvon the lexington A decisive Japanese victory there would leave the United States with little choice (so theargument ran but to accept a compromise peace. Unfolding events disrupted this planning. First, the Pacific Ocean no longer monopolized the interests of American strategists, who turned during the 1930to the Atlantic as well. A rearmed Ger-many, allied with Italy, confronted France and Britain in Europe. The threat of war there forced the US Navy in 1939to abandon its traditional war plan (call-ed Orange) against Japan in

favor of a series of plans (dubbed Rainbow) covering number of possibilities and beiligerents. In the crucial year of 1940, moreover, Japan fortified the Marshall Islands. The American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, reacted by order-ing the United States Fleet to remain in Hawaii after completing its annual war compelling both perceived the huge building program as goals. The United States was just one of part of a larger plan to give the US Navy several potential enemies. The German long-range plans. In response, the United clear superiority in the waters near government had informed Japanese States Congress authorized construc Japan. In response, Japantion of what was called a "two-ocean" joined the leaders that Britain's military officials Axis (September 1940), taking advan-believed that their forces were too slim tage of Germany's defeat of France toto hold Malaya if Japan attacked, Assum large aircraft carriers, 5 small carriers, gain bases in French Indochina, ing that were true, Malaya and theBy the end of 1940, Adm. Yamamoto, Netherlands East Indies provided oppor179 destroyers, 67 submarines, and anow head of Japan's Combined Fleet, unities for easy conquests that would large force of support and amphibious thought seriously of abandoning the give Japan a secure supply of oil and ships. Justified at home by the potential Japanese navy's accepted strategy of aother needed resources, offsetting the threat from Germany, the proposed fleet was seen as something very different infighting, drawn-out defense against an constraining effect of the ever American offensive. His thinking lightening American economic boycott. Japan, There, the military leadership reflected a change in Japan's strategic With the

Royal Navy hard-pressed Japanese battle plans completely - to March, the military chiefs of the United States and Great Britain formally and as the prelude to a decisive battle, and secretly agreed to take a defensive but move offensively against the United States Fleet in Hawaii while attacking Japanese moves in the Pacific. They Atlantic and the Mediterranean, agreed on little else. There would be no Singapore posed a diminished threat. Mulated a draft plan for the Pearl Harbor unified Pacific command, and no joint strategy. However, the Congress, at The danger that the Imperial Fleet would operation, and the admiral submitted it Roosevelt's urging, approved the Lend-lease to fight a multi-front campaign to Cdr. Minor Genda, a young aviator while still trying to consolidate its con-Lease Act in March, allowing Great Bri- with a brilliant grasp of carrier air craftta in to tap US industry without paying quest of the Philippines seemed much reduced. tactics, Genda became convinced the at-for its purchases immediately in cash, tack would work, provided sufficient air-In April, Adm. Yamamoto formed the The position of the United States was craft were massed for the operation. He First Air Fleet, the striking force of also changing. In November 1940, Presi-also persuaded Yamamoi that dune Japan's six largest aircraft carriers that dent Roosevelt had accepted "Plan D'based on the fourth paragraph, lettered primary target of the attack should beD,of a proposal by Chief of Naval Opera-the US Navy's aircraft carriers, and he attack Pearl Harbor that

December. In support of its move south tions Adm. Harold R. Stark that argued unsuccessfully for and east, Japan signed a neutrality pact America's primary goal, in the event of was a knock-out blow",phibious, assault on alw-Sende Shierwith the Soviet Union in April, protec-a world war, should be the defeat of Ger-however, remained content with ating Manchukuo and Korea from attack and further directing the coming Theat ermany. The American decision to focus" knock-down blow", of war to the South Pacific. At the end of first on Europe gave Japan a great oppor-That same month, the United States the month, Yamamoto submitted his plant unity, and Adm. Yamamoto capitalized on it. In January 1941, the Combined Navy formally acknowledged the shift infor multiple offensives (including the American strategy toward Europe by Pearl Harbor attack) to the Imperial Fleet formally requested the Imperial dividing the United States Fleet into Fleet's General Staff. His plans gained Navy Ministry to supply the Fleet's car-Atlantic and Pacific commands. In support from an American decision toner torpedo planes with weapons that could be launched in the 40-to-45-foot(12-13m) depths of Pearl Harbor. This proved quite a challenge. Aircraft torpedoes usually sank below that depth before stabilizing on shallow runs to their targets. However, Royal Navy torpedo planes had used shallow-running torpedoes in their attack on the Italian battle fleet in Taranto in November 1940,with spectacular results, so Yamamoto thought the gamble well worth the risk. Also that January, the admiral revealed to a colleague his plans to change shift three battleships, an aircraft car-attack ships at sea, although

under adrier, and supporting cruisers and destroyers to the newly formed Atlantic midted range o reach a panes hilter? Fleet. Adm. Husband Kimmel was noon Formosa. Secretary of War Henry Llonger in charge of the United States Stimson and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Fleet. The ships that remained under his(who had been recalled from retirementc ommand now constituted the Pacific to lead US and Philippine troops) were Fleet, but Kimmel and his staff did not convinced that land-based air power think the force in Hawaii could Deter could take up the slack left by the Japan from a move against the Philip-transfer of American aircraft carriers to pines or Southeast Asia, the Atlantic. In September, the firstB-17sPresident Roosevelt froze Japan's landed at Clark Field on the island of assets in the United States in July, an-Luzon, near Manila. MacArthur hoped nounced that the United States would to have 300 of them by April 1942. When send a military mission to China, and cut Pearl Harbor was attacked, he had 35,the flow of oil to Japan to a trickle. His It was too little, too late. On November goal was to influence Japan without pro-5, the Japanese set a date for the Pearl voking her. He failed. He had no in-Harbor attack; on the 26th, the Pearl fluence whatsoever with the men who Harbor Striking Force left its anchorage now mattered: the staff officers in Tokyo in Etorofu, in the Kurile Islands. The analyzing Yamamoto's plans. Force, commanded by Vice Adm September, a series of war games, in Chuichi Naqumo, was built around thew hich the senior Japanese naval officers took part, tested Yamamoto's proposals. Based on the results of the games, the General Staff recommended against the Pearl Harbor attack. The Imperial

