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From Paradigm to Paradigm Shift: The Military and Operations Other Than War

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The purpose of military forces is combat, that is to deter and to defeat the enemies of the United States; that is their central mission, their raison d'être, the only justification for expending resources on their creation and maintenance.

Samuel Huntington

Beware of Foreign Entanglements
George Washington

These might well be the watchwords of the armed forces officer when presented with missions referred to in Department of Defense (DoD) parlance as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). OOTW includes, but is not limited to: "nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, treaty verification, support to domestic civil authorities, and peacekeeping." More often than not, OOTW involves intervention in another nation's political situation.

American military officers, in general, have an ambivalent, if not

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2FM100-5, Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army 1993) 2-0.
negative attitude towards OOTW. This outlook results from a variety of organizational and operational reasons. This article examines why American armed forces are hesitant to accept OOTW missions. First, the article clarifies areas of concern by concentrating on organizational attitudes from an officer's perspective. Second, the discussion addresses how the doctrine is changing to meet current international realities regarding OOTW, while simultaneously addressing organizational concerns.

Officers do not feel OOTW is useless or irrelevant. OOTW is a necessity in a world that may produce conflicts over scarce resources, rising ethnicity, religion, or resurgent nationalism. Wars generated by these hatreds have no borders, no respect for basic humanity, and are exceptionally ruthless. In addition, these conflicts are usually internal and regional. They do not pose overt external threats. The regionality, ethnicity, and lack of borders involved in these wars pose significant challenges for planners, which in turn heightens the concern by American officers towards involvement.

DoD will always accept the missions passed down by the National Command Authority, but the military leaders who advise elected leaders will voice their concerns towards OOTW based on three behavioral/historical themes: the desire for concrete victory conditions, the desire to have a concrete definition of how firepower is to be used to achieve operational objectives, and the need for political and popular support. In short, their concerns revolve around victory, violence, and Vietnam.

The leaders' concerns about OOTW should not be taken as recalcitrance. Given the decision to execute OOTW, the Army has the ability to execute the mission due to years spent developing a doctrine enabling forces to execute OOTW with maximum effectiveness and minimum casualties. This doctrine, though lacking in certain respects, reflects an able attempt to address the officer's concerns towards OOTW.

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3For an excellent look inside the problems creating the conditions for low-intensity conflict, see John Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 44-60. Mr. Kaplan admirably applies and interprets other distinguished authors, such as Martin Van Creveld, John Keegan, Samuel Huntington, and Thomas Fraser Homer-Dixon, weaving them into a bleak, if not accurate, picture of the future.

4The Clinton Administration shares these concerns. Anthony Lake, the President's National Security Advisor, recently stated in "The Limits to Peacekeeping," New York Times, February 6, 1994, p. 17, that the administration will ask tough questions before becoming involved in any United Nations Peace Operation. These questions include, "What is the threat to our interests? Is there a clearly defined mission? A distinct end point? How much will it cost? Are the resources available? What is the likelihood of success?"
Cognitive barriers to OOTW

Examining any organization is a difficult task. For our purposes, this article confines itself to the officer level. "The officer corps is the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of society." To fully understand the American disposition towards peacekeeping operations, and more specifically, OOTW, the reader needs to understand the issue from the perspective of the professional military officer.

There are three conceptual foundations for the officer's concern towards OOTW:

1) The American military is an organization centered and formed upon victory in battle.
2) In general, officers view themselves as warriors, or, using a contemporary term, managers of violence. Most operations within OOTW do not fit within that definition.
3) 'No More Vietnams.' The legitimacy of the armed forces, and especially the Army, lay with people. If a mission is not supported by the population, how do we justify involvement?

Few people outside the military comprehend the responsibilities of officers in terms of the burden of leadership. According to FM100-5, leaders have special challenges and responsibilities in regard to soldiers. They successfully lead them through danger, mold and protect their spirit, and channel their energies toward mission accomplishment. Leaders consider the physiological, psychological, and ethical challenges soldiers will face, providing them the proper training and leadership that give them the will to fight. They build units and teams that have the courage to overcome odds to accomplish the mission and the determination to press on to victory.

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5James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (Basic Books 1989)
7Ibid.
8FM 100-5, 14-1. FM represents Field Manual. FM100-5 describes and defines the doctrinal foundation for Army Operations.

