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Bureaucratic Politics and the Foreign Policy Process: The Missing Element Of Process

Paul D. Hoyt
West Virginia University

This article reviews the recent resurgence in interest in Bureaucratic Politics, especially with the publication of the second edition of Essence of Decision (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). The paper presents a review of both Allison and his critics and argues that both sides in the debate have over-emphasized the issue of the structure of policymaking. A set of scope conditions for determining the applicability of the bureaucratic politics approach are presented and used to argue that the Cuban missile crisis was a poor choice of case for evaluating Allison's argument. The paper presents a discussion on the role of process in bureaucratic politics, arguing that process has been neglected. Some ideas on how to better incorporate process elements in the approach are considered.

INTRODUCTION

The release of the second edition of Essence of Decision (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) is likely to spur a renewed interest in the study of bureaucratic politics as an explanatory framework for the foreign policy process. The new statement of the approach comes after several high profile critiques have appeared in such journals as the American Political Science Review, International Security, and World Politics (Ben-

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In this environment it is appropriate to ask where bureaucratic politics stand as an explanation of foreign policy.

It is commonly recognized among analysts of foreign policy that the interpersonal interactions and dynamics of the decision-making group are key to understanding the policy process and the eventual policy output (Vertzberger, 1990; Hermann, 1993). Paradoxically, despite the awareness of the prevalence of the small group in foreign policy decision-making, there are still very few conceptual frameworks in the foreign policy realm for describing the policy process in foreign policy. The most visible and elaborated framework remains that of bureaucratic politics as described in Graham Allison's classic text, *Essence of Decision* (1971; Allison and Zelikow, 1999).

However, neither Allison nor other proponents and critics of bureaucratic politics have done an adequate job in explicating what the process of foreign policy decision-making entails. Instead, the debate has tended to focus on what is the true *structure* of the decision making body. The emphasis on structure

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2The conceptual differences between the two editions are minimal regarding the presentation of bureaucratic politics as an explanatory framework. The fundamental insights and components of the model are maintained with only slight alterations. Thus, the second edition can best be viewed as a update of the original, not a major revision of that volume.

Based on his work as transcriber (with Ernest May) of *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1997), the addition of Zelikow as co-author added greatly to the case material on the Cuban missile crisis. The other major update concerns the review of the relevant material on such research areas as game theory, institutionalism, and epistemic communities, and does much to bring the literature review up-to-date.

3Of course, not all foreign policy decisions fall under the rubric of bureaucratic politics. Other interpretations, such as groupthink (Janis, 1982), predominant leaders (Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan, 1989), and various voting schemes (Hermann, 1993; Vertzberger, 1990), also need to be acknowledged. However, the prevalence of these alternatives has not been demonstrated and their impact on the literature has not matched that of bureaucratic politics.
has resulted in a long, and so far fruitless, debate that has in many ways paralyzed the analysis of bureaucratic politics.

I argue that there is a need to move beyond the current impasse on bureaucratic politics. One requirement for moving on is a set of explicit scope conditions that identify under what structural circumstances the insights of bureaucratic politics are likely to pertain. The second requirement is a better awareness of the types of existing process-focused research that can be incorporated into the bureaucratic politics approach to shed additional light on the foreign policy decision-making process.

GRAHAM ALLISON AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

A reconciliation of Allison and his critics may, in the end, be possible. Fundamental to the reconciliation is the need to understand the bureaucratic politics perspective not as a general theory of international relations or a comprehensive model of foreign policy, but instead as a depiction of the causes of intragroup conflict and its possible resolution within the policy process.4

I argue three points in answer to the “Allison paradox”: How can the bureaucratic politics approach be so influential yet so widely criticized? The first point is that both the proponents and opponents of Allison are, in a sense, right. Allison’s Model III traces a perspective that is intuitively appealing and appears to portray the reality of political decision-making. Yet, many of the specific propositions derived from Model III, and their application to the Cuban missile crisis, fail both logical and empirical evaluation.

The second point is that the failings of Allison’s undertaking have too readily led to a rejection of the overall enterprise.