Navy Above: A cheerier moment late in November 1940 and Japan's ambassador to Washington, the politically moderate Admiral Richisaburo Somura fought and

the more hard-line special envoy Saburo Kurusu, who arrived on November 5 following carriers: Akagi (commissioned, Soryu (1937), Shokaku, and Zuikaku (both commissioned 1941). These ships had only 11 carriers. In sending the six carriers, Yamamoto was He also carried 423 aircraft, their maximum best against Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto was He also understood better than any complement. Escorting them were the risking everything on one throw of the other senior naval commander in the modernized battle cruisers Hiei and Mutsu. Moreover, in striking at Pearl Harbor region what advances in aviation had Kirishima, two heavy cruisers (Tone and Mogami, Yamamoto was placing heavy dependence on the traditional plans of the Chikuma), and a squadron of nine destroyers on the air and naval units left to American and Japanese navies. Kagero class destroyers, patrolling cover the invasions of the Philippines, Yamamoto had no doubt that Japan's ahead of the Striking Force were three Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, ultimate goal was still a negotiated settlement. I class submarines; supporting it were Equal losses at Pearl Harbor - threat element with the United States. However, eight tankers and supply ships, steaming Japanese carriers for three American - he also knew that the increases in range at latitude 43 degrees North, the Force would threaten the whole enterprise, and striking power of carrier and land-based aircraft turned southeast on December 3, and Yamamoto was no fool, however, He well based planes gave him the chance to do headed for a point 275 miles (440km)

understood the risk, with aviation what the naval limitation north of Oahu, agreements prevented him from doing with a surface fleet -- to be in all the places that mattered in sufficient number. Contingent both, the Fleet Admiral was tied by Japan and a buffer zone between Japan and the United States. Yamamoto needed to be able to "run free" for about six months. Then, his initial objectives in hand, he could adopt the traditional waiting game. There was really no other alternative, and Yamamoto threatened to resign if the General Staff did not set aside its Reservations. A similar understanding of the impact of long-range aviation was shaping the agreements were in effect, the US Army was not allowed to improve or enlarge its Philippine defenses. After Japan withdrew from the agreements in 1936, Congress declined to appropriate funds for Philippine fortifications because the United States was scheduled to grant independence to the islands in 1946 and because the Army and Navy did not think that scarce military appropriations should be diverted to what was regarded as a lost cause. However, in 1941 the Above: The American diplomat with the difficult task of putting the American point of view to the Japanese was the ambassador Joseph G. Grew, who later became Under Secretary of State dealing with problems relating to Japan's surrender. Army's B-17 four-engined bomber looked like just the mobile weapon which might make defense of the Philippines feasible. The heavy bombers had demonstrated that they could find and vanquish Expeditionary Force: 27 large, long-range submarines - 11 with small aircraft and five carrying midget submarines for use inside Pearl Harbor. Each midget carried two

torpedoes. The large submarines were to remain off Oahu after the initial attack; their job was to ambush any ships which the air, craft could not sink. The whole plan was bold. Admiral Nagumo did not assume that he could approach undetected; he had orders to attack even if detected in his final approach to Pearl Harbor. If US ships left the harbor during his approach, he was to find and sink them. He was not to assume complete surprise. The chance that the midget submarines and the aircraft of Nagumo's force might not strike simultaneously was accepted as worth the risk.

Soon after 6:00 A.M. on December 7, the six carriers turned into the wind and launched the first wave of 183 planes. Another 170 aircraft were launched in a second wave an hour later. Of the 353 planes sent against Pearl Harbor, 50 carried 40-centimeter armor-piercing shells converted to bombs for use against battleships, 40 carried torpedoes with 450-pound warheads, 50 lighters, and the rest were dive bombers. At anchor in Pearl Harbor were 70 warships, including 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, and 5 submarines. There were also 24 auxiliaries, among them 10 Admiral Kimmel and the Army commander in Hawaii, Maj. Gen. Walter Short, had already been sent several "war warnings" by their superiors in Washington. As recently as November 27, Chief of Naval Operations Stark had cautioned Kimmel, largely on the basis of intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic, that Japan was expected to make an "aggressive move" in a matter of days. However, Stark had also said that the evidence "indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand or Kra

Peninsula or possibly Borneo
"As Stark's warnings demonstrated, the cryptanalysts who had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes could chart the breakdown of relations between the United States and Japan, but they tended to produce vague and sometimes contradictory indications of intelligence station on the island of Cor-regidor in Manila Bay had been monitoring Japanese naval and merchant marine communications in ports such as Shanghai and in the South China Sea. The Japanese clearly were on the move, but the volume and sources of radio traffic pointed toward a southward advance, since Nagumo's force maintained strict radio silence as it steamed eastward, Pearl Harbor was calm. Though painted a warlike dark grey, the battleships were not protected by anti-torpedo nets and their ready-to-use anti-aircraft ammunition was stored in locked boxes. There were no barrage balloons over the harbor, nor was there equipment to put up an effective smokescreen over the anchored ships. Many B-29 Superfortresses heavily laden with bombs were on the flightdeck fits carrier for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The type was used for torpedo and level bomb in a, in the latter role us in a converted armor pierce I na naval shells Above: The ship large tina detail on this captured Japanese chart Parkarhor reveals the high quality of the naval intelligence received from Japanese agents on Oahu, who could Wale the om & number officers and enlisted personnel we reashore The Navy had two sea plane bases on Oahu - one in Pearl Harbor and the other at Kaneohe Bay - plus an

airfield on Ford Island, in the center of the harbor, for its carrier planes. There was also a Marine Corps airfield at Ewa. Not one of these fields could put up an effective defense. The Army was responsible for anti-aircraft protection, but many of its artillery units had been depleted in order to build up the defenses of the Philippines. There were two large Army airfields on Oahu: Hickam, next to Pearl Harbor, and Wheeler, in the center of the island. There were also two small auxiliary fields, Bellows and Haleiwa. Based mostly at Hickam and Wheeler were 64 modern, flyable P-40 fighters, six combat-ready B-17s, and 21 obsolete B-18 twin-engine bombers. All told, the Navy and Marine Corps had about 150 planes on Oahu, while the Army counted 143. However, most of the flyable Army planes stood precisely planed enments- They were so exposed because Gen. Short feared sabotage Above: Adm. Husband E. Kimmel was the commander-in-chief of the US Navy's Pacific Fleet with his headquarters at Pearl Harbor. Though alerted to the possibility of war with Japan, Kimmel had not brought his command to high side of preparation. Above: Kimmel's army counterpart was Gen. Walter C. Short. Like Kimmel, Short had failed to ensure that his command was prepared for war, and was there tore relieva of his command less than a fortnight after be Pearl Harbor disaster. more than attack, despite the fact that both he and Adm. Kimmel had been midgets were hard for their crews to con-A.M., the cruiser float planes sent as warned by their senior aviation officers (rol) attempting to follow repair ship An-scouts ahead of the Striking Force's first the previous March that Oahu was