Volume 22 1994 | 149
Because of this responsibility, the officer becomes very close to the soldiers under his or her command. This attachment relates not only to the fraternal bond generated through the hardship of the profession, but because any officer understands that soldiers are the key to victory. Without disciplined, well trained and motivated soldiers, the best equipment is worthless. Thus, risking a soldier's life is not done frivolously or without reason.

Without a doubt, the best way to prepare soldiers is to train them for battle. A common adage is "More sweat on the drill field leads to less blood shed in battle." Before an officer trains soldiers, however, he or she must have a mission in order to orient the training. Mission-oriented training is critical to effective forces. Proper training is the only way an officer can balance his duty to his soldiers, and his responsibility to accomplish the mission.9

To insure proper training is one reason an officer must ask probing questions concerning any potential conflict. A clear definition of the mission enables them to train and mentally prepare soldiers for conflict. Officers want to know when they can declare victory. This clarification helps planners reduce casualties and operate wisely, aiding the troops' morale. Additionally, planners need to determine the amount of force to use. They need to know the legal status of the conflict, and the amount of support of the American people.

*There is no substitute for Victory* (Douglas McArthur)

A noted international relations scholar once mentioned that the reason the American Army does not get involved in peacekeeping operations is that as a superpower Army, the American Army has always been an Army of conquest -- it fights to win.10 For most of the wars of its history, the American Army, usually after some setbacks, emerges victorious and forces the adversary into unconditional surrender. Washington at Yorktown, Grant at Appomattox, Pershing at Compeigne, and McArthur in Tokyo Bay are historic symbols that represent the potential power and ultimate purpose of the American armed forces.

This American bias is reinforced through doctrine which is based strongly upon Clausewitz' school of Total War. According to Clausewitz, in order to win,

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10Discussion with Professor Lily Ling, Washington D.C., 2 September 1993.
...the art of war tells us: go for the greatest, most decisive purpose you can achieve; choose the surest way to it that you dare to go. War should be conducted with the utmost necessary or possible degree of effort.\textsuperscript{11}

War is fought for a political purpose, "...either to destroy the enemy's state or dictate the terms of the peace."\textsuperscript{12} You must, therefore, capture your enemy's heart...defeat his core, destroy his ability to wage war.

Americans have followed this principle in past wars. Sherman demonstrated its potency in his 'March to the Sea' during the Civil War. The Army pursued Total War again in the West, with the wars against the Indians, annihilating total tribes and civilizations. In this century the doctrine of strategic bombing campaigns and night raids laid waste entire cities.\textsuperscript{13} Strategic bombing, combined with armored thrusts towards the enemy's heartland contributed to victory. Properly used, the idea of depriving the enemy of its ability to fight can only leave one side in control of the battlefield.

OOTW challenges the American officer's assumption of total war. Former Chief of Staff Carl Vuono addressed the issue very succinctly. At the end of Vuono's tenure, when it was clear that the Army would face a sizable reduction and a reorientation to new missions, an officer asked Vuono about the Army of the future and what bit of advice he would leave to his successor. Vuono replied,

I'll tell you the purpose of the Army is to win the wars of the nation. That's what the purpose of the Army is. Don't let anybody give you nonsense about peripheral issues or peripheral missions. Well it would be nice if the Army did so and so. That may be good for a cup of coffee down the hall here, to talk about. But don't spend more time than that on it. I sure as hell wouldn't.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 204.

\textsuperscript{13} These bombing raids, although invoking the spirit of Total War, were aimed at reducing the enemy's potential for manufacturing war goods. The British concept of night mass bombing was much more akin to total war than the American policy.

As for the bit of advice, Vuono added,

The first one is beware of the good idea guys.... You see, there's a lot of good idea fellows running around.... Who have a great program that they just think we got to institute in the Army. And watch the peripheral missions. Okay? They don't contribute to a trained and ready Army. ¹⁵

When Vuono spoke of fighting wars, he included short-term actions like the interventions in Grenada and Panama. ¹⁶ That the traditionalists still remained disdainful, however, of other low intensity missions in this period is clear. This is particularly true of politically ambiguous missions such as "nation-building," humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and even counterinsurgency. ¹⁷

Being placed into a peacekeeping scenario is very difficult for an American officer. An officer is trained to use firepower and maneuver to defeat an enemy. This ability provides a beginning and ending point for a battle or war. If a mission does not have a prescribed beginning, means, and end, the officer is hesitant, for fear of being unable to develop the focus needed to bring effective fire on the enemy. This focus is critical for winning on the battlefield.