4The use of the term “conflict” should be viewed as synonymous with “disagreement” or “dissent.”
Instead, a middle ground needs to be identified. Allison has claimed too much for Model III while the critics have been too sweeping in their condemnation. What is needed is a more specific outline of the bureaucratic politics approach that states the scope conditions under which the model may be expected to be of value.

Third, both Allison’s followers and his detractors have neglected a central element of Allison’s work. Frequently the debate has centered on specific aspects of the model, such as the “real” role of the president and whether roles determine policy positions, preferences, and status. The more significant, though underemphasized, contribution of Allison is in identifying the value of analyzing the process of conflict resolution in a shared-power, mixed-motive decision making group. While Allison and Zelikow do provide for one procedure, that of bargaining and the “pulling and hauling” of politics (1999, 302), “pulling and hauling” by no means exhausting the range of possibilities. Identifying and examining the mechanisms of intra-group conflict resolution constitutes a fruitful direction for the further study of the foreign policy process.

Refocusing the debate on Allison allows us to avoid over-emphasizing some of the more marginal aspects in his approach and, instead, to take from *Essence of Decision* some valuable insights with which to extend and re-invigorate bureaucratic politics as a field of research.

**THE DEBATE OVER THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLICY MAKING GROUP IN ALLISON AND HIS CRITICS**

Since the initial publication of *Essence of Decision*, there has been a growth industry in arguing the merits and completeness of Allison’s work. Model III, the organizational (bureaucratic) politics approach, has, by far, received the most attention. The central argument is as follows: “The name of the
game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood according to a third conceptual model, not as organization outputs but as results of bargaining games" (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 255). Several debates have subsequently arisen over the accuracy of this interpretation.

A recurrent debate focuses on the role of the president in decision-making. Model III proponents maintain that power in such policymaking circles is diffuse with no one player (in this case, the president) possessing a monopoly on the authority to decide (Allison, 1971; Destler, 1972; Allison and Zelikow, 1999). Instead, the president is portrayed as a "president-in-sneakers" (Neustadt, 1960) seeking to persuade and reconcile the various factions of opinion within the decision making group. Acting in this capacity, the president attempts to engineer an acceptable decision.

Critics argue that the president is not "a first among equals" but is instead a "king" with the power—some would say the moral obligation (Krasner, 1971)—to make choices and structure the decision-making environment according to his own desires. In this way, power in the decision-making circles is not diffuse, but is concentrated at the highest level (Krasner, 1971; Art, 1973; Perlmutter, 1974; Bendor and Hammond, 1992).

A second debate revolves around the degree of opinion consensus among the members of the decision making group. For Allison and his followers, dissent and disagreement among the various bureaucratic actors is virtually inescapable (Destler, 1972; Allison, 1999). The existence of numerous decision makers, each uniquely influenced by various pressures (such as bureaucratic role, constituencies, personality, and so forth) inevitably produces different viewpoints on an issue. Believing that their cause and interpretation is correct, members will seek to have their positions adopted as the final group output.
Critics of the bureaucratic politics perspective have argued that the members of the president’s inner circle are not likely to be as contrary as Allison suggests, since their inclusion and continuation in office depends upon presidential sufferance. They have been brought into the government by the president who has selected them because of their common views. Possessing a similar mind-set, these individuals are not likely to advocate ideas contrary to those of the president (Art, 1973). If dissent were to arise, it is argued that it would quickly dissipate as the dissenter moves to avoid accusations of disloyalty. Therefore, in the end consensus will be the order of the day (Krasner, 1971; Perlmutter, 1974; Freedman, 1976; Bendor and Hammond, 1992).5

The third debate involves the notion of role effects. Usually the debate centers on the accuracy of the view that “where you stand depends upon where you sit.” Sometimes referred to as “Mile’s Law,” the proposition holds that the issue position of bureaucratic actors is a function of their bureaucratic role. The congruence between roles and positions is put forth to account for the range of policy options preferred by the various actors. Since each of the actors holds a unique bureaucratic role, with various attendant pressures and interests, each actor comes to perceive the issue in different ways and to advocate different solutions accordingly (Destler, 1972; Allison and Zelikow, 1999).

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5Several related points should be considered here:

1. Intragroup conflict could be over goals, means, timing, or implementation. Thus, there are many opportunities for conflict to arise other than just over the policy goal.