lares into the harbor. Ward attacked the poorly prepared to ward off an attack, small sub at 6:45 A.M. Nine minutes wave of attacking aircraft. Half an hour If Oahu had been alert, the first efforts later, William W. Outerbridge, Ward's of the Japanese midget subs would have captain, who had been summoned to the given the whole game away. Launched bridge from his cabin, notified the Com-after midnight December 6-7, the five mandant of Hawaii's naval district (the sightings were reported to a central plot-small subs gamely approached the an-officer responsible for the harbor's ting station, but the young officer there ti submarine net stretched across the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbor. At 3:42 defenses) that it had fired upon, ramm-(filling in temporarily for the regular du-A.M., a small minesweeper patrolling ed, and sunk a submarine. The anti subty officer) thought that the radar was just the entrance spotted the periscope of marine net, opened at 5:00 A.M. for picking up a flight of B-17s due in that one of the midgets. The mine sweeper routine morning traffic, was still open, morning from California. At 7:53 A.M., summoned the World War I destroyer Even worse, Adm. Kimmel's staff was not the senior officer with the first wave Ward, which searched the area for the told of the attack until 7:25 A.M. Kimmel radioed Naqumo" Tora, Tora, Tora (liger, Tiger, Tiger)- telling the admiral that surprise had been achieved, patrolling PBY flying boat sighted and on Kahuku Point, above the northern Two minutes later, the first wave marked the same or another midget (the started attacking Pearl Harbor and shore of Oahu, had detected, at

6:45 Oahu, Torpedo planes struck the anchored ships while dive bombers and fighters attacked the American air craft lined up on the ground. As the first torpedo planes pulled away, other Type 975, flying at 10,000 feet (3,000m), released their converted 40-centimeter shells. Within minutes, Japanese planes were swarming all over their primary targets, and inflicting terrible damage. The primary targets of the first wave were the seven battleships berthed at mooring quays along the southeast side of Ford Island, opposite the Navy yard piers. Nevada (launched in 1914) was hit by a torpedo on her port side 14 feet (4m) above her keel, between her two forward turrets (1915) was apparently also torpedoed forward. A motion picture film taken at the time shows fuel oil from this hit burning on the water around her bow. Oklahoma (also launched in 1914) was struck on the port side our same in a matter of minutes. She listed so rapidly that the third and fourth torpedoes detonated above her side armor belt. West Virginia (launched in 1921) had her port side ripped open by six torpedo explosions, seventh torpedo crashed into the battleship's rudder and tore it free. Two torpedoes hit California (launched in 1919). The first cut a gash below the waterline between number two turret and the bridge; the second blew outside went after the ships in the anchorages on the opposite side of Ford Island, holing the disabled battleship Utah (a target ship) twice and light cruiser Raleigh (launched in 1922) once. Virginia appeared to be headed for the altitude bombers

carrying the converted armor-piercing shells dropped the inloads, one of shells plummeted through Arizona's two armored decks and ignited her forward main battery magazines, of the explosion was tremendous. From her second turret forward, Arizona's sides were blown completely out, and the ship's armored decks and turrets dropped straight down onto the wreckage which had formed Arizona's forecastle. An all-consuming fire followed the thunderous detonation. Tennessee sister to California, and anchored inboard of West Virginia) and hapless West Virginia were also hit by converted shells. Two struck the latter. One was stopped--unexploded--by her armored deck; the second crashed through the roof of her superimposed 16-inch turret aft but broke up. Two also fell on Tennessee. One broke through a turret roof but caused only local damage; the other blew up after striking the middle barrel of one of the ship's three-gun, 14-inch turrets. By 8:30 A.M., "Battleship Row" was chaos. Oklahoma had rolled 150 degrees to port until her superstructure jammed wreck; over one thousand men were fired upon by the anchored tender, the dead in her. The Japanese did not overlook other sub was rammed and depth charged by destroyer Monaghan, which had been above water. West Virginia also rested on targets. One Japanese torpedo plane the bottom, but still upright. Promptly crossed Ford Island from the northwest on its way to reinforce Ward. Counter flooding, and the retarding and launched a torpedo at light cruiser The second group of attacking

planes struck their targets just before 9:00 A.M. pressure exerted by the bulk of Tenn. Helena (launched in 1938) anchored Dive bombers attacked battleship Tennessee as the two ships wedged together, alongside a Navy Yard pier. The torpedo had kept the sting West Virginia from hitting the cruiser amidships; the concussion going all the way over. However, she was from the explosion so damaged the destroyers high and dry in Pearl Harbor's neighboring old minelayer Ogilala, concrete drydock. One 250-kilogram mothered by oil fires which were gut-however, that the latter rolled over. Ford bomb landed on the battleship amidships her superstructure and threatening to trigger an explosion in her unflooded Island's seaplane ramps and hangars ships, doing superficial damage, were also given a good working over. For However, other bombs ruptured the fuel forward 16-inch powder magazines, good measure, a midget sub that had tanks of the destroyers, starting a severe Nevada was down by the head and on penetrated the harbor tried to attack fire in the bottom of the drydock, fire forward, Arizona was a hideous sea plane tender Curtiss at 8:39 A.M. Flooding the drydock only made matters worse, for the burning oil rose with the water, turning the destroyers into blackened hulks. At about the same time, the damaged Nevada attempted to sortie from Pearl Harbor. The ship had raised steam before any of the other battleships because her engineers had kept more of her boilers active than was the usual habit while in port. Under the command of a reservist, Lt. Cdr. J.F. Thomas, with her helm under the

