Campbell v. Campbell: An Examination of the Original And Revised Theories of Surge and Decline

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One of the most consistent patterns in American politics is the loss of congressional seats suffered by the president's party in midterm elections. This phenomenon can have important, even profound, implications for the operation of American government. Unsurprisingly, then, considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining midterm decline. This research examines two of the competing theories, the "original" and "revised" theories of surge and decline proposed by Angus and James Campbell, respectively. I outline hypotheses following from each theory and subject them to a series of empirical tests using data from the American National Election Studies' (NES) panel surveys of 1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-94. My findings generally favor the original version of the theory.
midterm contest since 1862. In 1994, the losses suffered by President Clinton’s Democratic Party led to the first Republican majority in the chamber in forty years. The 1994 case illustrates the potential implications of the midterm decline phenomenon. The Republican majority entered the 104th Congress with much of its membership united behind the nationalized campaign message of the policy package known as the *Contract with America*. They intended to lead the way in formulating legislation, forcing Clinton to react to their agenda. Clearly, relations between the legislative and executive branches were likely to become more strained, and this indeed did come to pass, with the budget deadlock of 1995 representing the peak of the antagonism.

While the 1994 case demonstrates the profound implications for American government that the phenomenon of midterm decline may entail, it should be noted that many instances of off-year losses have not led to a change in the majority party in the House and the introduction of divided government. Nevertheless, midterm losses for the president’s party will always have potentially important consequences. They can affect inter-branch relations and presidential legislative success since members of the president’s party vote in accordance with his desire more than do members of the opposition (Aldrich 1995; Fleisher and Bond 2000). In addition, the composition of congressional committees will invariably change in the aftermath of midterm elections due to the necessary replacement of departing members. Finally, the very existence of the midterm loss pattern may exert influence over which individuals choose to run for office in the first place.

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1The 1902 elections also represent an exception to the strict pattern of midterm seat loss. In the elections of that year, the Republicans gained 9 seats in the House of Representatives. However, this gain actually represents a relative loss in comparison to the 25 seats gained by the Democrats in that year. Increases by both parties were made possible by an increase in the total number of seats in the wake of the 1900 census.
Because politicians are strategic actors (Jacobson and Kernell 1983), the party not controlling the presidency may field stronger candidates in midterm elections.

Given the wide range of possible implications of midterm losses, it is not surprising that political scientists have devoted considerable attention to the phenomenon. Research on midterm decline typically involves aggregate analyses attempting to explain the magnitude of the presidential party’s seat change (loss) and to forecast outcomes of impending midterm elections. At the risk of oversimplification, I group the literature into two major categories, coattails and referenda theory. Both emphasize national-level variables in contrast to the focus on local variables such as candidate assessments and campaign spending found in most general analyses of congressional elections (e.g. Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Gronke 2000; Herrnson 2000; Jacobson 2001; Krasno 1994).

Scholars of the coattails tradition point to the influence of presidential vote choice on voters’ decisions over congressional candidates. Because some citizens vote for candidates of their preferred presidential candidate’s party in other races on the ballot, the president carries some of his fellow partisans into office with him. Midterm elections remove the possibility of the presidential coattail effect, and the president’s party consequently suffers. The magnitude of their losses will depend on the strength of the coattail effect in the preceding presidential election and the “exposure” of the party (Born 1990; Campbell 1960; J. Campbell 1985, 1993, 1997; Gaddie 1997; Hinckley 1967; Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986; Waterman, Oppenheimer, and Stimson 1991).

Tufte’s (1975) groundbreaking work on the role of economic conditions and presidential popularity set the stage for a spate of alternative models falling under the heading of referenda theory. These models envision public assessments of the president’s per-
formance as the primary determinant of his party's fate in midterm elections. Following in Tufte's footsteps, many scholars focus on economic indicators, most commonly change in real disposable income per capita, as the basis for the referendum (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Bloom and Price 1975; Erikson 1988; Hibbs 1987; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1984, 1992; Rudalevige 2001; Tufte 1975, 1978). As mentioned above, Tufte's (1975) model also included presidential popularity as an explanatory variable, and several subsequent works have expanded on this (Kernell 1977; Lau 1982, 1985).

Debate about what drives the phenomenon of midterm losses remains unresolved. Even within the two more encompassing categories, disagreement exists over causal mechanisms and key independent variables. Rather than test the relative merits of the two broad theoretical perspectives, however, I highlight one of the intra-approach debates. Specifically, I examine Angus Campbell's (1960, 1964, 1966) "original" theory of surge and decline and the "revised" version offered by James Campbell (1987, 1993).² In doing so, my focus is not on explaining and predicting midterm losses, but rather on individual-level behavior.

SURGE AND DECLINE: THE ORIGINAL AND REVISED FORMULATIONS

Original Theory

Angus Campbell's original formulation of surge and decline was an effort to use survey data to provide an individual-level explanation for the regularities of lower turnout in midterm elections and the loss of congressional seats by the president's party.

²Unless otherwise noted, this paper will use Campbell to refer to Angus Campbell and J. Campbell to refer to James Campbell.
In Campbell’s theory, party identification is dominant in determining individuals’ behavior. An attachment to one or the other political party makes it more probable that a citizen will participate in politics and that she will consistently vote for candidates of the same party label. Political interest is also important. Some individuals are more engaged in the political arena than others and are consequently more likely to be regular participants.

Party identification and political interest thus establish a baseline for individual behavior and the phenomenon of surge and decline represents deviations from this baseline caused by short-term political stimuli. These stimuli include policy issues, the candidates involved in a particular contest, and other non-enduring forces. When such stimuli are numerous and powerful, the election can be described as a “high-stimulus” election, while elections in which short-term forces are weaker are considered “low-stimulus.” High-stimulus elections generally have higher levels of turnout as individuals whose levels of political interest and party attachment might not be sufficient to induce participation in low-stimulus contests are drawn into action. These citizens, who only vote when short-term forces are strong, are the “peripheral” voters who constitute the first component of electoral surges.

Some “core” voters also contribute to electoral surges. Because they have stronger party ties and more interest in politics, these individuals participate in all elections and tend to be loyal to their chosen party. Nevertheless, they too are subject to the influence of short-term forces. For some core voters these forces can be potent enough to overcome their underlying dispositions, leading to “defection” from their preferred party in a given election.

It is not sufficient, however, to argue that some elections will induce greater participation and defection due to the strength of their associated short-term stimuli. To account for the regularities

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observed, surge and decline theory must make two additional claims. First, Campbell proposes that presidential elections involve, by nature, significantly higher levels of stimulus than their midterm counterparts. Second, the short-term forces present in presidential years will generally favor one party over the other. As a result, both the partisan division of the peripheral voters participating and the balance of defections by core voters will favor that party. The party benefiting is almost invariably that with the winning presidential candidate, and that party is therefore likely to gain seats in Congress.