Many will say the American military desires free reign to accomplish anything they want on the battlefield. This is not entirely correct. More important than indiscriminate violence is the focus of the combat. What are the political objectives the government wants to achieve? For the military officer, the government's responsibility is to establish the political boundaries within which the military can perform its mission. "Operational and tactical commanders need to know the non-military features of the conditions, and how to measure them in order to take them into consideration as they plan for, conduct, and evaluate the effectiveness of operations." ¹⁸ These boundaries provide the focus for overall, strategic victory. These boundaries must be clear.

¹⁷ The current administration supports this idea. As Anthony Lake stated in his recent New York Times article, "Our armed forces' primary mission is not to conduct peace operations, but to win wars. The bottom-up review of our post-cold war defense requirements insures that we remain prepared to do that."
and they must be enforced. This does not mean they cannot be modified.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the mission changed from protecting Saudi Arabia to freeing Kuwait, but clear, new boundaries were established along with the mission change. This offered the military a new set of planning goals. The goals of the destruction of the Iraqi Army and freedom of Kuwait dictated the conditions for victory in the Gulf War. Of course, military planners understand they may not always enjoy such a clear-cut definition of combat, and thus must work in a more complex situation such as Somalia. A complex situation does not remove the need for distinct goals and objectives, including the conditions for victory.

The terms destruction and freedom, although prima facie opposites, actually establish boundaries within which military planners can make decisions concerning the use and focus of violence. With this as a precedent, what will be the conditions for victory in, say, Bosnia? According to French Lieutenant General Phillipe Morillon, former deputy commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, "The use of force without clear political objectives is something we must avoid." The problem with OOTW is that it blurs the requirements for and definition of victory.

Managers of Violence

According to Samuel Huntington, an officer is a 'manager of violence,'

...the function of a military force is successful armed combat. The duties of a military officer include: (1) the organizing, equipping, and training of his force, (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat. The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer.20

In the words of one officer, "no American commander wants to operate under rules that state: 'Close with and destroy the enemy, but don't shoot him too much.'" The idea of restraining the use of force jeopardizes the mission, his organization, and his soldiers.

The mission in the Persian Gulf was compatible with the concept

20 Huntington 11.
of the manager of violence. Although fraught with peril, this type of mission was accepted by the armed forces because it satisfied certain doctrinal principles. It also satisfied certain organizational perceptions.

What are these perceptions? According to Carl Builder, "...to find the service's dominant concepts of war, one need look no further than their finest hours....of what experience is it most proud?" Builder goes on to state that for the Army, "...its best memories of itself came in its march across Central Europe in the last months of the war [World War II]....the Army showed itself to be a confident, effective, and robust war machine, capable of taking and holding the initiative, demonstrating courage, resilience and innovation."21

Operation Desert Storm fit the World War II mold. The Persian Gulf conflict was a classic example of the Army supporting fundamental American principles, using the 'right' amount of force, to subdue an oppressor. A ready and well-trained Army coupled with a brilliant operational victory generated the new organizational symbol for maintaining ability and victory. Operation Desert Storm upheld the idea of organizational legitimacy through the idea of using force to liberate the Kuwaiti people. Today, the informal goal for warfighters in the Pentagon is to achieve another Desert Storm.

The planners developing the mission in Somalia were still jubilant from the laurels they received for their contributions to the Desert Storm victory. Somalia might not be the challenge posed by Desert Storm, but it still afforded the opportunity to be the liberating Army, using force for a good cause. The mission statement at the beginning was very simple: 'Provide security for the delivery of relief supplies in Somalia.'22 On its face, the mission seemed achievable: enter Somalia, suppress the warlords, escort the foodstuffs, and return home. Given all this, officers were still hesitant to accept the mission due to the hazy definition of victory, and due to uncertainty about the amount of force to be used. According to one officer, "Somalia is a tragedy that we can make into an opportunity -- if the politicians will help us."