hand of a veteran chief quartermaster, Robert Sedberry, Nevada swung clear of the burning Arizona, passed "Battleship Row", and headed as quickly as she could for the harbor entrance. Dive bombers lining up to strike dry docked Pennsylvania turned their fury instead on Nevada, and the wounded battleship was quickly obscured by columns of water thrown up by the explosions of 250-kilogram bombs. Nevada sustained more hits. Her bow was now so badly damaged that water was flowing in above her belt of anti-torpedo armor and running along her armored deck to cascade down through ventilation trunks into boiler rooms. To keep Nevada from sinking in the harbor entrance, the senior admiral on the scene ordered the burning battleship beached, where she slowly filled with water. Maryland, sister to West Virginia and nestled inboard of Oklahoma, was hit by two of the modified 40-centimeter shells. Neither caused serious damage. California, hit by two bombs as well as by two torpedoes, would have stayed afloat had her crew and her defenses been properly prepared, but the crew was ordered to abandon their ship just as they were afloat. Battleship at just the wrong time. As a result, California also gradually filled with water. By 10:00 A.M. the attack was over. Aviators returning to the Striking Force pressed Adm. Nagumo to order yet another strike. Only then did they argue that Pearl Harbor's docks, machine He still had no idea where carriers Lexington and Enterprise were. They could surprise him at any time. Although his air units had lost only 39 planes, many more had been damaged, if only lightly. Attacking Pearl Harbor again would put his offensive power

over Oahu just when he might need it to hit the American carriers, his primary target. Beyond that risk was the certain cost in lost and damaged aircraft - planes which his force might need on the return voyage. Nagumo chose to retire. In its wake, his command left five battleships and three destroyers sunk or sinking, three battleships and killed or wounded military personnel. It was a stunning victory. American commentators and historians have argued that Pearl Harbor was a tactical victory but a strategic error for Japan. The attack united public opinion in the United States in favor of war and also failed to catch the US Navy's carriers, though Enterprise was so close that some of her aircraft flew into Ford Island during the closing moments of the Japanese assault. However, Yamamoto's gamble did buy time. Carrier Yorktown, sister of Enterprise, left the Atlantic ten days after the attack on Pearl Harbor and took two weeks to reach San Diego via the Panama Canal. Saratoga, absent from Pearl Harbor on December 7, was in January, under repair, until May 22. Yamamoto's goal was to shove the US Navy aside while Japanese forces encircled the Philippines and conquered Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. He achieved it. Had circumstance put one or more of the US carriers in Pearl Harbor on December 7, American commentators on the battle might have taken a different view of the larger outcome. Midway, the decisive carrier battle of the war, could not have been won by the US. Beyond that, American commentators fail to consider the dilemma facing Adm. Kimmel. He had been told he had to remain in Hawaiian waters. He had also been denied the forces

necessary to take the offensive, in part because of demands of the Atlantic. He was not even allowed to pull his veteran battleships back to San Pedro or San Diego, where they would not drain his oil stocks in Hawaii. Kimmel actually had two fleets: one built around three fast carriers, the other composed of the slow battleships and their escorts. With this heterogeneous force, he was expected to undertake some sort of action against the Imperial Japanese Navy if war should come. His staff put together a foray against the Marshalls, but it was fortunate that the Japanese attack kept him from implementing it. The Pacific Fleet, even at pre-attack strength, would have been outnumbered two-to-one in carriers, in waters teeming with Japanese submarines and scouted by land-based Japanese military aviation. In his own defense, Adm. Kimmel later argued that he would have been prepared if he had been given access to the closely held Magic intercepts of Japan's diplomatic code. The admiral was understandably bitter, but the diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Washington did not reveal that the Striking Force was on its way to Pearl Harbor. Its consulate on Oahu sent it information about the ships anchored in Pearl Harbor. The fact that other Japanese diplomatic posts were asked to forward similar information did not make the move defensive at the outset to a surprise can obscure the fact that he was under no message from Oahu stand out. Finally, the Imperial Navy changed its operational attack followed by a prolonged defense, by his military opponent, tonal codes suddenly at the beginning to protect his country's rapid

thrust Pearl Harbor produced far more than south and west, Yamamoto needed to its fair share of myths. The worst was that of December. This was taken as a clue eliminate any threat from the east President Roosevelt knew of the attack that something was up, but radio traffic from Hawaii. The Imperial Fleet could ahead of time; some of his bitterest analysis continued to direct leaders in not be everywhere at once in strength, critics alleged that he deliberately set it Washington towards the Philippines and so Yamamoto first sent it, in overwhelm-up a In order to cover his undeclared Malaya, ing force, against his primary enemy. The truth is that Kimmel was surprise The test of a senior commander is hised because he did not see the strategic ability to perceive the enemy's strategy Roosevelt was indeed preoccupied by! COfsituation as Yamamoto did, Kimmel did and act against it, no matter what the events in the Atlantic. The destroyer not think his command was a serious odds, Kimmel's situation was impossible. Greer had been torpedoed in the North threat to the Japanese, and he also He could neither run nor fight to win, But Atlantic in September by a German U-failed to sense the possibility that he did not have to suffer so crushing a boat, and the US Navy to all intents and Yamamoto had changed Japan's strategy defeat, No excuse offered on his behalf purposes, had been a belligerent since that time. The destroyer Reuben James had been lost to submarine attack near Iceland at the end of October, US Navy ships were attacking submarines on sight. But the president knew the United States was not prepared for a two-ocean war. He was trying to pressure Japan without provoking war. If he

was guilty of anything, it was in believing that his administration's policies gave him some control over the actions of the Japanese government. A related myth is that Navy code-the message to Hawaii intime, either because of the president's interference of because of bureaucratic incompetence. There is no evidence for this claim either. The Striking Force maintained radio silence throughout its approach to Hawaii. A third myth, widely held after the attack, was that Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry had supplied information and even directions to Nagumo's Striking Force. This was an outright falsehood, promulgated by white Hawaiian officials and suspicious Army intelligence officers to justify a decree of martial law on Oahu and the internment of Japanese-American citizens on the US mainland. The air attack on Hawaii was a tremendous shock. Eyewitnesses were staggered by the blow, and many military and civilian 39 were definitely caused by large an-leaders on Oahu feared that the air strike ti aircraft shells which had failed to was only a prelude to invasion. Wild rumours swept Oahu, the panic they detonate in the air. Similarly, battleship Arizona was not blown apart by a bomb Above: A Somber President Roosevelt addresses an emergency session of Congress on December 8, as kind for a declaration of War against Japan for IS allack against Pearl Harbor - a date which will live in infamy, caused made worse by a radio blackout which went down her smokestack. All ordered by the military authorities. American battleships had thick armor executed attack staged by highly skilled Neither was it true that Japanese air-gratings over the outlets for their

