Tibetan Ethnonationalism and International Politics

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Landlocked and containing the world’s highest mountain range and its surrounding windswept plateau, Tibet has until recently been one of the most isolated regions on earth. Widely known for the majestic beauty of its scenery and the mystic attractions of its lamaist Buddhist religion, the Kingdom of Shangri-la had actually been visited by very few outsiders. Most of these were devout pilgrims or, as the nineteenth century wore on, a small number of intrepid western explorers. Though certainly not xenophobic or hostile to individual foreigners, most Tibetans had little interest in the world beyond their country’s somewhat ill defined borders, preferring to keep that world and its influences at a distance.

The internationalization of the status of Tibet may be considered to have occurred in three phases. The first began in the late nineteenth century, when an expanding czarist Russian empire began to draw closer to Britain’s Indian empire. British statesmen came to the conclusion that a buffer state would provide a convenient shield against this expansion. Tibet, by reason of its geographic location, and because its population was culturally, religiously, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from that of China, which claimed suzerainty over it, was a logical choice.

British diplomats began to negotiate with the Qing, or Manchu, dynasty that then ruled China. In 1893, as a preliminary step, they concluded with the Chinese government a trade treaty
involving Tibet. The Tibetans, however, refused to honor the treaty, since they had not themselves been a party to it. Britain next tried direct negotiations with Tibet, but these were also rebuffed by the government of the God-king, the Dalai Lama, on the grounds that the imperial government in Beijing would not allow it.

Diplomatic methods having failed, Britain dispatched a military expedition under Colonel Francis Younghusband. The Tibetan army had purposely been kept weak to avoid tipping the domestic balance of power against the influential monastic sector, and despite the country's rugged terrain and harsh climate, Younghusband's force took Tibet's capital, Lhasa, without undue difficulty.

Qing officials, in what later proved to be a serious blunder, decided to hold the Dalai Lama responsible for this defeat and declared him deposed. Initially annoyed with the British, the Tibetans became infuriated with the Qing for what they regarded as egregious interference in their internal affairs. Since the God-king holds his position not as an official with duties to perform, but as the reincarnation of a certain Living Buddha, the only way he can legitimately be deposed is by declaring him a false reincarnation. This would have to be done by the appropriate Tibetan religious authorities, which the Qing officials clearly were not. Hence, the court's decree was ignored. A further consequence of the blunder was to convince the shrewd and highly competent Dalai Lama that a degree of cooperation with Britain would enhance his chances of survival. Trade with India grew, British advisers were welcomed in Lhasa, and the Tibetan government began to insist that when the representative of the Qing requested an audience, the British consul be present as well. The 1911 revolution that toppled the Qing dynasty enabled the Tibetans to rid themselves of the Chinese presence, on the grounds that their association had been with a particular dynasty, and a non-Han Chinese dynasty at that, rather than with the state itself. Tibetan independence was never officially accepted by the Republican government of China, though it was too weak to exercise actual administration over the territory. Just on the verge of formalizing the status of the buffer state it had so long sought, Britain became absorbed in World War I. The difficulties of the post-war period and the increasing certainty that India would attain independence combined to diminish Foreign Office interest in formally severing Tibet from a China that did not control it anyway. A few individuals, some with official positions, retained their interest in the country. Basically, however, the newly independent India became the legatee of the Tibetan cause.
The second stage in the internationalization of the Tibet question may be considered to have begun with the Chinese Communist conquest of the country in October 1950. By actually asserting control over Tibet and announcing its intention to eventually make drastic changes in the area’s political, social and economic systems, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) galvanized a number of international forces. Understandably, these were most prominent in Tibet’s nearest neighbor. Indian diplomats worried that China would use Tibet as a forward area from which to press territorial claims; Indian business interests feared interruption in trade routes, and Indian religious leaders were concerned about the fate of their lamaist Buddhist colleagues. World anti-communist forces, most vocally those in the United States, lamented the loss of yet another area to the Marxist-Leninist conspiracy. The defeated Nationalist (KMT) government of China, which had fled to Taiwan, was also concerned with developments in Tibet. Although one of the few things the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agree on is that Tibet is part of China, the KMT understandably also wished to weaken its communist adversary wherever it could.