2. Allison applies his model to a presidential system where power is not likely to be so equally shared (still, there could be competition between advisors over access to the ear of the president). Application in other areas may require that we adjust our applications of bureaucratic politics to focus more on political situations where power is more evenly shared (cabinet systems and oligarchies for example). Doing so is likely to be more fruitful and it has the added benefit of extending the utility of bureaucratic politics by making it less of an Ameri-centric perspective.
This "bureaucratic determinism" (Cottam, 1977) has been attacked repeatedly as both simplistic and inaccurate (Krasner, 1971). For example, the inherent preferences of some roles, such as the vice-president, are argued to be unknown. More to the point, efforts to rigorously study the connection between bureaucratic role and policy position have failed to find any tie (Smith, 1984-1985; Vertzberger, 1990; Rhodes, 1994).

Of course, few analysts ever argued for such a rigid application of this rule. Allison himself acknowledges in *Essence of Decision* that an actor's position on an issue is influenced by many things such as national security interests, organizational interests, domestic political interests, and personal interests (1999, 298). In doing so, Allison opens himself up to the subsequent criticism that, by allowing for so many influences, it is impossible to accurately predict when, and to what extent, organizational interests will determine the actor's position (Art, 1973; Welch, 1992).

In the end, there may be less to these debates than meets the eye. I argue that the bureaucratic politics perspective may prove useful as an analytic device only when three scope conditions are evident. They are

(1) Decision making must take place in a group setting.

(2) No one actor within the group may be predominant such that his/her opinion is sufficient to decide the issue.

(3) The decision must be a case of split opinion (as to goals, means, timing, etc.) among the central political actors.

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6 In the 1999 edition, Allison and Zelikow are careful to reject the "deterministic" version of this proposition though he does feel that a person's stance is still "strongly influenced" by their position (1999, 307).
These scope conditions indicate the requisite structural characteristics of the policymaking group for the applicability of the bureaucratic polities framework. When all three circumstances are not met by the case at hand, then bureaucratic politics has little to say about the policy process and alternative depictions need to be considered.

Limiting the applicability of bureaucratic politics through these scope conditions leads to two conclusions. First, the Cuban missile crisis was, ironically, a poor choice for the study of bureaucratic politics. A close reading of Allison’s own presentation of the case suggests that scope conditions 1 and 2 were not sufficiently met for the insights of the bureaucratic politics approach to be useful (Krasner 1971; Bendor and Hammond 1992; Welch 1992).

Scope condition 2 requires that no single actor be in a position to decide the issue at hand. Much emphasis has been made of the group decision-making aspect of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) during the missile crisis. Yet, as Allison unwittingly demonstrates in his case study of the blockade decision, John F. Kennedy was the final, and unchallengeable, decision maker. The ExCom had no decision-making role and was, at best, an advisory body.

As Allison (1971; 1999) describes the events of the crisis, four main options were identified for dealing with the Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba: do nothing, undertake a diplomatic approach to the Soviets, initiate a blockade (quarantine) of Cuba, or launch an air strike against the Soviet installations. Despite some early support within the ExCom, the first two options were never given serious consideration because “The President had rejected this course from the outset” (Sorensen, 1965, as quoted in Allison, 1971, 202; italics added). The fourth option, the air strike, was initially favored by a number of members of the ExCom including Kennedy himself. What moved Kennedy
off this position to instead favor the blockade was not bargaining or pulling and hauling within the ExCom but instead the information that an air strike could not be surgical. According to Allison, with this information the air strike became a "null option" (1971, 205). Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a proponent of the air strike option, met with Kennedy on Thursday (October 18) and tried to convince Kennedy to support the air strike: "The President listened to his argument, but Acheson left with no question in his mind about where the buck stopped" (Allison, 1971, 207).

Kennedy did not attend the next two ExCom meetings. When he did attend an ExCom meeting on Thursday evening, he "had already moved from the air-strike to the blockade camp" (Sorensen, 1965 as quoted in Allison, 1971, 205). As Allison puts it, "That evening, Kennedy informed the entire group of his decision in favor of the blockade" (Allison, 1971, p.207; italics added).