Boiler professional pilots. Such myths allowed craft had bombed Honolulu. Of the 40fire exhausts, and Arizona's was never people to avoid the hard questions of explosions in the city during the attack, were angry, confused and afraid. The Did the Japanese pass up an opportune-terrible Japanese had bombed civilians not returning to attack? Yes. Though US anti-aircraft fire improved in Honolulu as they had smashed Nan-king, in China, Arizona had been shat-decidedly once the initial shock of the surprise wore off, Japanese air craft tered of a luck shot, not in awe would have been able to return and smash the tank farm and the Navy Yard shops. They might even have discovered Enterprise, only 200 miles (320km) west of Oahu as the second flight of Japanese planes worked over Pearl Harbor. Was the ultimate cost of the surprise attack balanced by its benefits? No. The effect of the attack on American public opinion was electric. The surprise nature of the attack reinforced an already widely accepted image of the Japanese as cunning and unscrupulous. Moreover, the damage inflicted on the Pacific Fleet was largely made good through repair and salvage. Only Arizona and Oklahoma of the major Ships were total losses, Arizona, stripped of her super structure, still reposes on the bottom of the harbor; Utah lies there, too, Oklahoma was roll-ed upright and floated in an impressive feat of salvage, but her hulk sank in deepwater while being towed to the mainland Tor scrapping. During the course of the war Pear Harbor was never blockade dor rendered ineffective as a fleet base

Perl Harbor Japan Receipt

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***** December 8, 1941 *****

This receipt is created the translation the Japanese middle school level, social studies, new history textbook published by Jiyusya, Published around 2012.

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Morning of December 8th: The Imperial Japanese Navy surprised the U.S. base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and delivered a near-extinction blow to American warships and base air units.

Aim of Operation: Destroying the main fleet and gaining control of the Pacific. On the same day, the Japanese Army landed on the Malay Peninsula and advanced toward Singapore while destroying British forces.

Declare of War: Japan declared war on the U.S. and Britain, declaring that this war was a war for "self-existence and self-defense. It also named the war "The Great East Asia War. Germany and Italy also declared war on the U.S., and World War II expanded into a worldwide war between the Axis powers of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and the Allied powers of the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and China.

The Outbreak of the War: Many Japanese who heard the news of the outbreak of war against the U.S. and Britain rejoiced at the successes that followed one after another. The U.S. government, on the other hand, propagandized to its own people that the delay in notifying the Japanese of the termination of negotiations was a despicable "trick" compared to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan's

attack on Pearl Harbor was a military success, but it did unite the American people, who had previously opposed the war, against Japan under the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor.

The Intention of the Attack: The Japanese government had no intention to deceive and had planned to notify the Japanese government of the termination of Japan-U.S. negotiations before the attack began, but due to an oversight on the part of the Japanese, the notification was made after the attack.

End of WWII American Receipt

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**** August 6, 1945 ****

**** August 9, 1945 ****

**** August 15, 1945 ****

This receipt is an expert from a middle school level American textbook. The textbook is "Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific" published by Salamander Books Ltd on January 1, 2001.

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"Japan in Flames"

One of Hansell's major problems was that many of the damaged Super forts returning from Japan often had to ditch in the sea because they had nowhere to land between the air bases and the target. Although the air-sea rescue service of the Army Air Forces and sub-marines assigned as lifeguards mounted, bite at swarm to into pro bien was to be zero. Iwo Jima, an eight-square-mile (20km²) island in the Volcano chain mid-way between the Marianas and Japan, as an advanced base where B-29s could land in an emergency and from which American fighters could be launched against Japanese planes attacking the Marianas. The marines landed on Iwo Jima on February 19, 1945, and bloody fighting continued throughout most of March before the island was declared secure. On March 4, while the battle still raged, the first B-29 made an emergency landing on Iwo Jima. Meanwhile, in January and February the aerial onslaught against Japan had intensified when, in addition to the B-29 raids, hundreds of carrier-based planes of the American fast carrier task forces operated. On February 16, Vice Adm Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58 conducted the first carrier strike against Japan. The carriers swept the defenders from their attacks on Japan. LeMay skies over Tokyo in preparation for an experiment with new tactics. At first he tacks on airframe and aircraft engine tried to bomb from high altitude - to do factories in the vicinity of the Japanese what his

predecessor had done, only capital. The fighters and bombers more effectively - but he soon adopted returned on February 17; and in two days different approach. By early 1945 plan-the Navy pilots claimed the destructions and analysts at Army Air Forces of 341 enemy aircraft in aerial combat headquarters expressed great and another 190 on the ground at the enthusiasm for incendiary bombing at-cost of 88 airplanes shot down or lost intakes against Japan's largest cities, which contained lightly constructed, highly inflammable wooden houses and lacked attacks not only screened the invasion well-equipped, highly-trained fire of Iwo Jima, but further reduced the fighters. Indeed, Gen. LeMay had number of aircraft and pilot available to the Japanese. In March, in order to protect the invasion of Okinawa, Task Force 58 again attacked Japan; on the 18th bombing airfields on Kyushu and on the following day hitting ships and installations on the Inland Sea. The Navy pilots damaged the aircraft carrier Amai, reduced to Okinawa operation. Kamikazes or bombers damaged three American carriers - the new Wasp, the new Yorktown, and Franklin, which was shaken by explosions so violent that they could be felt by crewmen on the carrier Bunker Hill 20 miles (32km) away. While the fast carriers were launching conducted a devastating fire raid enhance (Hangzhou) when he operated in China, while Hansell had also experimented with fire raids. Once he decided that he could burn down the cities, LeMay made one of the most important decisions of the war when he launched his B-29s on low-level, night week later. At the end of July 1945 Gen. Carl A. "Tooley" Spaatz, fresh from the victory in Europe, took over control of air operations in the Pacific. In addition to the Twentieth Air Force in the Marianas, he controlled the