Officers seek the opportunity to resolve the dilemma of force and justice -- 'how can we use force for a good cause?' If a potential conflict does not lend itself to resolving this dilemma in any degree, the military will remain hesitant. If there is no criteria for victory, the civilian leadership presents the officer with two related questions: 1) What type of threat am I training my troops to encounter, and 2) What can I tell them and the operational planners the purpose of this mission is?

Officers are concerned, and rightly so, that failure to define proper

objectives may result in the improper management of violence -- too much or too little. Too much might harm the local population needlessly. Too little results in the problems such as the 3 October ambush of the forces in Mogadishu in which 18 US Army Rangers were killed. As Marine Lieutenant General Robert Johnston stated, "[W]hat appeared to be a simple mission of getting food to starving Somalis turned out to be much more complicated."\textsuperscript{23} Failure to consider critical aspects of violence and victory, and the resulting impact upon support from home leads one to problems similar to the ones encountered during Vietnam.

**No more Vietnams**

The 'Vietnam Syndrome' as George Bush called it, is still very prevalent within the military community. The spectre of 'another Vietnam' raises its ugly head every time the United States becomes involved in a conflict, especially those involving civil war or internal unrest. To be successful, an operation must have not only force, and the will to use that force, but also a clear political objective.\textsuperscript{24} One civilian official described the dominant view: "Senior military leaders don't want another 'dirty little war' where the President gets them into a conflict and then leaves them there."\textsuperscript{25}

Why is this such a problem? According to Harry Summers, Jr., "[the Vietnam Syndrome...had] far-reaching consequences, for while American military power remained formidable after Vietnam, its military authority declined precipitously."\textsuperscript{26} In fact, the Vietnam syndrome poses a serious threat to military legitimacy in a democratic system.

The legitimacy of the military in a democracy lies with the people. The military establishment in the United States cannot operate outside of the public eye and cannot lose the public trust.\textsuperscript{27} As General Frederick C. Weyand once explained,

\textsuperscript{23}Naylor
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25}Locher interview.
\textsuperscript{27}To insure the Army never went to war without the public trust, DoD implemented the Total Force Policy in 1974. This policy, championed by then Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams, placed the reserves on the same warfighting level as active component forces. For a thorough investigation of the ideas behind Total Force, see Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime," *Parameters*, Summer 1991 pp. 35-50.
Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. When the American Army is committed, the people are committed; when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try and keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people.28

The concern about public support during operations was validated following the 3 October firefight between American Rangers and Somali gangs. The deaths of eighteen Americans dictated a fundamental change in US policy towards Somalia and the establishment of a withdrawal date. One cannot help but draw the conclusion that the change in policy was related to a change in feelings by the American public about the war.

Although American officers join the Army to uphold and defend the Constitution, they do not want to fall victim to the vacillations of elected representatives who may change their policy on a moments' notice. Any form of operations other than war includes the aspect of political will. This is what worries officers the most. Officer's specific questions include: Will there be adequate rules of engagement to protect friendly forces and conduct operations? Will the operation be run from the tactical headquarters or from the Pentagon? Will the operation have Congressional and Executive branch sanction? These questions demonstrate the complexity of the political aspects of operations other than war, and serve as speedbumps to the rapid acceptance of any operation other than warfighting.

Before any external military operation is conducted, the military desires that the government determine the focus and rules of engagement for the mission and that the government ensure support for the mission. If this support and consensus are not present, the armed force will remain skeptical of the operation.

Paradigm Shift: The Genesis of Doctrinal Change

Even before the demise of the USSR and the advent of the Iraqi crisis, the Army was planning to reduce and reorganize itself. The disappearance of the threat in Europe merely hastened this process and deepened the force and budget cuts. Despite the USSR's dissolution,

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the challenge of low intensity conflict and of regional crises remained. Much of the debate in the post-Soviet period focuses on confronting and prioritizing these remaining threats.

As early as October 1989, General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had come to the conclusion that the reforms initiated by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev would usher in a new security era for the United States. Consequently, Powell immediately set to work defining the new environment that the United States would face in the decade of the 1990s.