The final decision was made on Saturday, October 20, in a meeting of the National Security Council. The remaining element in the decision was whether the blockade should be paired with an offer to negotiate on U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy, plus the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba or with an ultimatum demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles or face air strikes (two other options—an air strike without the blockade and a blockade with no other action—were also presented) (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 344). After hearing the various presentations, "President Kennedy first sharply ruled out the blockade-negotiate variant... He then ruled in favor of the blockade-ultimatum option..." (Allison, 1999, 344-345, italics added).

In brief, Kennedy was not beholden to the opinions or votes of the members of the ExCom. In the end, President Kennedy, on his own, eliminated three of the four initial options from consideration and then decided on the form of the blockade. In
doing so, Kennedy was acting as a predominant leader in the policy process. Unfortunately for Allison’s case, bureaucratic politics, with its emphasis on intra-group bargaining (the “pulling” and “hauling” of politics Allison identified) did not make this decision—Kennedy did.

As for Scope condition 1 that the decision be made in a group setting, the ExCom was such a setting and it was characterized by differences of opinion among the participants (Scope condition 3). However, as previously discussed, the principal actor was John F. Kennedy. Thus, the critical question is where was he during the decision making process. In fact, Kennedy appears to have had little direct involvement in the ExCom deliberations. The crisis broke on Tuesday morning (October 16). On Wednesday the 17th, during the height of the ExCom debate, Kennedy was absent, having flown to Connecticut for a campaign commitment. That evening he did meet with Robert Kennedy and Sorensen, but not the full ExCom. On Thursday (October 18), Kennedy did not attend any ExCom meetings until the evening session where he announced his decision (Allison, 1971, 203-205).

Thus, the critical decision of implementing a blockade of Cuba was not made in a group setting and was not made by a group of actors sharing power. It was made by Kennedy, aware of the ExCom, but not controlled by it.7

The second conclusion is that when appropriate cases of bureaucratic politics are found, the crucial concern should not be over whether the role determines a player’s position, preference, or power. Instead, the focus should be on the collective decision

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7The failure of the Cuban missile crisis, as a single case, to satisfy all three conditions does not mean that the bureaucratic politics perspective itself should be abandoned. The research challenge is to find cases where these three conditions do apply and then examine the utility of the bureaucratic politics approach.
making process under such conditions and how the divergent positions are reconciled such that a policy output emerges.

In brief, these three scope conditions specify, and limit, the “structure” within which bureaucratic politics is operational. Doing so serves to resolve some of the issues that have long divided Allison and his critics. One position is not right and the other wrong, they simply are talking about different structural conditions.

Within a better-specified structure, however, the more critical, and under appreciated, task is to grasp the “process” through which the different actor’s positions are reconciled in order to make group action possible (Rosati, 1981).

**PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS TO RESOLVE INTRA-GROUP CONFLICT**

The argument so far has illustrated the extent of prior efforts to define the “structure” of bureaucratic politics. If we accept that bureaucratic politics will have variable utility based upon whether the scope conditions are satisfied, we can move beyond those debates and concentrate on other aspects of the perspective.

A critical element in Allison is the need for some process for intragroup conflict resolution. Of course, there is no certainty that any particular group will be characterized by factionalism or dissensus. In that case, a different set of group dynamics may apply and effect the final decision. However, there are likely to be a set of cases where no quick consensus emerges among the group members. In fact, foreign policy issues, which are commonly ambiguous and complex in nature, are particularly susceptible to alternative interpretations and hence, policy preferences (Vertzberger, 1990; Hermann, 1993). The bureaucratic politics approach is most usefully applied under such circumstances.
If this situation, as defined in the scope conditions previously described, pertains, then the insights of bureaucratic politics become relevant. Allison and Zelikow state that the critical question is "How are players' stands, influence, and moves combined to yield governmental decisions and actions?" (1999, 300). The actual process of opinion resolution is achieved, say Allison and Zelikow, through bargaining whereby "each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception of national, organizational, group, and personal interests" (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 302; see also Neustadt, 1960; Destler, 1972). Through the bargaining process the divergent positions reach a policy "resultant" that satisfies the actors to some degree, although the final output may not be any one actor's favored position or even a policy foreseen by any member.