Having outlined the logic of partisan surges in presidential years, the decline in midterm elections is quite straightforward. The diminished level of stimulation in these years means that peripheral voters who had participated in the preceding presidential contest will now choose to stay home while core voters will revert to their underlying preferences. With both elements of the surge removed, the presidential party will suffer losses and the result should approximate a longer-term equilibrium or "normal vote" in which each party receives a proportion of the vote commensurate with the proportion of citizens who identify more strongly with that party.

Campbell's (1966) analysis of electoral decline relies on data from a 1956-58 panel study by the Survey Research Center. The majority of his findings are supportive of the theory. The short-term stimuli associated with the presidential campaign of 1956 did seem to stimulate turnout relatively more for Independents than for strong partisans (as shown by the relative shares of these two groups respectively in the voting public in 1956 and 1958). In addition, the influence of short-term forces on the vote choice of peripheral citizens was borne out by the two-to-one margin enjoyed by Eisenhower among such voters in 1956. These short-term forces also appeared to be more powerful for peripheral voters than core voters, as evidenced by lower defection rates.
among the latter group. Furthermore, defection rates in the presidential contest were quite unequal, with Democrats abandoning their candidate far more often than Republicans. Finally, the ability of short-term forces to alter behavior of core voters was seen in the dramatic decline in Democratic defection rates between 1956 and 1958.

Although Campbell’s theory went essentially unchallenged for nearly a decade, it did eventually come under closer scrutiny by other scholars. In addition to the emergence of referenda models, the propositions of surge and decline themselves were increasingly brought into question. The first notable studies showed not only that the sociodemographic composition of midterm and presidential electorates is almost identical, but that these electorates also lack meaningful differences in terms of their partisanship (Arseneau and Wolfinger 1973; Wolfinger, Rosenstone, and McIntosh 1981; Kernell 1977). There is also evidence that defection rates are not necessarily higher in presidential years than in midterm elections (Ornstein et al. 1984). Furthermore, core voters may not be more loyal to their identified party than are peripheral individuals (Cover 1985; Kernell 1977). The lack of greater fidelity by core voters is also implied by aggregate data that show midterm elections to be more volatile than their presidential counterparts (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).

Revised Theory

In response to these findings challenging many of the hypotheses proposed by surge and decline, James Campbell (1987, 1993) formulated a revised version of the theory. Like the original version, J. Campbell’s theory presumes that higher levels of short-term political stimuli associated with presidential elections drive the surge and decline phenomenon. Short-term forces favor the party winning the presidency, resulting in congressional gains
for that party. The subsequent midterm election then brings about a return to normal turnout and vote choice patterns and losses for the party controlling the presidency.

The primary difference between the original and revised theories is in the individual-level processes hypothesized to be at work. J. Campbell proposes that the electoral cycle is a product of variations in the vote choice of Independents and the turnout of partisans. Presuming that strength of partisan identification is positively related to turnout in all elections, J. Campbell claims that Independents will not experience disproportionate (relative to partisans) increases in turnout under the high stimulus conditions of presidential campaigns. Instead, the contribution of this group to surge and decline is the result of their greater support for candidates of the winning presidential party in on-year elections than off-year elections.

The proposed effect of short-term stimuli on partisans is also different. Rather than contributing to the surge by causing some proportion of identifiers of the losing presidential candidate's party to defect, these stimuli are believed to exert influence via turnout effects. Pointing to literature on the effects of cross-pressures (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Zipp 1985; Southwell 1986), J. Campbell argues that "disadvantaged" partisans (i.e. individuals identifying with the party of the losing presidential candidate) are more likely to abstain than defect. In addition to the withdrawal of disadvantaged partisans, the biased short-term stimuli of presidential years create a sense of enthusiasm among "advantaged" partisans, thereby augmenting their participation. Without powerful stimuli favoring one party over

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3It should also be noted that J. Campbell's (1987, 1993) revised theory also entails an attempt to merge surge and decline with referenda approaches by including presidential popularity and economic conditions in his model for midterm election outcomes. More recently (1997), J. Campbell has also incorporated realignment into his model of midterm decline.

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the other, midterm contests lack the strong cross-pressures and reinforcing pressures of on-years. Consequently, partisan turnout levels more closely approximate the proportion of identifiers in the electorate and the presidential party suffers some setbacks.

In his 1987 piece, J. Campbell examines two testable hypotheses that follow from his theory using data from National Election Studies covering the seven election pairs from 1956 to 1982. He finds that partisan representation in the presidential electorate varies directly with the strength of short-term stimuli favoring their party (as measured by the actual partisan division of the presidential vote) and that the presidential vote division of Independents also reflects the strength and direction of short-term forces.

In J. Campbell's most complete formulation (1993), he identifies three types of propositions emerging from the original and revised theories of surge and decline: national, district, and electorate. The propositions of the two theories are identical across the first two categories, and the findings are generally supportive of the notion that short-term political stimuli are an important determinant of congressional candidates' electoral fortunes. It is with regard to the electorate that the two theories diverge. J. Campbell lists six propositions derived from the original theory, two of which diverge from the expectations of his own model. He states those two as follows:

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4The actual wording of the hypotheses (p. 970) is as follows:
(1) Partisans should be present in the presidential electorate in direct proportion to the magnitude of short-term forces favorable to their party.
(2) The division of the independent vote in presidential elections should reflect the magnitude of short-term forces favoring one party over the other.

5The four additional hypotheses are as follows:
Proposition 5: All things being equal, midterm electorates are older than presidential electorates (p. 45).
Proposition 6: All things being equal, midterm electorates are more highly educated than presidential electorates (p. 45).

Note continues on next page.
Proposition 8: All things being equal, voters with a strong party identification compose a larger segment of midterm electorates than of presidential electorates (p. 46).

Proposition 9: Partisan defections from the disadvantaged party (i.e., the party losing the presidential race) in presidential elections are greater than in midterm elections and are proportionate to the short-term forces favoring the president’s party (p. 48).

Using a variety of data covering the years 1952-1990, J. Campbell finds that neither of these propositions is well supported. Instead, the evidence seems to favor the revised theory’s expectations regarding turnout and vote choice.

SURGE AND DECLINE: TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

J. Campbell’s most recent analysis (1997) of midterm decline examines possible additions to his model to help account for the overwhelming losses by Democrats in 1994. Incorporating realignment into the explanation is a significant step. However, the work does not address the electorate propositions that differentiate the original and revised surge and decline theories. Perhaps J. Campbell views the matter as settled. I revisit the debate for two reasons. First, there is a need to outline an explicit list of testable propositions derived from each theory. Second, J. Campbell’s

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*Proposition 7:* All things being equal, voters with a deep and sustained interest in politics compose a larger segment of midterm electorates than of presidential electorates (p. 46).

*Proposition 10:* The independent vote for the president’s party in presidential elections is greater than in midterm elections and is proportionate to the short-term forces favoring the president’s party (p. 48).