Despite Powell’s broad vision of the potential for change, much of the thrust of the new strategy focused on the mid-intensity dangers of future Iraqi-style wars brought on by the proliferation of high-technology weapons and weapons of mass destruction. There was no widespread agreement among the various leaders in the services and the legislature. None of the service chiefs immediately agreed with Powell. All of them argued for a future similar to the past. The Army’s initial plan, founded in concepts of total victory, envisioned reducing the force only down to 625,000, mostly in response to the anticipated results of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The result of this tumult in the strategic view of the security environment was that low intensity conflict entered the mainstream for all of the services. The Navy and Marine Corps even adopted a "littoral" strategy, or as some call it, a "brown water" strategy, that

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30 In the Aspen speech, Bush spoke of "renegade regimes" and of 20 countries with chemical warfare capabilities, and another 15 that would soon possess ballistic missile technologies. See the reprint of the speech in Cheney, 1991, 131-134.

31 Snider 13. In fact the service chiefs asked for 2% real growth in the defense budget for several years.

32 Vuono was successful in the early meetings with Powell, pegging the Army size to a total U.S. force in Europe of 150,000. See Snider 15. See also statements by Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone and Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl E. Vuono, 29 March 1990 in U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1991, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 101st cong., 2d sess., pt. 3 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1990) 3, 17-18.

Turregano and Waddell

foresaw the future in terms of force projection and not maritime dominance, which was taken as a given.34

The Army also reconfigured its thinking. As Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan put it, "America needs a different model by which to raise, equip, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and sustain her armed forces."35 Sullivan also suggested two ways of viewing the use of force: "war," and "operations other than war."36 Sullivan maintained that this new view of warfare was necessary to replace the negative aim of containment -- stopping the spread of Soviet power -- with a positive aim: "to promote democracy, regional stability, and economic prosperity."37 Again this policy reflects attempts to use force for a 'good' cause. Additionally, this shift allows the Army to get smaller, yet more active at home in all manner of civic undertakings from disaster relief to the vaccinating of inner city children, thus contributing to "the challenges of domestic regeneration."38

Thus, the consequence of Sullivan's views, which were different from those of his predecessor, was that the Army would be much more active at home and abroad, despite reducing its size by at least 33%. In 1993 the Army had 590,000 soldiers on active duty. Under the new policies, about 25,000 were engaged in deployments to more than sixty countries on any given day.39 This was double the amount of 1992, and was slated to rise, while the Army's end strength was slated to fall. Almost all of these deployments would fall into the categories of low intensity conflict. To respond to these changes in the security environment and in the national strategy, the Army completed, or planned, major changes in doctrine.

34 See Sean O'Keefe, Admiral Frank Kelso, General C.E. Mundy, From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, September 1992). The authors are, respectively, Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps.


36 I will continue to use the phrase "low intensity conflict" except when referring directly to official Army publications using the new phrase.

37 Sullivan and Dubik 8.

38 Sullivan and Dubik 5. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Deborah Roche Lee, spoke of "utilizing military forces, and reserves in particular, to try to add value and give back and meet needs in America that are otherwise going unmet." See William Mathews, "New Chief Sees Increased Role for Reserves," Army Times, 21 June 1993, 20.

39 Sullivan 3. Army end strength is slated to reach 545,000 by end of Fiscal Year 1995 in September 1994.

158 | The Journal of Political Science
From Paradigm to Paradigm Shift

Doctrine

In late 1990, the Army issued a new edition of its low-intensity warfare doctrine FM (Field Manual) 100-20, titled *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*. As will be noted below, the new manual was almost dead upon arrival; however it did represent a significant improvement over both the last edition for 1981 and an interim field circular from 1986.

The 1990 edition retained four broad categories of conflict from the mid-1980s: insurgency, terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations. The writers addressed in detail the political environment of each of the different categories, emphasizing the often highly-charged political nature of low intensity conflict, and the ever-present ethical, moral, and legal dilemmas.40 A significant modification to the old manual is the inclusion, as an "imperative," of the notion of "legitimacy," defined as "the willing acceptance of the right of a government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions."41 Success in all low intensity operations, according to the manual, depends upon encouraging and sustaining legitimacy.42

With this manual, the Army exposed its concept of low intensity conflict well beyond the near total focus on counterinsurgency of the earlier doctrinal publications. Yet, because the topic of low intensity conflict was treated so lightly in the main doctrinal manual in existence, the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 *Operations*, the new FM 100-20 was not taken seriously. Moreover, the new FM 100-20 was put into revision almost upon being issued.

The Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, and his doctrinal writers at TRADOC, determined that having two doctrines, one for war fighting and another for low intensity conflict, no longer made sense.43 The chief doctrinal writer for the 1993 edition of FM 100-5, Colonel James McDonough, maintained that all Army operations deserved treatment in the new manual.44 Moreover, McDonough thought that low intensity

40 See FM 100-20, 1990, pages 1-2 through 1-4, 1-8 and 1-9, and Appendix B "The Law and Low Intensity Conflict."
41 FM 100-20 1-6.
42 In reflection of the experience of the 1980s, the manual specifically distinguished between supporting insurgency and supporting counterinsurgency, while still disproportionately emphasizing the latter. The bulk of the second chapter addresses the general political environment of insurgency. Three of the six appendices are devoted to counterinsurgency. See FM 100-20, 1990 chapter 2, and Appendices A, D, E. U.S. support for insurgency is covered on 2-17 and 2-18. U.S. support to counterinsurgency is covered on 2-18 through 2-25.
43 Council Interview.
44 Interview with Colonel McDonough, West Point, NY, 17 June 1992.
conflict should be seen "as part of wider, general theory of war." To encompass this wider theory, "Doctrine should address nonconventional operations in operations short of war, during limited hostile action and in conditions of war and its aftermath." Also, "Future doctrine should be expanded to incorporate our evolving missions in areas such as stability operations, nation assistance and contraband flow."

Controversy also arose over the definition and scope of low intensity conflict with President Bush's 2 August 1990 speech at Aspen, Colorado. Bush spoke of "peacetime engagement," which observers took to mean, variously, a new security strategy for the United States, a component of a new strategy, or a new name for low intensity conflict. Where the Bush speech seemed to refer to the whole breadth of American foreign policy, Secretary of Defense Cheney in his 1991 annual report called peacetime engagement "a strategy that seeks to counteract violence and to promote nation-building." Among the crafters of the U.S. statements on national strategy and military strategy, "peacetime engagement" was in competition with "active presence" and "forward presence" as names for U.S. activities abroad. The resulting interagency confusion, complicated with the organizational focus on a definition of victory, made writing the Army doctrine very difficult. Some officers "were troubled to meet participants who had 'an aversion to the term "LIC'' and so were ready to ignore 'all excellent concepts and useful doctrine [extant low intensity conflict] in the process'." Reminiscent of the long-standing disagreement over war fighting versus low intensity conflict, the Army

45 McDonough Interview. Also interview with Major Rick Brennan, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations and Plans, Strategic Plans and Policy Division, May 1992.
47 McDonough 8. See also General John W. Foss, "Advent of the Nonlinear Battlefield: AirLand Battle-Future," Army, February 1991, 22, 24. Foss was the commander of TRADOC, the organization responsible for writing Army doctrine. Foss makes the same point about including low intensity conflict in the capstone manual.
49 See Don M. Snider, Strategy 4.
51 A-AF CLIC, 1 July 1991-31 December 1991 34. See Supporting Document 83 for the trip report within which these observations were recorded.
argued for a narrow interpretation of low intensity conflict that encompassed only activities not involving combat. Ultimately, the Army adopted a new name for low intensity conflict - "operations other than war."

Perhaps as a result of the confusion, the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 exhibits certain discontinuities. However, the manual does adequately address the concepts discussed earlier of victory, violence, and Vietnam. As promised by McDonough, the manual propounded a unified vision of Army operations which fully incorporated what was known as low intensity conflict. The process of rewriting FM 100-5 Operations had begun before Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the rewriting began anew to incorporate lessons learned and the new military strategy. Consequently, the opening statement is a direct reflection of the changed strategy: "[This manual] addresses fundamentals of a force-projection army with forward-deployed forces." Furthermore, the manual "is the authoritative guide to how the Army forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war." Yet, the manual quickly assures the reader that

Winning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine in this manual....The manual also addresses the related fields of joint and combined operations, logistics, the environment of combat, and operations other than war. But, its primary focus is war fighting and how commanders put all the elements together to achieve victory at least cost to American soldiers.