Unfortunately, Allison and Zelikow provide very little insight into the actual process that takes place. What does "bargaining," "pulling" and "hauling" entail? What behaviors constitute this process? They acknowledge that "accurate accounts of the bargaining that yielded a resolution of the issue" are quite rare (1999, 312), and, they say, that developing a method of reliable process reconstruction constitutes "this model's most pressing need" (1971, 181).

A close examination of Allison's presentation of the case reveals very little in terms of the actual decision making process. At most, Allison provides evidence of the various positions presented within the ExCom. What is lacking is a detailed discussion of the various forms of bargaining or pulling and hauling that are the central dynamic element in the model. The actual policymaking process within the ExCom or between the ExCom and the President receives scant attention.

As evidence of the workings of the policy process, glancing references to "bargaining" and "pulling and hauling"
will not suffice. More concrete and systematic descriptions of the actions and interactions of the actors are required. Similarly, most critiques—focused on other issues—have also not provided much in the way of elaboration or alternatives. The absence of elaboration has resulted in a certain gap in the discussion. Characterizing the process as one simply of “bargaining” overlooks much of the diversity and nuance of decision-making. The diversity has great implications for the policy output chosen and deserves attention.

In the next section I briefly review a number of areas of research that provide some insight into the fuller activities of the policy process. Subsequent research into the foreign policy process may be well served by incorporating these, plus, undoubtedly other, elements into the analysis.

There have been efforts (particularly in public administration, social psychology, and political science) to identify the various processes of intragroup conflict resolution. In such “political-bureaucratic” situations, where opinions are divided and power is shared among the group members acting as advocates (Meltsner, 1990; Rosenthal et al., 1991; Bryson and Crosby, 1992), a number of potential actions may take place.

Though not developed by Allison, the closest set of process concepts to Allison’s “bargaining” is that of compromise among the group members. Vertzberger (1990) describes three types of compromise:

(1) Content compromise involves the adoption of a third alternative as a substitute for the conflicting positions. This new position may “split the difference” of the original positions or it may constitute an entirely new approach.

(2) Temporal compromise is when one member yields on one issue with the understanding that the other member will similarly yield on a future issue. This form of “log-rolling” requires an ex-
pectation that the member's interaction is reiterative.

(3) Interissue compromise occurs when the disagreement involves multiple issues simultaneously. A group member may compromise on those issues for which the salience level is low in exchange for compliance by the other group member(s) on the issue(s) of higher salience. Such "vote-trading" does not require a reiterative aspect.

Another response, commonly portrayed as the antithesis of bureaucratic politics, is consensus seeking among the group membership. Under this generic argument, positional differences either do not emerge or are quickly stifled, allowing the group to arrive at a common decision in the virtual absence of conflict. As noted earlier, several of Allison's critics argue that decisional conflict will not occur because the group members are all appointed by the president and thus will work to maintain group harmony out of shared beliefs, loyalty, and/or fear (what Raven, 1990, calls "coercive power").

Other dynamics that may lead to a quick consensus include the rapid emergence of an "operative consensus" where, despite underlying differences in reasoning, a single operational policy is favored by the group members (Vertzberger, 1990); an acceptance of the views held by a large majority or the higher status members of the group (Vertzberger, 1990); or the functioning of a certain personality type that favors conformity even at the expense of personal judgment (Asch, 1951). A more extreme, and pathological, version of this pattern of consensus achievement is well-described in the "groupthink" literature which argues that group members may engage in conformity and consensus seeking to such an extent that careful analysis and
vigilant decision making do not occur (Janis, 1982; Hermann, 1993).

When differences among the group members are persistent, other forms of resolution may be used. Group members may engage in persuasive argumentation (informational power) in an effort to convince others to adopt a different perspective (Maoz, 1990; Raven, 1990). In this version, the logical power of the position provides the means of gaining the acceptance of other group members until one position emerges as the consensus choice.