The intelligence agencies of the US, India, and Taiwan all appear to have been active in Tibet, providing arms, money, and training to anti-communist Tibetan guerrillas. Since most were from the Kham region, they were collectively known as the Khambas. Typically, these fighters were hardy merchants whose caravans had legitimate reasons for travelling throughout the country. Familiar with the terrain, accustomed to strenuous activity at high altitudes, and with good contacts among the people, they effectively turned Mao Zedong’s military advice that “the army is the fish and the people are the water; the water will support the fish” against the communist troops. One source estimates that by 1959, 42,000 Khamba guerrillas were being funded by the US Central Intelligence Agency. He describes their major activity as mining the roads between Tibet and China proper.3

Meanwhile, the CCP government attempted to assert its jurisdiction over the area. Both from its own point of view and by comparison with the many changes it made in China proper during this period, the CCP could not be accused of wielding a heavy hand in the area it later designated the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) from 1950 through 1958. It did, however, attempt reforms in other areas inhabited by Tibetans which aroused significant resistance. It also made a number of decisions that created tension with Tibetans regardless of their place of residence.

Among the most noteworthy of these was to expand the administrative jurisdiction of Qinghai province to include several
so-called autonomous Tibetan prefectures. As these territories were contiguous to the area that the CCP designated the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and had been considered by Tibetans as the country’s Amdo province, the action was criticized as a “divide and rule” tactic. So also was the creation of comparable Tibetan autonomous areas in Sichuan province. Chinese anthropologists’ "discovery" of two additional minority ethnic groups, the Loba and the Monba, within the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) was similarly construed as an effort at dividing and weakening. The Chinese also proved adept at exploiting already existing cleavages within Tibetan society, for example between the secular nobility and the monastic hierarchy, and between the wealthy and the poor, to their own advantage. In this instance, of course, the term “divide and rule” is somewhat misleading: the Chinese did not create the divisions, but rather cleverly manipulated them to serve Party policy.

A road-building program also proved highly unpopular: most Tibetans did not regard highway construction as a beneficial upgrade for the infrastructure, but instead saw the project as creating smooth paths for an invasion of unwanted Chinese immigrants, bureaucrats, and soldiers. Moreover, while Party propaganda regularly railed out against the burdensome corvee labor arrangement required by the traditional system, Tibetans found themselves “volunteered” for road construction duties by their Chinese mentors.

A number of other tensions were unintended. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s need to obtain food supplies locally created food shortages and inflationary pressures in a society that had heretofore been insulated from both. PLA mess units stationed at Lhasa regularly burned bones, as well as other remnants of food, as part of their regular sanitation procedures, not realizing that this offended Tibetan religious beliefs. For their part, the Chinese were horrified at many Tibetan practices. So-called sky burial, in which corpses were exposed to be picked clean by vultures, contrasted sharply with Chinese notions of reverence toward deceased ancestors. Frugal Chinese were also horrified to discover that more than half of Tibet’s butter production was burned as incense in the temples. Moreover, olfactory senses that associated the scent of sandalwood and burning joss sticks with religious ceremonies found the odor of burning rancid butter difficult to get used to.

While some Tibetans proved successful collaborators, and found their lives materially enriched because of it, a much larger number regarded the Chinese as unwelcome imperialists and resisted them in various ways ranging from passive resistance
to armed attacks. Tensions accumulated. In 1958, Tibetan refugees from outside the TAR began to arrive in Lhasa with horror stories of what the disastrous social experiment known as the Great Leap Forward had done to the rest of the country. Millions of people throughout China were dying of starvation and related diseases. In Tibetan communities, forced communication had been accompanied by mass arrests and the destruction of monasteries. Quite naturally, both the refugees and residents of the TAR assumed that a comparable program of reforms would soon be imposed there. Existing tensions were exacerbated. When, in March 1959, a rumor spread that the Chinese were about to kidnap the Dalai Lama, a major rebellion began.

The PLA put down the rebellion with relative ease, though scattered resistance continued for a long time thereafter, and the fact that the uprising occurred at all was a severe embarrassment to the Chinese government. The PRC had been touting the relevance of the Chinese path to socialism as a model for the non-Han Chinese societies of the developing world, whereas the implied message of the revolt was that a large number of Tibetans were extremely unhappy with it. Party propaganda had in fact portrayed the Tibetan people as pathetically grateful for Chinese beneficence in providing them with roads, schools, and modern medicine.