With these statements, it becomes clear that low intensity conflict, now called operations other than war, had made it into the mainstream of Army thinking.

Unlike joint and combined operations, respectively operations with sister U.S. services and with foreign militaries, or logistics, the vast majority of operations other than war are not directly linked to war fighting. The manual's writers seem uncomfortable with the difference, proclaiming in one instance, that "the spirit of the

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56 FM 100-5, 1993, v.
offense...characterizes the American soldier." This directly conflicts with some of requirements for low intensity missions and reflects the 'manager of violence' spirit.

The writers wrestled with the notion of how to handle anything less than war fighting. In a subsection titled "The Range of Military Operations," the manual states,

The Army classifies its activities during peacetime and conflict as operations other than war. During peacetime, the US attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations. Conflict is characterized by hostilities to secure strategic objectives. The last environment - that of war - involves the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy.

Clearly there is confusion here between conflict, combat, hostilities, and war. This causes concern to many officers, for these definitions provide doctrinal guidelines concerning the use of force and the conditions for victory. The ambiguities no doubt reflect the lack of agreement among the writers and reviewers of the manual. One clue to the dividing line between these terms comes from the views of General Sullivan, who became Chief of Staff in mid-1991:

The concept of "war" is usually understood in terms of conventional combat: the armies of one nation-state or alliances of nation-states fighting those of another. Every other act of violence, use of force, or form of hostility is characterized as "operations other than war."

However, his distinctions would allow any interstate combat to be called war, no matter the level of violence or casualties, thus allowing the definitional problem of the "small war" to creep back in. Finally, the manual's definitions also lump low intensity conflict missions, which all involve at least some chance of combat, into the same category as civic missions involving no chance of combat whatsoever.

While the 1993 edition of Operations continues and even expands the conceptual fuzziness of low intensity conflict, it also breaks new ground. It brings low intensity missions into the mainstream, giving them near-equal billing with war fighting. The manual notes that a regional commander-in-chief may be conducting peacetime and conflict

57 FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0.
58 FM 100-5, 1993, 2-0. Emphasis original.
59 Sullivan and Dubik 8.
operations in one part of his region simultaneously with a war in another part. The manual then devotes an entire chapter to the topic of operations other than war, heavy with highlighted, inset references to "operations other than war" which have been conducted at home and abroad since 1990, such as support to civil authorities in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in Florida, a nation-assistance mission involving immunizations in Cameroon, and Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq.

The Army lumped these operations together with those that involve the potential of combat, and those that involve small-scale combat. Another officer suggested that the Clinton administration officials on the National Security Council were uncomfortable with the very notion of "war" and "conflict," preferring to call all operations, absent a declaration of war, "peace operations." Hence, one can perhaps surmise the reason for the shift away from low intensity conflict to "operations other than war." This category has now officially grown broader and more diffuse.

The manual notes the necessity of including OOTW in the capstone doctrine because "Army forces have participated in operations other than war in support of national interests throughout its history." And, in an even grander sense, "The entire Army...is involved daily in operations other than war." What does the manual say of the conduct of these operations? Continuing the progress begun in the 1990 edition of FM 100-20, the chapter highlights the importance of legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance: "In operations other than war, victory comes more subtly than in war. Disciplined forces, measured responses, and patience are essential to successful outcomes." In further contrast with the FM 100-5 manuals of the 1970s and 1980s, with their concentration on speedy victory by massed maneuvering of armored units, in operations other than war "the activities of relatively small units can have operational, and even strategic impact."
The concern for perseverance and restraint in the chapter on operations other than war seems odd in comparison to the manual's remaining focus on speed, maneuver, and firepower. In a manual that proclaims that the American soldier is imbued with an offensive spirit, notions such as patience, subtlety, and measured response are an odd fit. The aggressiveness and lack of hesitation inherent in an offensive spirit clearly conflict with the reticence and judiciousness inherent in the idea that "the use of overwhelming force may complicate the process toward the Army's stated objectives." Certainly the training required of the soldier faced with an operation other than war would be more similar to that of a police officer than of a combat soldier. Yet, the manual, reflecting the "Any good soldier..." mindset, simply states, "In preparing to fight the nation's wars, the Army develops the leadership, organizations, equipment, discipline, and skills for a variety of operations other than war."