J. Campbell argues, and I agree, that propositions 5 and 6 are essentially tangential to the validity of the theory. While more central to the original theory, propositions 7 and 10 do not conflict with expectations of the revised model.
examination (1993) of the competing theories uses different types of data than those employed by his predecessor. This study addresses both issues in an attempt to more directly compare the two theories. I begin by presenting testable hypotheses (which can be grouped into those dealing with turnout and those dealing with vote choice) for each of the models.

**Turnout**

As noted above, the original and revised theories differ in their beliefs about the effect of short-term stimuli on the participation rates of partisan groups. According to the original theory, the lack of partisan attachments among Independents makes them less likely to participate, ceteris paribus, and consequently relatively more stimulated by presidential elections than their party identifier counterparts. This leads to:

**Hypothesis 1 (H1):** The presidential-year electorate will have a higher percentage of Independents (or, at least, individuals who are not strong partisans) than that of the midterm.

The hypothesis may also be stated in terms of partisan composition of core and peripheral voters:

**Hypothesis 1A (H1A):** Independents (or, at least, individuals who are not strong partisans) represent a larger share of peripheral voters than they do of core voters.

Meanwhile, the revised theory presumes that Independents and partisans are approximately equal in their underlying propensities to participate in elections and that short-term political stimuli affect turnout by creating cross-pressures for disadvantaged partisans. Consequently, we have:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The proportion of Independents in presidential-year and midterm electorates will be approximately equal.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Advantaged partisans will compose a larger segment of presidential-year than midterm electorates.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Disadvantaged partisans will compose a smaller segment of presidential-year than midterm electorates.

Again, these hypotheses may be rephrased in terms of core and peripheral voters:

Hypothesis 2A (H2A): The proportion of Independents in the ranks of core and peripheral voters will be approximately equal.

Hypothesis 3A (H3A): Advantaged partisans will compose a larger segment of peripheral voters than core voters.

Hypothesis 4A (H4A): Disadvantaged partisans will compose a smaller segment of peripheral voters than core voters.

As should be apparent, hypotheses 1 and 2 (1A and 2A) are directly contradictory. This is shown in Table 1 by their juxtaposition and also means that the two may be framed as null and alternative hypotheses for a single statistical test (see Appendix B). In contrast, hypotheses 3 and 4 have no counterparts in the original theory.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turnout</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1/1A:</strong> Independents greater share of: on v. off-year electorates/peripheral v. core voters</td>
<td><strong>H2/2A:</strong> Independents equal share of: on and off-year electorates/peripheral and core voters</td>
<td><strong>H3/3A:</strong> Advantaged partisans greater share of: on v. off-year electorates/peripheral v. core voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H4/4A:</strong> Disadvantaged partisans smaller share of: on v. off-year electorates/peripheral v. core voters</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote Choice</th>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H5:</strong> Defection rates lower for core v. peripheral voters</td>
<td><strong>H8:</strong> Defection rates equal for core and peripheral voters</td>
<td><strong>H9:</strong> Defection rates equal for advantaged and disadvantaged partisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H6:</strong> Defection rates in on-years higher for disadvantaged v. advantaged partisans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H7:</strong> Defection rates higher in on v. off-years</td>
<td><strong>H10:</strong> Defection rates equal in on and off-years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H11:</strong> Higher independent vote for presidential party in on v. off-years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H12:</strong> Higher vote for presidential party by peripheral v. core voters</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Vote Choice

The two theories also differ in their expectations regarding the behavior of individuals in the voting booth. The original theory regards the participation of partisans as a given and posits that short-term stimuli can alter the decisions of these citizens. Variability in the strength of short-term stimuli, the predictable directional bias of these stimuli in presidential years, and variation in the susceptibility of individuals to these stimuli lead to the following propositions:

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Core voters will exhibit lower defection rates than peripheral voters.

Hypothesis 6 (H6): Defection rates will be higher for disadvantaged partisans than for advantaged partisans in presidential years.

Hypothesis 7 (H7): Rates of defection will be higher in presidential years than in midterms.

In contrast, the revised theory presumes that the primary effect of short-term stimuli on party identifiers is on their likelihood to cast a ballot, not whom they mark on the ballot if they do show up to the polls. This implies:

Hypothesis 8 (H8): Defection rates of core and peripheral voters will be approximately equal.

Hypothesis 9 (H9): Defection rates of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans will be approximately equal in both presidential years and midterms.

Hypothesis 10 (H10): Defection rates will be approximately equal in presidential years and midterms.

As with hypotheses 1 and 2, these hypotheses derived from each of the theories are diametrically opposed. As before, this is
illustrated by their side-by-side placement (5 and 8, 6 and 9, and 7 and 10 respectively) in Table 1.

Before continuing, I note two hypotheses regarding vote choice shared by the original and revised models:

Hypothesis 11 (H11): The percentage of Independents voting for candidates of the president's party will be higher in presidential-years than in midterms.

Hypothesis 12 (H12): The percentage of peripheral voters voting for candidates of the president's party will exceed that of core voters.

The logic behind hypothesis 11 is straightforward: the short-term stimuli that are important to the choices made by Independents are biased in favor of the winning presidential candidate's party. In contrast, the two theories arrive at hypothesis 12 from different directions. The original theory presumes that peripheral voters support the winning party largely due to the disproportionate representation of Independents and weak partisans in that group. The revised theory views disproportionate support of peripheral individuals as resulting from the effects of short-term stimuli on partisan turnout outlined in hypotheses 3A and 4A.

**Design**

Because theories of surge and decline are grounded in visions of individual change, the data (aggregate-level) and methods used in most analyses of midterm losses are of limited utility for present purposes. Instead, comparing surge and decline models is best accomplished using data that allow for examination of individual behavior over consecutive elections. Consequently, like Scheve and Tomz (1999), I use the American National Election Studies' (NES) panel surveys of 1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-
94. Methodologically, the analysis is not complicated. Each of the hypotheses outlined above specifies a personal trait (e.g. party affiliation) or type of behavior (e.g. defection) that is of interest. The traits or behaviors under examination can each be regarded as dichotomous variables. Two examples illustrate the point. In testing hypotheses 1 and 2, each observation (namely individuals casting a vote) falls into either the category of Independent or non-Independent (i.e. partisan). Similarly, hypotheses 5-10 require only a distinction between individuals who defect and those who do not.

The dichotomous nature of our variables of interest allows us to regard each individual observation as an instance of either "success" or "failure." Consequently, each observation represents a Bernoulli trial with some underlying probability of success. Of course, we are not comparing the outcomes of individual cases in testing our hypotheses. Rather, we are interested in the number, or, more precisely, the proportion, of successes across repeated Bernoulli trials. For example, in hypotheses 1 and 2, we wish to compare the proportion of Independents (instances of success) in the presidential and midterm electorates. As with all statistical hypothesis tests, however, we wish to test the population parameters, not the proportions observed in our samples. Using our sample information, the appropriate statistical test is the z-test for comparison of two proportions derived from independent groups and the test statistic is

\[
z = (\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2) - (\pi_1 - \pi_2)/\sqrt{\hat{p}_1(1-\hat{p}_1)/n_1 + \hat{p}_2(1-\hat{p}_2)/n_2}
\]

6The surveys are conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, and the data is organized and made available by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither of these organizations bears any responsibility for the analysis and conclusions found here.