The CCP declared that the revolt had been caused by a small number of disgruntled aristocrats and religious figures who had “hoodwinked” the masses into participating and abducted the Dalai Lama. It also judged that the revolt had ended an agreement made with the Tibetan government in 1951, and began an ambitious reform program. One important effect of the revolt was to end the special treatment promised, albeit on a temporary basis only, to Tibet, and to facilitate Tibet’s integration into the regular administrative system of China. This did not, of course, guarantee that the area would become integrated into China in the more important psychological sense.

Another important consequence of the 1959 revolt was that it created a Tibetan diaspora. At least 80,000 refugees—out of a total population estimated at about 4.5 million, and including the Dalai Lama himself—made their way out of the country, bringing vivid accounts of the hardships of life under Chinese colonialism that were highlighted by the world media. The Dalai Lama and a majority of these refugees settled in India, with sizeable groups also in Nepal and Bhutan. International refugee organizations arranged for small groups to settle in several other countries, including, among others, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States. Others made their way to Taiwan. From these
bases, the same people who had tried to keep the world at bay proved immensely skillful at attracting world attention to their cause. Hence, 1959 may be considered to mark the beginning of the third phase of the internationalization of the Tibetan question.

The Tibetan Government-in-Exile set up representative offices cultural and administrative capitals of the world, and began to lobby for the cause of Tibet. Typically, these publish newsletters summarizing developments in Tibet.4 There are also international monthlies, the Tibetan Review and Tibetan Bulletin, which deal with various aspects of traditional religion and culture and give news on the activities of the various diaspora communities as well as chronicling events in Tibetan areas under PRC control. An international Tibet Press Watch compiles data on news concerning Tibet from the world media. Since adherents of many faiths can be assumed to have sympathy for those of other faiths who are being oppressed, Tibetan Buddhists have set up contacts with other religious communities. Such groups have been instrumental in having the Dalai Lama or his representatives invited to their countries to speak. The Chinese government is strongly opposed to such visits.

Tibetan efforts received a setback in the 1970s when most of the international community began to seek better relations with the PRC. The US ceased its support of the Khamba guerrillas, many of whom were summarily executed. It, and other countries as well, began to give more consideration to China’s attitude toward Tibet. The PRC’s protests and vague but strongly-worded threats of retaliation have intimidated all but a handful of world leaders from receiving the Dalai Lama. Most governments have, however, been willing to agree to an unofficial visit from His Holiness in order to confer privately (though typically attended by much publicity) with interested groups. These have included, among others, universities with religious study programs, Buddhist associations who express the desire to discuss fine points of theology, and Jewish groups who wish to conduct an inter-faith dialogue. An ongoing subject of discussion with obvious mutual interest between the Dalai Lama and world Jewish communities concerns the matter of how an exile group maintains its cultural and religious identity many centuries after leaving its homeland.5 While Tibet’s international status is not the topic of His Holiness’s speech, the issue is almost invariably raised in the question and answer session, and is addressed. Jewish groups have been strongly supportive of Tibet: for example, during the summer of 1990, the Central Conference of American Rabbis passed a resolution condemning the PRC for its treatment of Tibetans, urged President Bush to invite His Holiness to the White House, and asked
Congress to pass a bill granting permanent visas to a thousand Tibetans.⁶

Exile leaders have also sought to attract attention to Tibet’s cause by enhancing the world’s awareness of their country’s distinctive culture. New York’s Tibet House, for example, sponsors art exhibitions and conferences. Tibetan paintings have toured major museums of the world, and Tibetan handicrafts shops sell such items as traditional carpets, fabrics, and jewelry. Several publication houses specialize in books dealing with Tibet, carrying titles on topics including traditional medicine, religion, and art as well as politics. While Tibetan leaders would deny that there is a public relations motive behind these ventures, they have indeed served to draw attention to the area’s plight. A number of prominent people have become activists in support of Tibet, including American film actor Richard Gere and German Green Party leader Petra Kelly.