Eighth Air Force which was deploying from Europe to operate against Japan from the Ryukyus, joining forces with the Marianas-based B-29s. Earlier the four B-29 groups from India had joined the Twentieth and more units arrived from the United States. Spaatz would rec the final aerial assault on Japan, including the atomic bombing. By now B-29 strength in the Marianas had grown to nearly 1,000 bombers, permitting an armada of as many as 625 B-29s to attack on a single day. In the organizational shuffle that followed the appointment of Spaatz, the XXI Bomber Command was a valid and became Chief of Staff of Twentieth Aero center United States had drafted plans for the invasion of Japan beginning with an assault on Kyushu in the fall of 1945; a second invasion of Honshu, was planned for the Spring of 1946. Japan was attacked with incendiaries. By coming in at low altitude, only 7,000 feet (2,000m), cities were laid to waste. Even after June thought to have an army of about two million men and 8,000 airplanes for use the planes could carry larger bomb first phase of their defense of the Home Islands. If the destruction of urban areas had ended, loads, and they avoided a long climb at LeMay did not ease up. Whenever poor Japanese fought with anything like the maximum power that strained their tenacity they had displayed at Iwo Jima temperamental engines. The first attack weather was predicted over his primary American losses would be staggering. Targets, like airfields or aircraft factories, on March 9-10 by a force of 334 B-29s. No American leader contemplated a burned out 16 square miles (40km²) of LeMay continued fire bombing missionary or an easy Victor. Against secondary industrial targets and the heart of Tokyo, destroyed about one-

Fortunately, a weapon existed that launched precision daylight strikes fourth of all the buildings, and took more under visual conditions. On June 11, 1945, Col. Paul W. Tibbets, than 80,000 lives. The American Pacific Fleet, assisted Commander of the 509th Composite The astounding success of this mission since mid-March by the British Pacific Group, arrived at North meld on nian, established a pattern for the fire-Idleetoperatinaasanintegraltask forcebombing campaign against Japan returned to Japanese waters in Jul and bomb on Japan - was known only (0 cities Four more incendiary attacksremainedthereuntiJapansu rrendered,selectew, followed in rapid succession anby March 20 the Super forts had flown 1,600Fask Force 38 but commented b) Vice on August 13, 1942 the United States initiated the Manhattan Project, an Allamon S. McCain, instead Fischer just as Adm. Spruance's Fifth areas in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fleet became the Third Fleet when Fleet administered by Brig.Gen. Lesha R.Kobe. Because the Japanese air defenses Adm. Halsey and his slate of officersGroves, in the head of the Manhattan against night attack were poor, the B-29sassumed command), attacked militarvengineerina District, the project tooxsullered only minor losses in these at-and industrial targets in Tokyo and on in three vears to complete. Operationalists. In fact the Americans were so elsewhere on the island of Honshu andunderelaborate security masns the confidant of success that they stripped on Hokkaido to the north. For the British true nature of the project west heir B-29s of guns and ammunition and the high point of this foray may have as Marlboro Individuals we lherfilled the planes with additional bombs, come on July

17 and 18 when their car-Secretary of State Cordell Hull nor Vice Japan's fighter defenses collapsed sorrier aircraft Joined in attacking Tokyo, President Harry S, Truman knew of the quickly that the P-51 escort lighters On July 29, the battleship HMS Kingundertakina. The secrecy was astound became superfluous almost as soon George V shelled the industrial city of they began flying from Iwo Jima. Hamamatsu in contral-onshu- DespiteManhattan Protect empovedmorethan Toward the end of the war, the B-29sbegandropping leallets110,000 people at numerous locations, was estimated to have cost (wournesJapanese cities that were targeted and Naval Operations, that the British couldDrNikoberOpwarning the civilian population to flee by the end of the war the B 29 bomber had dropped 145,000 tons of bombs on organized a train of oilers and supplydathereddloplevelresearch leantalliosJapan and destroyed 105 square miles ships and caused a minimum of disrupt Alamos New Mexica kasic research(260km°) in Japan's six most important to the replenishment system as they Was conducted atthree centers;Dr AR Industrial centers. Dozens of small helped carry the war to Japan. Hurt, Compion headed the University Social and Political Implications, as it was called, urged Stimson and the presidentatomic bomb test while he attended the first to demonstrate the power of the conference of Allied leaders which met disarm its military forces; destroy its war bomb before an international audience at Potsdam, near conquered Berlin, bet-industry; submit to the trial and punish- on some barren spot. However, the ad-ween July 17 and August 2. On July 26,ment of war

criminals; institute the vice of the concerned scientists was re-President Truman, with Prime Minister rejected on grounds that "the possibility Churchill and Generalissimo Chiangof a dud made an advance notice a bad Kai-shek, issued an ultimatum (the Potsdam Declaration) for Japan to sur-Suzuki rejected the Allied terms, psychological risk,whereupon Truman made the fateful, render unconditionally. Truman had though all but inevitable, decision to use Regarded as a kind of ultimate weapon, decided that if the Japanese failed to ac-atomic bombs. The atomic bomb might serve as thicket, " They may expect a rain of ruin Despite the devastating B-29 attacks, answer to avoiding the enormous from the air, the like of which has never American casualties contemplated in an invasion of Japan. Truman, who had been seen on this earth, The Allies Japan had refused to surrender. The coup degraceagainst Japanwasbecome president after Roosevelt's demanded that Japan: limit its sovereign- delivered with the dropping of the to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and death in April, learned of the successful atomic bombs against HiroshimaShikoku; accept Allied occupation on August 0 and Nagasaki on August 9since the loss of Saipan, it hadbecomeincreasingly obvious to those Japanese leaders willing to face reality that Japan could be destroyed by starvation andbombing, even without an invasion. But influential groups of Japanese militants,determined to fight to the bitter and, refused to give in, and others preferred national suicide to theProbable imprisonment and possible execution of the emperor they revered. The final blow that convinced Japan to come to Its payload was an experimental plutonium bomb named Fat Man"

did its U-235 atomic bomb named "Little Boy". At 8:15 A.M. Tibbets dropped the bomb. Grisly work. Although the second bomb—At 2,000 feet (600m) above Hiroshima, Bing was less effective, it too produced enormous destruction as 36,000 were the bomb exploded in a blinding flash of killed and 60,000 injured at a single light, with a force equal to 20,000 tons stroke. The bombing of Nagasaki con-of TNT. A huge mushroom-shaped cloud evinced the Japanese leaders of the futile—that rose 40,000 feet (12km) marked the of further resistance, bomb's devastation. An hour and a half In a radio broadcast shortly after the later Tibbets and his crew were 360 miles bombing, President Truman explained: away, but they could still see the cloud. The destruction was unprecedented: nearly five square miles of Hiroshima had vanished, 40,000 people were killed instantly, 20,000 others died even—tally of gruesome wounds or radiation, and yet another 60,000 were injured. The Japanese literally did not know what hit them, nor did they have any idea how to treat the burned and bleeding hapless victims. When the Japanese government, atomic strike, Kokura was the intended "I realize the tragic significance of the atomic bomb. Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to shorten the agony of young Americans. We shall continue to use it until we completely destroy Japan's power to make war. Only a Japanese surrender will stop us." city cloud-covered and flew some 80 miles (128km) to the southwest for his On August 8, 1945, in accordance with

secondary target. At 11:00 A.M. on the the Yalta agreement made in February, morning of August 9, Nagasaki was turn—the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, Ed into another atomic furnace.