7It is also assumed that the observations are statistically independent, i.e. that the success or failure on any given trial does not affect the probability of success for any other trial.
where $P_1$ is the sample proportion for the first group, $P_2$ is the sample proportion for the second group, $\pi_1$ is the population proportion for the first group, $\pi_2$ is the population proportion for the second group, and $n_1$ and $n_2$ are the sample sizes of the first and second groups respectively.

In looking at the test statistic, we note its sensitivity to both sample sizes and the distance of the sample proportions from 0.5. Differences of the same magnitude between proportions will be more likely to be statistically significant as sample sizes are increased and/or as proportions approach the extremes of 0 and 1. Given this sensitivity, the present analysis emphasizes not only statistical significance, but also the directional consistency of findings.

In addition to methodological procedures, two substantive aspects of this analysis deserve more detailed mention here. First is the issue of classifying individuals as core, peripheral, or non-voters. Previous work has adopted one of two approaches in this regard. Some research, especially that not employing panel data, has used respondents' answers to the question regarding participation in previous presidential elections (e.g. Cover 1985). If individuals claim that they have voted in all or almost all ("most") elections since they were old enough to do so they are regarded as core voters. Peripheral voters are individuals who claim to have voted in only some of the elections while nonvoters are those who say they have never participated. The alternative method involves using behavior in successive elections as the defining criterion. Thus, individuals who respond that they have participated in both elections are classified as core voters.

Given the lack of retrospective voting questions in most surveys, this method is more appropriate for panel studies and is the definition most commonly employed by Campbell (1966). This pa-
per adopts the second technique, using responses to the following survey item: “In talking to people about the elections, we often find that a lot of people weren’t able to vote because they weren’t registered or they were sick or they just didn’t have time. How about you, did you vote in the elections this fall?” Individuals answering “yes” in both years of the relevant panel qualify as core voters, those affirming participation in only the presidential year are considered peripheral voters, while those answering “no” both times are nonvoters.

The second issue deserving more careful explanation is the treatment of party identification. At question is the proper measure of party identification. In his 1966 piece, Campbell employs a five-point scale that distinguishes between strong and weak partisans while grouping together “leaners” and “pure” Independents. As subsequent research has illustrated, however, not

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9 This wording is taken from the 1972 post-election survey. Some wording discrepancies between the years included in this study do exist, but there is no reason to suspect that these variations might lead to systematic differences in citizens’ responses. Wording for the relevant item in other years, as well as descriptions of other variables, can be found in Appendix A.

10 This is obviously not the only possible classification scheme. For instance, peripheral voters might alternatively be conceived of as individuals who participated in one of the two election years, regardless of which. The approach used here is chosen in order to more clearly outline differences between habitual voters and citizens who are only motivated to participate under high stimulus conditions.

11 The distinction between these types of Independents comes from responses to the follow-up question in the party identification sequence of queries. For the order and text of these questions see Appendix A. Debate about the proper measure of party identification remains unresolved. Miller (1991), one of the founders of the Michigan school, has argued that there is a distinction to be made between party identification and partisanship. He maintains that the original intent of the party identification variable was only the long-term affective attachment to a political party and that the appropriate measure is consequently a three-point scale based on responses to the root question (again, see Appendix A for question text). In contrast, partisanship includes not only direction of party commitment, but also its strength. While it is not my intention to take any position in this debate at the present time, most of the analysis here employs the three-point party identification measure.
all Independents are equal. Instead, those Independents who reveal that they lean toward one of the two parties exhibit behavior that is often more partisan than that of weak identifiers of that party (Keith et al. 1992). Consequently, use of a five-point scale may obscure some important differences within the ranks of Independents with regard to their voter status (i.e. core v. peripheral v. non) and their vote choice. In keeping with the initial examination of surge and decline, findings in the current study are presented with leaners included among the ranks of Independents. Separate analyses were conducted in which distinctions between types of Independents were made, but these were generally supportive of those reported here.

The other point to be made about party identification is that it is not immutable. Literature regarding the endogenous nature of party identification dates back at least to Fiorina (1981) and it is now widely accepted that individual movement along the seven-point scale over time is not uncommon. Consequently, in presenting behavioral patterns of partisans, a determination must be made regarding the appropriate temporal measurement of their identification. This paper adopts the convention of using citizens’ initial response (i.e. that given in the presidential year).

Findings

The 1992-94 Election Cycle: Turnout. As is always the case with political surveys, the 1992-94 NES panel yields an inflated estimate of electoral participation. A full 62% of the respondents claimed to have voted in both elections while another 20% reported voting only in the 1992 contests. Unfortunately, recent NES studies have not included a voter validation component. While we cannot be certain about the nature of overreporting, it seems unlikely that overreports are systematically biased in a fashion that would be of concern to the present study. We have no reason to suspect that either Independents or adherents of one
or the other political party would be more prone to exaggerate their behavior.

Of those individuals casting a vote in 1992, 36% classified themselves as Independents. In the midterm contests two years later, this percentage remained unchanged. This finding clearly supports the revised theory's claim that short-term stimuli do not disproportionately encourage Independents to participate. Given this, we might expect the revised theory's hypotheses regarding cross pressures to also fare well. Looking at Table 2, however, we see that the evidence is far from convincing. While Democrats did compose a larger share of the 1992 voters, their percentage in that year exceeded their midterm share by only a single point. The two-percentage point rise in the Republican share from 1992 to 1994 still fails to meet conventional standards for statistical significance.

As J. Campbell notes, differences in the composition of presidential and midterm electorates should be muted versions of

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Identification</th>
<th>1992 n = 600</th>
<th>1994 n = 472</th>
<th>Core n = 451</th>
<th>Peripheral n = 149</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Leaner</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Independent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican Leaner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Journal of Political Science
the differences that will exist in comparing core and peripheral voters. Consequently, an examination of the alternative hypotheses regarding turnout may yield information that helps pass judgment on the relative merit of the competing theories. Returning to the original theory’s proposition that Independents should be more motivated by short-term forces and should therefore be better represented among peripheral voters than core voters, we are indeed confronted with more noticeable variations. As shown in Table 2, Independents compose a full 41% of peripheral citizens versus 35% of the core. While more eye-catching, this difference still does not attain statistical significance. However, looking at Table 2, we see that the 6% gap is driven entirely by pure Independents, and, for that group, a gap of this magnitude is significant.12

Turning to the revised theory’s hypotheses about the relative presence of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans we again find mixed evidence. As expected, each category of Democrat identifiers is more represented among the peripheral voters while the Republicans all compose a larger share of core voters. Yet, the only difference that is statistically significant across the two types of voters is that of strong Republicans.13 J. Campbell’s hypothesis regarding cross-pressures for disadvantaged partisans is borne out for this group. While it makes sense that more committed identifiers might be the most likely to experience discordance and withdraw from participation, a discussion of variation in cross-pressure effects is missing in J. Campbell’s exposition. For strong partisans, the decision to cross party lines is probably more momentous than for their weaker counterparts. Further-

12 This is an illustrative example of how statistical significance in the z-test for comparing proportions is a function of sample size and distance of the proportions from 0.5.
13 The fact that the only significant difference is for Republicans suggests there may be an asymmetric effect of the biased political stimuli on the turnout decisions of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans.
more, Perot's candidacy may have exacerbated this differential effect by presenting a fourth (in addition to voting for either one of the major party candidates or abstaining) alternative that was more appealing to weaker Republicans.