Other forms of social power may also be used to influence other members. Raven (1990) refers to such influences as “referent power” (calling on feelings of similarity among the members); “legitimate power” (calling on the structural relation between the actors) and “reward power” (promises of benefits from compliance) through which group members seek to gain the adherence of one another to a preferred policy position. While there is no certainty that the “best” policy will be adopted using such mechanisms, consensus is sought and may be achieved.

Of course, there is no requirement that a group arrive at a consensus position in order for there to be a decisional output. Oftentimes, disagreements will persist even after prolonged discussion. To break such deadlocks a voting process may be used (Vertzberger, 1990; Hermann, 1993). Relying on voting schemes allows making decisions and taking actions even in the absence of group consensus. The particulars of the voting arrangement can play a large role in determining the outcome (Maoz, 1990).

All of these processes share one common element: resolution is achieved through some interactive mechanism within the small group. Analysis of the policy making process also needs to recognize that resolution may also be sought through the less overt mechanism of political manipulation. Ma-
Manipulation involves a different response to the problem of deciding policy in opinion divided decision-making groups. By manipulating a group’s composition, information flows, and/or processes, actors may be able to push the decision in a favored direction. Manipulation is argued to take three possible forms: informational, procedural, and compositional. Informational manipulation occurs when a group member (or members) attempts to alter the preferences of another member(s) by selectively presenting, withholding, or interpreting information to the group (Maoz, 1990; Meltsner, 1990). Such control of information allows the manipulator to appear more knowledgeable about the issue than the other group members, and thus make use of “expert power” (Raven 1990). Manipulators of information may also ignore discrepant information, “bury” or “highlight” certain information, or “frame” the issue in self-serving ways (Vertzberger, 1990).

Procedural manipulation involves an attempt by a group member to use the existing practices and processes of the group to further his/her policy preference. Practices such as agenda-setting, strategic voting, determining the operative decision rule, and the “salami tactic” are all procedural manipulations designed to structure the decision environment to advance the manipulator’s position (Riker, 1986; Lynn, 1987; Maoz, 1990; Bryson and Crosby, 1992).

Compositional manipulation entails manipulating the membership of the group such that supporters of the manipulator’s position are included and accorded high status while dissenters are either diminished in status or even removed entirely from the decision-making group. A primary benefit of manipula-

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8 The determination of success is a difficult issue. For this paper, success is considered an increase in the influence a manipulator has over the policy decision. Therefore, success should not necessarily be equated with a “high quality” decision or with group satisfaction.
tion techniques is that they operate outside the social realm and thus may achieve success without entailing the difficult process of getting others to consciously alter their preferences (Riker, 1986; Maoz 1990).

The potential for manipulation, voting practices, power plays, and/or consensus seeking within a decision making group demonstrates the existence of alternative process behaviors to the limited bargaining notion put forth by Allison.

CONCLUSIONS

Research into the process of foreign policy creation has lagged behind that in the domestic arena. A portion of the explanation for the lag lies in the manner in which the most visible foreign policymaking perspective, bureaucratic politics, has been treated. The literature on bureaucratic politics has focused on what appear to be sharp divisions between its proponents and opponents on several critical dimensions: What is the actual role of the president in the decision making process? And to what degree can the decision-making environment be characterized as heterogeneous regarding the policy preferences of the central players? Much attention has also been given to the notion that bureaucratic role determines a player's position on the issue.

Absolutist positions on these debates are neither empirically justifiable nor theoretically helpful. A more valuable endeavor is to assess the scope conditions under which the bureaucratic politics approach to the foreign policy process is most applicable. Previous debates over Model III in *Essence of Decision* may thus be better viewed as more a matter of the degree to which the Cuban missile crisis actually meets the scope conditions of the bureaucratic politics approach than a debate over the utility of the approach itself.

It has been argued here that the focus of the debate has centered largely on the *structure* of the decision-making envi-
ronment. What need to receive more explicit attention are the processes of reconciling the divergent views among the actors within a shared-power setting.

Further research on the process of intragroup conflict resolution will serve to better inform the bureaucratic politics approach and enhance its utility as a tool for the study of the foreign policy decision-making process. Emphasizing questions of structure over process has led to too ready a dismissal of the bureaucratic politics approach, which, if properly amended, still offers powerful analytic value and inspiration for a new generation of process-oriented research.

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