This edition of FM 100-5 breaks new ground in its treatment of low intensity missions. The nagging discontinuities in its treatment of the primary purpose of the Army - war - and its treatment of the activities in which the Army engages daily are no doubt a reflection of the debate mentioned above over the scope and definition of low intensity conflict. That the topic has been brought into the capstone manual is also a direct reflection of the perceived changes in the security environment and the missions that the Army was required to perform as the manual was being written.

With the new capstone doctrine in place, the Army began work on FM 100-23 Peace Operations, which was to be the replacement for the 1990 edition of FM 100-20. In keeping with the categories of activities set forth in FM 100-5, this new manual will address all activities not included in "war," and will significantly expand the treatment of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in light of operations in Somalia and Macedonia.

68 FM 100-5, 1993, 13-0. When soldiers are used merely for their technical capabilities, absent any potential for combat, such as vaccinations or filling potholes, it is undoubtedly true that their technical training and their existing organizational structures suffice. However, introduce the potential for combat and the question rapidly arises, "how are the soldiers trained to respond?" Training soldiers to respond to airborne or armored assaults is different than training them to respond to snipers, ambushes, or assaults by irregulars.

69 Interview with Major Rick Brennan, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy, Human Rights, and Peacekeeping, 14 July 1993. Brennan had moved on 12 July from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations and Plans, Strategic Plans and Policy Division where he was responsible for Army policy on peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Conclusion

In the 1990s, a vision of warfare based on the Desert Shield and Desert Storm experience, as the armor traditionalists would have liked it, proved to be too politically unpopular with the civilian reformers in Congress and the executive branch, especially in the Clinton administration, which did not perceive such scenarios as credible. In such an administration, given a desire to promote democratic institutions abroad, the desire to use the Army for nation assistance, humanitarian relief, and low level military-to-military contacts came to be the major policy thrust. 70

By the end of 1991, under pressure from civilians, power shifted to officers who might work to overcome organizational constraints. These officers might be termed the visionaries. Had the Army remained dominated by traditionalists, it would have found itself hard pressed to respond well to the missions it was given in an era of budgetary constraints. To meet the new missions, and avoid a disgraceful failure, the Army no longer has the luxury of dealing with such missions on the margin. It has to confront them directly.

Evidence is not yet available, but a reasonable assumption is that one of the reasons for the selection of General Sullivan as General Vuono's replacement was Sullivan's willingness to embrace non-traditional missions. Moreover, the Clinton administration's choice for Powell's replacement was General John Shalikashvili, an officer with a background as an adviser in Vietnam, and who commanded the large humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq. The Clinton administration's determination to use the military in non-traditional ways made officers who could think intellectually about the subject of low intensity conflict all the more important. Yet, these officers were not in any sense "mavericks."

The debate within the Army, though, is not yet over. The Army may be at a threshold of change where it must seriously reconsider its focus and core. The Army must understand its organizational boundaries and seek to modify them towards OOTW. Thus, one needs to understand the process of change, and its likely outcomes. Absent clear priorities, a consistent effort from civilian leaders, or Army involvement in missions such as those in Somalia and the Balkans, intergroup conflict based upon organizational discomfort with OOTW could continue in a smaller Army, perhaps at a dysfunctional level.

Fundamental change will become concrete when the Army devises lists of tasks for each of the various missions within the concept of OOTW, requires units to train on those tasks at all levels from individual to higher level "war games," and when the officer corps

70 The Bush administration had already emphasized these as "Forward Presence Operations."
becomes comfortable with the concept of OOTW. By 1993 the Army had begun to move in these directions, but was not yet there. Hence, we have only change in progress with an as yet undefined outcome.

Finally, officers in the armed forces must accept Samuel Huntington's adage:

The purpose of military forces is combat, that is to deter and to defeat the enemies of the United States; that is their central mission, their raison d'être, the only justification for expending resources on their creation and maintenance. The forces created for that mission, however, can and throughout our history have been employed in non-combat non-military uses.

The task now facing officers is how to form an organizational mentality that incorporates the idea of victory, the management of violence, and the support of the American people into a comprehensive definition of Operations Other than War.