The 1992-94 Election Cycle: Vote Choice. A look at behavior in voting booths may provide some additional insight into questions about intra- and inter-party variations and the role of a viable third-party candidate. The first question to be answered concerns the relative loyalty of core and peripheral partisans to their party's candidate. The original theory posits that the weaker partisan binds among peripheral voters should lead them to defect at higher rates (H5) while the revised version envisions little difference since the decision for most partisans is whether or not to vote at all, not for whom to vote. In Table 3, we see that the differences are in the direction predicted by H5.\textsuperscript{14} We notice once again, however, that Perot's presence complicates the analysis. When we consider only cases of "pure" defection (i.e. Democrats voting for Bush and Republicans for Clinton), the peripheral rate exceeds that of the core voters by only 3 percentage points. But, if we include votes cast for Perot as defection, the difference jumps to a statistically significant 10 points. Peripheral partisans were more likely to vote for Perot than were their core counterparts (see Table 4).

A glance at defection in the 1992 congressional races strengthens the case for H5. The magnitude of the core-peripheral gap in those contests is 9 percentage points. It appears that the same forces leading individuals to vote against their party's presidential nominee were at work to steer them away from congressional candidates with the same label. While not

\textsuperscript{14}Note that Table 3 excludes leaners from the partisan ranks in calculating defection rates. If leaners are treated as identifiers, the differences between core and peripheral voters become more pronounced.
exactly the prototypical coattails effect, this pattern does point to a meaningful relationship between choices made at the top of the ticket and those for lower offices.

### TABLE 3

**Defection Rates of Various Voter Groups in Presidential and Congressional Elections, 1992-1994**
*(in percents)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992*</th>
<th>1992†</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Election</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Voters</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral Voters</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional Elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Voters</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Peripheral Voters</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Defection rates for the presidential contest in this column represent "pure" defection (Democrats voting for Bush and Republicans voting for Clinton).
†Defection rates for the presidential contest in this column include votes for Perot by identifiers of either party as instances of defection.
with cross-pressures, the decision was made to show up to the poll and abandon their party's candidate. Meanwhile, the Democratic defection increase points to the operation of coattails (even if not of overwhelming magnitude) in 1992.

In addition to the competing propositions examined above, the two theories hold two common expectations. First, they both propose that the contextual bias favoring the winning presidential candidate's party will influence the vote choice of Independents, leading them to provide more support for that party in the presidential-year election than the following midterm (H11). The evidence here is clear. Whether we consider all Independents or just the pure variety, Table 4 reveals there is a significant decrease in the percentage of the vote given to Democratic congressional candidates from 1992 to 1994. The second hypothesis common to the two theories (although, as discussed above, on the basis of differing rationales) is that peripheral voters will be more supportive of the president's party than will core voters (H12). Once again, the conclusion reached depends at least partly on how we treat votes for Perot. 45% of both core and peripheral voters chose Clinton, but this figure represents 59% of the two-party vote of peripheral individuals and only 53% for core citizens. The 5-percentage point gap in the expected direction between votes for Democratic House candidates by the two types of voters lends additional credence to the proposition.

**Evidence From Earlier Studies: Turnout**

Both the presence of a strong third-party candidate and the sensitivity of the z-test for comparing proportions to sample sizes and the distance of the proportions from 0.5 makes the task of passing definitive judgment on the relative merit of the original and revised theories more daunting. One way in which we
Having revealed differences in defection rates across types of voters, we turn our attention to partisan differences. Here, the original theory holds that the biased nature of short-term stimuli in presidential years leads to greater defection by disadvantaged partisans (H6) while J. Campbell again argues that the effects of the stimuli are manifest in turnout rates rather than vote choice (H9). As with the core v. peripheral distinction, the definition of defection employed has a bearing on the appropriate conclusion. Democrats and Republicans each leant 10% support to the presidential candidate of the other party, but when votes for Perot are included, the Republicans defected at a 27% clip compared to the 17% mark for Democrats. Again, behavior in the congressional elections lends greater credence to the original theory with the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged partisans being 12 percentage points.

The final point on which the two theories differ with regard to vote choice is their propositions about defection rates across successive elections. The original theory suggests that the relatively low levels of stimuli at midterms will lead to diminished instances of defection (H7) while the revised version once again posits that the tendency for disadvantaged partisans to abstain in presidential years leads to stable defection rates across elections (H10). Comparison of defection rates across years requires the use of congressional elections, and in Table 3 we see that the rate for all participants in the respective years did drop by 5 percentage points. Even if we restrict the comparison to individuals who participated in both years (since we already know that peripheral voters are likely to defect more than core voters), there is a 3-point decline. Most telling, however, are the rates for identifiers of the two parties. The Republicans had their rate cut almost in half while the Democrats actually edged up a couple percentage points. The former indicates that for many Republicans faced
can gain additional confidence in our conclusions is by examining the competing hypotheses across a number of data sets. Unfortunately, panel studies are quite expensive, and the NES series consequently includes only two additional panel surveys since its inception, one covering the years 1956-60 and the other spanning 1972-76.\textsuperscript{15} In looking at the data from these studies, we are espe-

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lccc}
\multicolumn{1}{l}{\textbf{TABLE 4}} & & \\
\textbf{Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning the} & & \\
\multicolumn{3}{c}{(in percents)} & \\
\hline
\multicolumn{4}{c}{n = 589} \\
All Voters & 45 & 55 & - \\
Core Voters & 45 & 53 & - \\
Peripheral Voters & 45 & 59 & - \\
Independents & 40 & 54 & - \\
Pure & 39 & 60 & - \\
Democrat Leaners & 73 & 95 & - \\
Republican Leaners & 11 & 15 & - \\
\hline
\textbf{Congressional Elections} & \textbf{n = 486} & \textbf{n = 413} & \\
All Voters & 56 & - & 47 \\
Core Voters & 55 & - & 47 \\
Peripheral Voters & 60 & - & - \\
Independents & 53 & - & 42 \\
Pure & 51 & - & 43 \\
Democrat Leaners & 75 & - & 68 \\
Republican Leaners & 35 & - & 22 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning the Presidency by Various Voter Groups, 1992-1994 (in percents)}
\end{table}

*Figures for the presidential contest in this column represent absolute vote percentages for Clinton.
†Figures for the presidential contest in this column represent Clinton’s share of the two-party vote.