End of WWII Japan Receipt

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**** August 6, 1945 ****

**** August 9, 1945 ****

**** August 15, 1945 ****

This receipt is created the translation the Japanese middle school level, social studies, new history textbook published by Nihon Bunkyo. Published around 2014.

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Questions to ask ourselves:
How does the atomic bomb differ from previous weapons?

What is the difference between the atomic bomb and previous weapons?

Hiroshima after the atomic bombing: The atomic bomb exploded almost directly above the Hiroshima Prefectural Industrial Promotion Hall on the right. This building is now registered on the World Trade Organization list as the Atomic Bomb Dome.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Japanese government did not accept the Potsdam Declaration, hoping for Soviet mediation. Conscious of its superiority over the Soviet Union in the postwar world, the United States dropped the world's first atomic bombs on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945.

The Effect of the Atomic Bomb: Both cities were instantly destroyed by the intense heat of thousands of degrees and the ferocious blast, and their people were exposed to massive amounts of radiation. Within months, the death toll reached more than 100,000 in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki, many of them civilians, including women and children. Hibakusha are still suffering from

radiation damage caused by this brutal weapon, and the number of victims continues to rise.

Potsdam Declaration:

6 The power of those who have deceived the Japanese people into embarking on world domination shall be removed forever.

7 The Allied Powers shall occupy Japan until an order of peace, security and justice is established in Japan.

8 Japanese sovereignties shall extend only to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such islands as the Allied Powers shall determine.

10 All war criminals shall be severely punished. The Japanese government shall revive and strengthen the democratic tendencies of the people. The Japanese government should revive and strengthen the democratic tendencies of the people. It must establish respect for fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech, religion, and thought.

(July 26, 1945, partial summary)

Japanese casualties in World War II:

Deaths of soldiers: approx. 2.3 million

Deaths of civilians approx. 800,000

(Ministry of Health and Welfare data)

Japanese military deaths include Korean and Taiwanese military casualties, about 50,000.

Many Koreans were also exposed to radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Many people have become ill or developed cancer as a result of radiation. Many of them developed the disease decades later.

Japan's Surrender: The Soviet Union violated the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and invaded Manchuria, South Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands after August 9. As Japan retreated, the pioneers who had settled in Manchuria were left behind and were attacked by the Soviet forces and the Chinese people. Some children were separated from their immediate families and were raised by the Chinese. Also, some 600,000 Japanese soldiers were captured. About 600,000 Japanese soldiers were interned in Siberia as prisoners of war and forced to work for a long period of time, resulting in many casualties.

Declaration of the end: In the midst of this situation, the Japanese government worked to confirm the continuation of the Emperor System until the very end. On August 14, the government finally decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration, and on the following day, August 15, Emperor Showa announced Japan's surrender to the people through a radio broadcast. Thus, World War II ended with deep scars, including tens of millions of casualties, especially a large number of civilian casualties.

Information in the Collection of Materials: The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a uranium bomb. Some researchers suggest that the U.S. dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a local experiment.

The Atomic Bomb and My Sister:

After a few days of seeing each other again, we cried and hugged each other to make sure we were safe, but then my father, mother, brother, and sister died of atomic bomb sickness one after the other every other week, I longed for my mother, called out her name, ate nothing for days, had nosebleeds and vomited blood from my mouth all day long, and still my life was unbroken,

The sister suffered and struggled as long as she could. She cried when a canned tangerine she scooped with a spoon into her mouth stuck in her throat, and she died in a little over a month.

(Fumiko Nakahiro, "Burnt Like a Leaf")

Damage in Hiroshima

Dead: 118,661 people

Missing 3,677 people

Seriously injured: 35,524

Slightly injured: 48,606

Population around 350,000

55,000 houses burned down

6,820 destroyed houses

2,290 houses half burned down

3,750 houses half destroyed

Damage in Nagasaki

73,884 people killed

74,909 injured

120,820 people affected

Population around 270,000

11,574 houses burned down

1,326 destroyed houses

5509 houses half burned down

18,409 houses half destroyed

("Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-bomb Disasters," etc.)

After effects: In the five years following the atomic bombings, the death toll in Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached approximately 200,000 and 140,000, respectively. Approximately 300,000 Japanese Hibakusha are still suffering today.

Foreign Hibakusha: A Korean newspaper reported the death of a Korean woman who was exposed to the atomic bomb in Hiroshima when she was 5 years old, and that her family is suffering from aftereffects (December 1967).

The Soviet Union declares war on Japan: In February 1945, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan under a secret agreement concluded by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference. Since Japan had concluded the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war caught Japan by surprise. One hour after the declaration of war, Soviet forces invaded Manchuria, Korea, the Kuril Islands, and South Sakhalin.

The Tragedy of the Soviet Entry into the War: When the Soviet forces attacked, the Japanese army fled, leaving the Japanese residents behind. About 180,000 of the approximately 1,550,000 people who had been there died by the time they were repatriated. In addition, 600,000 Japanese soldiers were interned in Siberia, and more than 60,000 died of starvation and disease, as well as forced labor in railroad construction.

The second atomic bomb: Nagasaki was the site of the atomic bombing (October

1945), and the plutonium bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. There were approximately 12,000 to 3,000 Koreans, 650 Chinese, and 200 other foreigners in Nagasaki at the time, and it is estimated that several thousand people died in the bombing.

Who is this boy?: In Nagasaki, they were still carrying bodies one after the other. Carts were heading to the burning area. ...An attendant wearing a large white mask grabbed the bodies by the hands and feet from the cart, unloaded them, and threw them into the fire with great force. The body burst into flames and burned up. That was the end. ...