These efforts to call attention to the cause of Tibet have been helped by the PRC’s lack of success in administering the region. The reform policies imposed after the 1959 rebellion included the wholesale destruction of most monasteries and the arrival of a large number of Han Chinese administrators who neither knew the country nor appeared interested in remedying this deficiency. Most immigrant Chinese seemed to ignore the CCP’s orders to learn Tibetan. The Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, was a particularly devastating experience in Tibet. While most of the actual fighting appears to have occurred between different factions of Han Chinese Red Guards rather than directly involving Tibetans, there was great destruction to temples and monasteries.⁷ By September 1966, the official Xinhua news agency reported that the prayer flags that formerly flew from Lhasa roofs had all been replaced by the five-star Chinese flag, and that walls and household shrines now contained images of Chairman Mao Zedong rather than “superstitious” pictures.⁸

In the 1970s, a more benign policy toward China’s ethnic minorities in general allowed Tibetans as well as others more freedoms. But an effort to force Tibetans to grow wheat rather than the traditional barley backfired badly. Touted as a way of raising crop yields, it was perceived by many Tibetans as forcing them to raise an unwanted commodity in order to feed more Han immigrants. Wheat proved to be unsuitable ecologically as well as culturally: after a few years of apparently good results, the soil became exhausted. Crops failed disastrously in the late 1970s, to the extent that in 1980 Han immigrants were evacuated because of the food shortage.⁹

The government reversed its wheat policy, allowing Ti-
betans to raise barley again. It also ended the commune system, resulting in increases in agriculture and livestock production. Rural discontents were reduced, although urban dissatisfactions continued to grow. A number of factors were involved, only a few of which space permits to be mentioned here. First, in order to encourage Han to come to Tibet and contribute their skills to the area’s development, the government paid them salary supplements. This created a two-tier wage scale that disadvantaged local people and created jealousy. Second, Tibetans complained that Han received preferential treatment in hiring and promotions. Tourism presented other, more complicated problems.

The Chinese government has encouraged tourism as a relatively easy way to enhance its foreign exchange holdings, and Tibet, though an expensive destination, has had considerable appeal for foreign visitors. Some Tibetans welcomed the visitors, and prospered by selling items such as ceremonial scarves and distinctively Tibetan jewelry made of coral, turquoise, and silver. Others viewed tourism as one more example of Tibet’s exploitation by the Chinese, feeling that it was the Han rather than the locals that profited from it. In the words of one native,

First the Chinese cut our trees, mined our gold, and took our grain. Now there’s nothing left, and they’re selling our country to the foreigners.

Foreign tourists report being approached by Tibetans who wished to complain about their treatment by the Chinese, and who begged them not for money, but for pictures of the Dalai Lama. A number of the tourists had come because of a prior interest in Tibetan culture and religion, and were therefore predisposed toward sympathy with the local people. Various forms of collusion developed, including the smuggling in of religious tracts, and the smuggling out of letters to Western human rights groups. Demonstrations of varying sizes were endemic; at least one tourist, a Dutch human rights advocate, was shot by Chinese police as she marched with the protestors.

In March 1989, on the thirtieth anniversary of the 1957 rebellion, a demonstration turned particularly brutal, with 450 Tibetans killed and thousands more arrested. The TAR was placed under martial law for over a year. An eyewitness to the demonstration reported that he and approximately a hundred other tourists had been expelled from Lhasa so that there could be no outside corroboration for the retaliation that the PLA and police were about to take. During the following year, a defecting Han Xinhua correspondent presented evidence that the demonstration had in
fact been incited by agents provocateurs acting on instructions from Beijing.\textsuperscript{13}

In sum, the record of Chinese administration in Tibet has given the region’s refugee lobbyists a long grievance list with which to attract international attention.

Demands

Independence from Chinese rule has been the consistent demand of Tibetan expatriate communities, as well as anti-Chinese activists within Tibet.\textsuperscript{14} Some individuals have occasionally intimated that they might be willing to define independence in a manner that did not imply complete and total separation from Chinese rule. If the region were to truly be given the autonomy implied in its designation as an autonomous region, many Tibetans would probably be mollified. Foreign sources have suggested that Tibet be re-designated a Special Administrative Region (SAR), a classification written into the PRC’s 1982 constitution in order to facilitate the re-integration of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan with the People’s Republic. This plan was not well received by Tibetans, and received an unequivocal rejection from the Beijing government. The latter declared that the status of Tibet had been fixed by treaty many years ago, and was not subject to re-negotiation.