\textsuperscript{15}While each of these panel surveys covers three elections, two presidential years and one midterm, the analysis here uses data from only the initial presidential-year contest and the subsequent midterm (i.e. 1956 and 1958, and 1972 and 1974).
cially concerned with the consistency of behavioral patterns across election cycles of different decades. Even if not always statistically significant, repeated findings supportive of one theory over the other should be regarded as meaningful evidence upon which to draw conclusions.

As was the case with the 1992-94 cycle, evidence from the earlier periods regarding turnout propositions generally favors the original theory. As shown in Table 5, Independents did com-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Identification</th>
<th>1956 (n = 834)</th>
<th>1958 (n = 681)</th>
<th>1972 (n = 1216)</th>
<th>1974 (n = 916)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Leaner</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Independent</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Leaner</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

pose a larger share of the presidential-year electorate than the midterm in both the 1950s and 1970s panels. While these differences (1 percentage point in each case) fail to attain statistical significance, they are in the predicted direction. In contrast, the revised theory's expectations about the relative shares of party identifiers in subsequent electorates are clearly repudiated. In both cycles, the proportion of advantaged partisans (Republicans) in the voting public increases as we move from the presidential-year to the midterm. This directly contradicts H3. The
story for disadvantaged partisans is almost as unfavorable to the revised theory. Instead of witnessing a rise in their share of the electorate from the on to the off-year as suggested by H4, disadvantaged partisans retain the same shares in 1958 and 1974 as in 1956 and 1972 respectively.

Comparison of the turnout hypotheses in terms of core and peripheral distinctions also clearly favors the original theory. Table 6 reveals that the proportion of Independents among peripheral voters was significantly larger than that among core vot-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Identification</th>
<th>Core (n = 681)</th>
<th>Peripheral (n = 153)</th>
<th>Core (n = 916)</th>
<th>Peripheral (n = 300)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
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<td>22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Leaner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pure Independent</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Republican Leaner</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
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<td>Strong Republican</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Columns may not add to 100 due to rounding.

ers in both of the earlier election cycles. In addition to failing with respect to H2A, the revised theory runs into trouble with both H3A and H4A. The differences across voter classifications for advantaged partisans are in the opposite direction of those predicted by J. Campbell. In both the 1956-58 and 1972-74 panels, Republicans represent a larger share of core voters than pe-
ripheral voters. On the Democratic or disadvantaged partisan side of the ledger, the most notable finding is the relative lack of differences across core and peripheral percentages. In the earlier panel, Democrats maintain a two-percentage point edge among core voters, but in the later panel they represent a larger share of peripheral voters by a single percentage point. The revised theory's proposition that cross-pressures should induce abstention by disadvantaged partisans is not supported.

**Evidence From Earlier Studies: Vote Choice**

As with the turnout hypotheses, the evidence from the panel surveys of the 1950s and 1970s generally tends to favor the vote choice propositions of the original theory over those of the revised version. In both 1956 and 1972, peripheral individuals were more likely to cast a vote for the presidential candidate of the opposition party than were their core counterparts as seen in Table 7. Unlike the 1992-94 cycle, however, defection rates in congressional contests do not reinforce the support for H5 over H8. Here, we note that in both 1956 and 1972, core voters actually abandoned candidates of their own party at a higher clip than peripheral voters by a single percentage point. The discrepancy between evidence at the presidential and congressional levels indicates a less than perfect relationship between choices made at each level.

Disjunction between presidential and congressional voting patterns is further illustrated in examining propositions about potential variations between the defection rates of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans. In the presidential contests of both 1956 and 1972, the defection rate of Republicans paled in comparison to that of Democrats (4% to 25% in 1956 and 5% to 44%)

---

16If leaners are treated as partisans, the Republicans do compose a single percentage point higher proportion of peripheral voters than core voters in the 1956-58 cycle.
TABLE 7
Defection Rates of Various Voter Groups in Presidential and Congressional Elections (in percents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Election</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Voters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral Voters</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional Elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Voters</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peripheral Voters</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
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<td>Weak</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in 1972, a finding in line with the original theory’s H6. Again, it seems that the bias of short-term stimuli does induce defection rather than abstention. While Democrats also defected more than Republicans in the congressional elections of 1956, the difference was far less noteworthy at three percentage points. And, in 1972, Republicans actually voted for Democratic congressional
candidates at a higher rate than Democrats voted for Republicans, a difference in the opposite direction of that hypothesized by the original theory (although not supportive of the revised version's expectation of no differences either).

Variations between choices made at the presidential and congressional levels indicate that short-term stimuli that favor one of the presidential candidates do not necessarily provide much guidance for down-ballot contests. In other words, the effects of presidential coattails have some real limitations. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to completely disregard the role of national forces in congressional elections. A simple comparison of defection rates of identifiers of both parties across consecutive congressional races illustrates the point. The presence of coattails is indicated by higher defection rates for disadvantaged partisans in the presidential-year than the subsequent midterm and lower rates for advantaged partisans in the initial election. With the exception of greater Republican defection in 1974 than 1972 (an occurrence which may be linked to the surfacing of the Watergate scandal), this pattern does indeed hold.

Variation in defection rates across subsequent elections is also the topic of the final pair of competing hypotheses regarding vote choice. As with the 1992-94 data, we examine H7 and H10 by comparing defection rates for both all participants and just core voters in successive congressional contests. Unlike the most recent panel, however, the evidence from the earlier periods does not support the original theory. Defection rates in 1958 actually exceeded those of 1956 while rates in 1972 and 1974 were essentially stable.

Finally, we turn to the two hypotheses shared by the two theories. Table 8 shows that as with the 1992-94 cycle, the earlier two panels support the proposition that the independent vote will
more markedly lean toward the president's party in presidential elections than in midterms (H11). The levels of independent (both excluding and including partisan leaners) support for Republican congressional candidates in 1958 and 1974 were lower than in 1956 and 1972 respectively. Once again, it appears that the presumed partisan bias in presidential-year political stimuli does exist and that it exerts considerable influence on the vote choice of those individuals with weak or nonexistent commitments to a political party.

Evidence for H12 is mixed. In 1956, support for both Eisenhower and Republican congressional candidates was higher among peripheral voters than core voters. However, in 1972 this pattern was reversed. Contrary to the expectations of both theories, peripheral support for the winning party actually lagged

| TABLE 8 |
| Electoral Support for Candidates of the Party Winning the Presidency by Various Voter Groups |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presidential Election</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core Voters</td>
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<td>Peripheral Voters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Leaners</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Republican Leaners</td>
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<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Voters</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>Core Voters</td>
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<td>Peripheral Voters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrat Leaners</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republican Leaners</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
behind that of core individuals. This result can be traced to the large presence of Democrats among the ranks of the peripherals. This presence certainly runs against the revised theory's notion of cross-pressure leading to abstention. At the same time, the original theory's supposition that peripheral voters will be easily moved to vote for the winning party appears overstated. Democrats whom turned out in 1972 but not 1974 were actually quite loyal to the party.