A boy of about 10 years old came to the burning place. His small body was emaciated and he was barefoot in tattered clothes. A little boy, no more than two years old, was strapped to the boy's back. The child appeared to be sleeping, and there were no burn marks anywhere on his body.

What was he doing in the grill?: ...The boy walks to the edge of the grill and stops there. He is unperturbed by the hot air that rises from the grill. The attendant lowers the infant on his back and places him on the blazing fire at his feet. Soon, the sizzling sound of burning fat reaches my ears. The flames flared up with such intensity that they flushed the face of the boy as he stood there.

How does a boy feel when he sees his dead brother off?: ...The boy, whose back had become rounded as if dejected, quickly straightened up again. I could not look away from him. The boy continued to stare ahead, in a posture of attention. He never once

looked down at his brother who was being burned. He looked away from his brother with the same splendid erect and immovable posture that a soldier would have adopted.

What is the boy staring at and thinking about?:

This photo was taken by Joe O'Donnell, an American military photographer. O'Donnell went into Nagasaki in 1945 after the atomic bomb was dropped and captured the devastation with his camera. Through the viewfinder of my camera, I watched the grief-stricken faces of those who could not even cry. ...But without being able to speak to him, I simply clicked the shutter again. Suddenly he turned and walked away, his back straight and looking straight ahead. Without looking back once more. ...My heart ached for the people I had seen all day. Where will that boy go and why will he live?

(All of the above are from Joe O'Donnell (photo), Jennifer Holdrich (interview), and Toyoko Hiraoka (translation), "Unofficial Records of a Japanese American Military Photographer in the Trunk,")

Americans Who Stood at Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

In September 1945, Joe O'Donnell landed in Japan. O'Donnell's assignment was to photograph Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as other war-devastated cities in Japan. This photograph of a boy in Nagasaki was also taken at that time.

Shocked by the devastation of Japan's former enemies, O'Donnell left Japan in March 1946 and put the photographs he had taken in Japan in a trunk, which he did not open for about 45 years.

He decided to face photography once again and

held exhibitions in the U.S. in 1990 and in Japan in 1992. Since then, he has continued to give lectures and hold photo exhibitions, arguing that the atomic bombings were a mistake. While O'Donnell's activities have been praised as "an act of courage," he has been criticized by those who believe that the atomic bombings were justified. Mr. O'Donnell passed away in August 2007 while continuing his efforts to convey the tragedy of the atomic bombings.

Day of Defeat, Day of Liberation: On August 14, Japan decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration and surrender, and on August 15, the people of Japan were informed of Japan's defeat through the Emperor's radio broadcast.

August 15, the day the Japanese people faced the war (A 17-year-old male substitute teacher at a national school): He went to the post office to listen to the important broadcast at noon. Today's broadcast would be a declaration of war against the Soviet Union. Or perhaps it was Prime Minister Suzuki's encouragement for a decisive battle on the mainland. He thought so. Soon it was noon. After "Kimigayo," he heard the voice of the Emperor of Japan. It was not a declaration of war against the Soviet Union or an exhortation to complete the war, but, on the contrary, an imperial rescript to end the war. It was a surrender. He could not believe his ears. His heart palpitated. He was so excited that he couldn't believe his ears. (Many staff members had come to the school, but none of them spoke.

(Horubu Shuppan "History of Japan 8")

August 15, the square in front of the Imperial Palace, some Japanese citizens were seen ranting to the Emperor about their defeat.

Nakanishiki in the overcoming division (September 2): On board the U.S. battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The center right of the picture is the Japanese representative.

Chinese people rejoicing over the end of the long war with Japan.

People rejoicing over the end of the war and liberation from colonialism

Liberated political prisoners and citizens of Seoul

August 15 in the Korean capital: Namdaemun Street was filled with white Korean clothes, and here and there the flag of "Tomoe" (Korean flag), the U.S. flag, British, Chinese, and Soviet flags. The crowd cried out "long live Korea," "long live Korea," "long live Korea," "long live Korea," "long live Korea," "long live Korea," "long live Korea, University students, junior high school students, female students, and white-robed people were making noise like a long snake, holding up banners saying "Independence of Korea," "People's Republic of Korea," and so on, (Atsunori Kawamura, "Diary in the Summer of 1945")

Public Opinion on the Atomic Bombings: Controversy in the U.S. In 1994, the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum attempted to exhibit materials that concretely showed the damage caused by the atomic bombing. In

response, a controversy raged
in the U.S.

American veteran's story:(The Smithsonian Air and Space Museum's exhibit (emphasized) too much what happened to the civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and too little about why we had to get involved in the war in the first place. ...The Japanese are pitiless in their warfare. They don't even think of people as people, ...Kamikaze suicide attackers shoot back like flies, but they still come at you.

(Hearing the atomic bombing)
Oh, God, it's finally over, I think the atomic bombing was worth it, even if it only saved one American life.

American citizens: "As far as the slaughter of innocent civilians is concerned, my heart also aches for the 2,400 people who were killed at Pearl Harbor", "I don't think there is much difference between the atomic bombings and the attack on Pearl Harbor in the sense that innocent people were all killed".

(NHK News Reporting Team, "The Atomic Bomb Controversy in the U.S.")

The view of people in China and Southeast Asia: The atomic bombings hastened the independence of the colonies.

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Argument that the atomic bombings were unjustified:

As of August 1945, the Japanese military was short of troops, oil, and food, and Japan's surrender was imminent even without dropping the atomic bombs.

The total number of civilians killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was about 800,000, which was an atrocity.

The U.S. only wanted to test the power of the atomic bombs. There was no need to surrender.

If the U.S. wanted to hasten Japan's surrender, it could have dropped the bombs into the seas near Japan to show their power. It would have been enough to warn Japan in advance.

The atomic bombs were dropped to scare the Soviet Union into favorable postwar treatment.

Judgment by the International Court of Justice (July 1996):The threat or use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law applicable to armed conflicts in general, and humanitarian law in particular. However, no definite conclusion can be drawn as to whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons in extreme self-defense situations, where the very existence of a state is at stake, is legal or illegal.

Incarceration of Japanese Americans

The attack on Pearl Harbor caused unrest in the United States. German and Italian Americans survived, but Japanese Americans of Japanese descent were forced into internment camps.

Japanese American internment camp at Manzanar, California, U.S.A.

About 10,000 people of Japanese descent were interned.