In June, 1988, during an address to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama outlined the framework for a Hong Kong style settlement. The key points were:

- Beijing would be responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy;
- Tibet would be governed by its own constitution or basic law;
- the Tibetan government would comprise a popularly elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature, and an independent legal system;
- Tibet would become a demilitarized zone, but with China retaining the right to maintain military installations in Tibet for defensive purposes only, until neutrality is established.\textsuperscript{15}

Most outside observers found the Strasbourg statement constructive, noting that for the first time, the Dalai Lama had formally asked for an arrangement short of total independence.\textsuperscript{16} Most Tibetans, and most vocally the younger generation thereof, did not approve of the statement, and pressed for immediate and complete independence with no conditions attached. The Chinese leadership accused the Dalai Lama of trying to internationalize what was actually an entirely domestic matter. They credited the proposal with “a change in tone,” though rejecting it as tanta-
mount to a declaration of independence or semi-independence, neither of which was acceptable.

The Dalai Lama was, however, invited to Beijing for negotiations. The Dalai Lama agreed to negotiate, but wished to do so at a location outside of China. PRC leaders initially seemed cool to the idea, but in September 1988 agreed to allow the Dalai Lama to choose the site. However, the Chinese side then refused to accept as part of the Tibetan negotiating team a Dutch lawyer who had worked with the exile government for many years. The Dalai Lama’s group countered by saying that the attorney, a specialist in international law, was an adviser to, rather than a member of, the negotiating team.

At this point, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that younger Tibetan radicals, frustrated at the lack of progress on the part of the Dalai Lama’s government, and by the Indian government’s neutral stance, began to urge a global terror campaign. This would include bombing PRC embassies, assassinating high-ranking Chinese leaders, and hijacking the mainland’s planes. When reminded that the religion and its leader, in whose names they acted, consistently preached non-violence, the radicals replied that they saw independence as a strictly political issue which should not be compromised by religion. While Tibetan sources have criticized this news report as greatly exaggerated, the existence of a substantial number of younger Tibetan radicals is not denied. China responded to this news by intensifying its efforts to find pronationalist leaders and put them in jail.

The atmosphere surrounding the consultations about negotiations was further clouded in January 1989, by the death of Tibet’s second highest reincarnation, the Panchen Lama. He had not left the country after the 1959 rebellion, and had had a good, though not completely unblemished, record of loyalty to whatever the Party line happened to be at any given moment. It was therefore shocking when, at a ceremonial occasion on January 24, he stated that, although there had been development in Tibet since its liberation by the CCP, this development had been outweighed by what it had cost. Xinhua subsequently announced that he had died on January 28, of a heart attack. Since the lama was only 51, had no previous history of heart disease, and was survived by both his parents as well as numerous siblings, suspicious minds concluded he had been murdered in retaliation for his outspokenness.

It is impossible to substantiate these charges, and the truth may never be known. What is certain is that the Panchen Lama’s death deepened the atmosphere of distrust between Tibet and China, and deprived the Chinese government of an important
conduit to the Dalai Lama. When Tibet was placed under martial law after the apparently Beijing-contrived rebellion of March 1989, the possibility of successful negotiations became still more remote. The Tiananmen incident in June provided yet another obstacle. As of early 1991, no meaningful progress had been made.

Resolution

The prospects for resolution of the Tibetan question do not look bright. While the plight of the Tibetans has aroused world sympathy, no major foreign government has been willing to jeopardize its good relations with China in order to actively support the Tibetan cause. Their attitude did not alter either after the PRC government moved violently against Chinese demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989, or after the Dalai Lama was awarded the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize.

In August 1990, the Dalai Lama announced that the continued existence of the institution of Dalai Lama would be up to the Tibetan people, and that he was willing to give up his demand for an independent Tibet and settle for autonomy within China. He called talk of complete independence “a little unrealistic,” though admitting this view would be unpopular with his followers. Indeed it has been. A factor further complicating the difficulties of finding a negotiated settlement to the Tibet question is the rise of a new generation of militants, both within the TAR and in the various exile communities. While their reverence for the Dalai Lama is sincere, they apparently find no inconsistency between these professions of unswerving devotion and their rejection of the Dalai Lama’s message of non-violence. Even were the Beijing government inclined to compromise—which thusfar it has not been—the compromise might not be acceptable to a sufficient number of Tibetans. Democratization has affected the Tibetan exile community to a significant degree: as of May 1990, for example, the Tibetan cabinet is now selected through popular election. Compliance with the Dalai Lama’s wishes cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, people accustomed to speaking their minds freely and choosing their own officials will find it difficult to re-integrate themselves into a Tibet ruled by the current Chinese government.