DISCUSSION

Perhaps more than anything else, the capture of both bodies of Congress by the Republicans in 1994 inspired the examination conducted here. The defeat of a number of congressional candidates of the sitting president's party in the midterm elections once again proved to be of great political relevance. Of course, the 1994 midterm decline is just another instance of a well-established political phenomenon. Yet, despite the fact that this phenomenon has been in place since the earliest days of modern American political science, explanations of its regularity remain incomplete. This paper returns to the original individual-level model proposed to account for midterm losses and evaluates it alongside a more recent revision of the model. Table 9 summarizes the findings.

In general, the findings of this study are more favorable to the surge and decline theory as formulated by Angus Campbell. This is especially true with regard to the competing versions' predictions about voter turnout. The heightened levels of political stimuli associated with presidential contests do appear to disproportionately encourage Independents rather than partisans to vote. Furthermore, the revised theory's claim that cross-pressure on identifiers of the party losing the presidency should depress
## TABLE 9
Evidence and Conclusions for Original and Revised Theories' Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis (theory)</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Evidence and Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turnout</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1 (original) (^v_). H2 (revised)</td>
<td>Independent share of electorates</td>
<td>H1 correctly predicts direction of differences in all cycles, but most differences statistically insignificant. Verdict: original theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1A (original) (^v_). H2A (revised)</td>
<td>Independent presence across voter types</td>
<td>H1A supported by all 3 panels. Verdict: original theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vote Choice</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5 (original) (^v_). H8 (revised)</td>
<td>Defection rates of core and peripheral voters</td>
<td>H5 supported in 1992 and in presidential contests of 1956 and 1972, but not congressional elections of earlier years. Verdict: leaning original</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6 (original) (^v_). H9 (revised)</td>
<td>Defection rates of advantaged and disadvantaged partisans</td>
<td>H6 supported in 1992 and 1956, evidence mixed in 1972. Verdict: original theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7 (original) (^v_). H10 (revised)</td>
<td>Defection rates in presidential and midterm elections</td>
<td>H7 supported in 1992-94 cycle, H10 supported in 1972-74, neither supported in 1956-58. Verdict: neither theory supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11 (both theories)</td>
<td>Independent vote choice in on and off-years</td>
<td>Evidence supportive in all 3 panels. Verdict: hypothesis supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H12 (both theories)</td>
<td>Vote choice of peripheral and core voters</td>
<td>Generally supported in 1992, supported in 1956, not supported in 1972. Verdict: uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their relative turnout in those years receives little empirical validation. Partisan biases in political stimuli also do little to spur greater participation by adherents of the advantaged party.

While the original theory also fares better with regard to propositions about defection rates, the story here is significantly more complex. The evidence is most clear on differences between advantaged and disadvantaged partisans. Given the failure of the revised theory's hypothesis about the role of crosspressures in reducing turnout for disadvantaged partisans, it is relatively unsurprising that these citizens do defect more than their advantaged counterparts.

What is perhaps more surprising is the existence of mixed evidence regarding the question of core and peripheral defection rates. While peripheral voters do consistently abandon their party's presidential candidate more than core voters (as predicted by the original theory), there is no obvious pattern in congressional contests. This finding points to leakages in the relationship between choices made at the top of the ticket and those made further down the ballot. Short-term stimuli have a pronounced and predictable influence on choices made at the presidential level, but their translation into voting in congressional elections is less clear.

The uncertain effect of the heightened stimuli surrounding presidential campaigns on congressional voting is further illustrated by evidence concerning defection rates across successive elections. The original theory's supposition that a return to the "normal vote" in midterm elections will mean lower defection rates in those years does not meet with success. Neither, however, is the revised theory's proposition that defection rates will remain stable borne out.

An examination of the individuals participating in the three panel surveys leads to the conclusion that national level forces do play an important role in the phenomenon of interest. Presi-
dential contests have the effect of bringing a group of citizens to the polls that don’t participate in other elections and, short-term forces influence the decisions of these individuals and those who vote on a regular basis. The combination of these two effects leads to greater support for congressional candidates of the party enjoying the advantage in short-term stimuli, support that is not present in the lower-stimulus atmosphere of the midterm elections. At the same time, one finding that has been repeatedly emphasized here is the gap between choices made at the presidential level and those made regarding candidates for the legislature. Although the existence of this gap does not necessarily mean that the coattail effect cannot completely account for the pattern of variation in the success of in-party and out-party candidates in successive congressional elections, it does mean that exclusive attention to national-level forces is unlikely to provide a robust model of vote choice in congressional elections. Any attempt to more accurately and completely explain which citizens are more likely to be influenced by their decision over presidential candidates will have to incorporate other variables, including those reflecting local context. Of course, development of such a model is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

APPENDIX A

SOURCE AND DATA DESCRIPTION

As mentioned in the text, the data for this analysis come from three American National Election Studies (NES) panel surveys, those of 1956-60, 1972-76, and 1992-94. The first two of these have been released by ICPSR as independent studies, the third is found in the 1994 post-election study. The question wording and coding schemes of the items used from the surveys are as follows:
Turnout
1956 (1972, 1974): "In talking to people about the election we (often) find that a lot of people weren’t able to vote because they weren’t registered or they were sick or they just didn’t have time. How about you, did you vote this time?"

1958: "In talking to people about the election we find that a lot of them weren’t able to vote because they weren’t registered, they were sick, or something else came up at the last minute. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in the November election?"

1992, 1994: "In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren’t registered, they were sick, or they just didn’t have time. How about you, did you vote in the elections this November?"

Coding: 1 if voted, 0 if did not.

Vote choice, President
1956: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Whom did you vote for for president?"

1972: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Who did you vote for in the election for president?"

1992: President: (if yes to turnout question) "Who did you vote for?"

Coding (1992): 1 if voted Democratic, 2 if voted Republican (3 if voted Perot).

Vote choice, House
1956, 1958: "Did you vote for a candidate for Congress. (if yes) Who did you vote for? (if r does not know candidate’s name) Which party was that?"

1972: "How about the election for congressman—that is, for the House of Representatives in Washington? Which party’s candidate did you vote for, for congressman?"

1974: Congress: How about the vote for congressman. Did you vote for a candidate for Congress? (if yes) Who did you vote for? (if r doesn’t know candidate’s name) Which party was that?"
1992, 1994: "Here is a list of candidates for the major races in this district. How about the election for the House of Representatives in Washington, did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives? (if yes) Who did you vote for?"

Coding: 1 if voted Democratic, 2 if voted Republican.

**Party Identification/Partisanship**

"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? (If Republican or Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat? (Independent, Other, or No Preference) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" Coding: 0 if strong Democrat, 1 if weak Democrat, 2 if Independent-Democrat, 3 if Independent-neither, 4 if Independent-Republican, 5 if weak Republican, 6 if strong Republican.

**APPENDIX B**

**Z-TESTS FOR COMPARING PROPORTIONS**

As noted in the text, the statistical test employed in this analysis is the z-test for the comparison of two independent proportions. Here I describe the actual hypotheses tested and record the calculated z-scores. Asterisks indicate statistical significance in the direction expected by the alternate hypothesis at the following levels:

* = $.10 
† = $.05 
‡ = $.01

**Hypothesis 1 vs. Hypothesis 2:** A one-tailed test with the revised theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis (H0) and the original theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis (H1).

H0: \( \pi_{Pr} = \pi_{M} \)

H1: \( \pi_{Pr} > \pi_{M} \)
where $\pi_{Pr}$ is the proportion of Independents in the presidential-year electorate and $\pi_{M}$ is the proportion of Independents in the midterm electorate.

1956-58: $z = 0.45$
1972-74: $z = 0.49$
1992-94: $z = 0.00$

**Hypothesis 1A vs. Hypothesis 2A:** A one-tailed test with the revised theory’s expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory’s expectation as the alternate hypothesis.

$H_0$: $\pi_{P} = \pi_{C}$
$H_1$: $\pi_{P} > \pi_{C}$

where $\pi_{P}$ is the proportion of Independents among peripheral voters and $\pi_{C}$ is the proportion of Independents among core voters.

1956-58: $z = 1.72$
1972-74: $z = 2.19$
1992-94: $z = 1.30$

**Hypothesis 3:** A one-tailed test in which the revised theory’s expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.

$H_0$: $\pi_{Pr} = \pi_{M}$
$H_1$: $\pi_{Pr} > \pi_{M}$

where $\pi_{Pr}$ is the proportion of advantaged partisans in the presidential-year electorate and $\pi_{M}$ is the proportion of advantaged partisans in the midterm electorate.

1956-58: $z = -0.41$
1972-74: $z = -1.00$
1992-94: $z = 0.34$

**Hypothesis 3A:** A one-tailed test in which the revised theory’s expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.

$H_0$: $\pi_{P} = \pi_{C}$
$H_1$: $\pi_{P} > \pi_{C}$

where $\pi_{P}$ is the proportion of advantaged partisans among peripheral voters and $\pi_{C}$ is the proportion of advantaged partisans among core voters.

1956-58: $z = -1.23$
1972-74: $z = -2.79$
1992-94: $z = 0.45$
Hypothesis 4: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory’s expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.

H0: $\pi_{Pr} = \pi_{M}$
H1: $\pi_{Pr} < \pi_{M}$

where $\pi_{Pr}$ is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans in the presidential-year electorate and $\pi_{M}$ is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans in the midterm electorate.

1956-58: $z = 0.00$
1972-74: $z = 0.00$
1992-94: $z = -0.35$

Hypothesis 4A: A one-tailed test in which the revised theory’s expectation represents the alternate hypothesis.

H0: $\pi_{P} = \pi_{C}$
H1: $\pi_{P} < \pi_{C}$

where $\pi_{P}$ is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans among peripheral voters and $\pi_{C}$ is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans among core voters.

1956-58: $z = -0.45$
1972-74: $z = 0.31$
1992-94: $z = -1.94^\dagger$

Hypothesis 5 v. Hypothesis 8: A one-tailed test with the revised theory’s expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory’s expectation as the alternate hypothesis.

H0: $\pi_{P} = \pi_{C}$
H1: $\pi_{P} > \pi_{C}$

where $\pi_{P}$ is the proportion of peripheral voters defecting and $\pi_{C}$ is the proportion of core voters defecting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>presidential election</th>
<th>congressional elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956: $z = 1.39^*$</td>
<td>1956: $z = -0.95$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972: $z = 1.04$</td>
<td>1972: $z = -0.27$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (&quot;pure&quot; defection): $z = 0.70$</td>
<td>1992: $z = 1.40^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (all defection): $z = 1.81^\dagger$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypothesis 6 v. Hypothesis 9: A one-tailed test with the revised theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis.

\[ H_0: \pi_D = \pi_A \]

\[ H_1: \pi_D > \pi_A \]

where \( \pi_D \) is the proportion of disadvantaged partisans defecting and \( \pi_A \) is the proportion of advantaged partisans defecting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>presidential election</th>
<th>congressional elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956: ( z = 8.07^\dagger )</td>
<td>1956: ( z = .11 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972: ( z = 14.97^\dagger )</td>
<td>1972: ( z = -1.27 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (&quot;pure&quot; defection): ( z = 0.00 )</td>
<td>1992: ( z = 2.58^\dagger )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (all defection): ( z = 2.34^* )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 7 vs. Hypothesis 10: A one-tailed test with the revised theory's expectation serving as the null hypothesis and the original theory's expectation as the alternate hypothesis.

\[ H_0: \pi_{Pr} = \pi_M \]

\[ H_1: \pi_{Pr} > \pi_M \]

where \( \pi_{Pr} \) is the proportion of voters defecting in presidential years and \( \pi_M \) is the proportion of voters defecting in midterms.

| 1956-58: \( z = -2.54 \) | 1956-58: \( z = 1.48^* \) |
| 1972-74: \( z = 0.00 \) | 1972-74: \( z = 0.93 \) |
| 1992-94: \( z = 1.54^* \) | 1992-94: \( z = 1.97^\dagger \) |

Hypothesis 11: A one-tailed test in which the expectation is represented by the alternate hypothesis.

\[ H_0: \pi_{Pr} = \pi_M \]

\[ H_1: \pi_{Pr} > \pi_M \]

where \( \pi_{Pr} \) is the proportion of Independents voting for candidates of the president's party in presidential years and \( \pi_M \) is the proportion of Independents voting for candidates of the president's party in midterms.

| 1956-58: \( z = 1.48^* \) | 1956-58: \( z = 1.97^\dagger \) |
| 1972-74: \( z = 0.93 \) | 1972-74: \( z = 1.97^\dagger \) |
**Hypothesis 12:** A one-tailed test in which the expectation is represented by the alternate hypothesis.

\[ H_0: \pi_P = \pi_C \]
\[ H_1: \pi_P > \pi_C \]

where \( \pi_P \) is the proportion of peripheral voters voting for candidates of the president’s party and \( \pi_C \) is the proportion of core voters voting for candidates of the president’s party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>presidential election</th>
<th>congressional elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>( z = 1.39^* )</td>
<td>1956: ( z = 0.42 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>( z = -1.83 )</td>
<td>1972: ( z = -0.52 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (&quot;pure&quot; vote %):</td>
<td>( z = 0.00 )</td>
<td>1992: ( z = 0.91 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (2-party vote %):</td>
<td>( z = 1.12 )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REFERENCES**