The Dalai Lama has viewed developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a possible precursor of liberalization in China, in which case a settlement might be possible. Chinese dissidents who fled to the West after the Tiananmen incident have in fact suggested that, under a democratic government, China could become a federation of five parts, including the mainland,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibet; each would have its own seat in the UN. The advent of a democratic China is, of course, a rather large condition to the fruition of this plan. Moreover, even a popularly elected Chinese government might not be willing to let Tibet go its own way.

In the short term, at least, a more plausible scenario is the emergence of a Northern Ireland-like situation, in which religious festivals or the anniversaries of previous uprisings become the occasions for outpourings of popular discontent. Each new uprising has the potential to provide more martyrs to the cause, and avenging the honor of the martyrs will provide the reason for future uprisings in Tibet. These will generate considerable sympathy from the international community, but no foreign government is apt to make any serious effort to influence China to loosen its hold over the region.

What China gets out of its occupation of Tibet is not immediately clear. There is undoubtedly a strong nationalistic motive: the PRC has maintained the southwestern boundaries of the Qing dynasty Chinese empire. Certainly the motivation for its continued presence is not economic. While Tibet contains uranium and other valuable minerals, they are not easily accessible. The TAR has since its inception been a substantial drain on the central government treasury, and the situation is getting worse rather than better. A 1985 article in one of the PRC's leading economic journals noted that money invested in Tibet did not have a multiplier effect. An increase of one yuan in output value required an input of 1.21 yuan in state subsidies. Over the previous thirty years, the average increase in output value in the TAR had been 5.45%, while the average annual increase in state subsidies was nearly 15%. Tibet was in fact becoming more dependent on state subsidies rather than less.

China does, of course, have a legitimate security interest in protecting its southwestern borders, but with Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-Indian relations so much improved, the continued stationing of troops estimated from a low of 50,000 troops to a high of 250,000 in the TAR would seem unnecessarily expensive from a defensive point of view. A more convincing argument for the PRC government's refusal to compromise on Tibet is that it fears the demonstration effect: granting independence, or even meaningful autonomy, to Tibet might well prompt similar, or even more far-reaching, demands from China's other minority groups. Some of their areas, such as the already restive Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, are potentially very wealthy, and their resources are more easily tapped than those of Tibet. The problems that contentious ethnic minorities, rich or poor, can pose
for the central government have been amply demonstrated in the Soviet Union in recent years.

It is not completely out of the question that a future Beijing government may come to the conclusion that granting a degree of internal self-government to Tibet would be preferable to continuing to sustain a financial black hole which is simultaneously an acute human rights embarrassment. At that point, it will become a question of whether the Dalai Lama can persuade his militant supporters to agree to such a compromise.

FOOTNOTES


2 The Simla Convention of 1914, initialled by British, Tibetan, and Chinese representatives, provided a separate status for an area designated as inner Tibet. However, the Chinese government refused to acknowledge the actions of its representative. See Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present, Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, 1924, pp. 155-156, for a fuller account.

3 See, e.g., Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 266 and p. 426, footnote 82. The number of Khamba guerrillas seems excessively high; I have been unable to ascertain McCoy’s sources.

4 For example, News Tibet is published bi-monthly by the Office of Tibet in New York. It is registered under the Foreign Agents Act as an agent of the Dalai Lama.

5 See, for example, Allison Kaplan, “Dalai Lama Discusses Oppression With Jews,” Miami Jewish Tribune, September 28-October 4, 1990, pp. 1;6. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Bernard Schechterman, for calling this article to my attention.


7 Apparently condoned by the more radical leadership elements in Beijing but disapproved of by others. Premier Zhou Enlai, a conservative, is reported to have tried to stop the desecration of temples and monasteries. For a detailed account of this period, see June Teufel Dreyer China’s Forty Millions, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1976, chapter 8.

8 Xinhua (Beijing), September 29, 1966.

31, 1980, p. 81.


15Reprinted in the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 16, 1988, p. 1.


17Ibid.


24Agence France Presse, August 1, 1990, in FBIS-CHI, August 1, 1990, p. 11.
