Strategy Choices in Electoral Competition

Gideon Doron

Uri On

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol11/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact commons@coastal.edu.
Strategy Choices in Electoral Competition

GIDEON DORON
Uri On
Tel Aviv University

Introduction

Political parties competing for power in democracies utilize electronic and printed media in order to affect the behavior of potential voters. Campaign managers in each of the competing parties have to decide how to allocate effectively and available resources so that their investment yields the highest returns in terms of votes.

In principle they could select one of the following two basic patterns of spending. In the first mode, the "positive strategy" they invest in an effort to transmit images of themselves so that the party looks attractive to the voters. The second alternative, the 'negative strategy' is a form of campaigning in which one party attacks the other or others by emphasizing their various disadvantages. Successful utilization of this campaign method would render the opponents unattractive to potential voters. The aggressive party may thus benefit from voters who negate the other parties and vote for it. The initiating party may also benefit indirectly by weakening other parties because affected voters would deny their support of main rivals, either by voting for others or abstaining totally. A certain composite of these two types of pure strategies is possible.

Our understanding of political processes will increase if we are cognizant of conditions that underlie the choice of a given campaign strategy. The first section of the article describes a framework for a rational model for a choice of a campaign strategy. The second part provides evidence for the theoretical expositions outlined. The supportive data is brought from the Israeli political context.

A. A Design for Optimal Competitive Campaign Strategy

A party competing in a political election may choose either one of the following strategies or a composite of both: a positive strategy in which leaders, ideologies, issues and actions are described in the most attractive manner; a negative strategy—in which leaders, ideologies, issues and actions of other parties are described in the most derogatory manner. The intensity of the campaign and the specific points of concentration are dependent upon the intrinsic style of the political game in a given system.

Political campaigning when conducted through the electronic and printed medium is similar in many ways to commercial advertising. An analogy can be drawn between firms and political parties, both attempting to affect people’s choice by advertising in a direction compatible with their interests.1 The following expands on this analogy.
Characteristics of the Political and Economic Markets

The main difference between political and economic markets, is that in the first the expression of preferences is required at greater intervals than in the latter. In this sense, a decision to buy a car every four years has many elements of a decision to vote for a political party during the same interval. There are several firms competing for consumer attention, offering a variety of models, and using multi-dimensional emphasis to show the advantages of their car, with or without reference to other firms or models.

Likewise in politics, several parties competing for voters’ attention offer different leaders and issues incorporating multi-dimensional space which are seen as relevant to the voters. Safety or security, comfort or welfare, reliability or credibility etc., are variables common to both markets by which a person makes his choice. The message in both is clear: a choice for us will increase your utility more than a choice for others. Alternatively, if you do not choose us, do not choose at all.

This message is transmitted through advertising. Of course, political choosers cast a ballot only once during the said interval while economic choosers can enter the market at any given time. This influences the intensity of the campaign but not its nature. In both cases the competition is conducted primarily over market share. Each party or firm tries to attract customers from other parties while maintaining their own. In addition, extensive advertising coupled with the laws and regulations designed in each system to guarantee “fairness” in the name of “public interest,” sets a barrier for new firms or parties to enter the game. A political example of such a barrier is the threshold percentage, and regulation design to allocate advertising time at given spots to parties on television and radio.

Positive campaign strategy is aimed not only at strengthening loyalty of supporters, but also it is designed to provide information to attract the indecisive, confused voters, known as floating voters (F.V.) by affecting their choice of party.

Negative Campaign Strategy

Negative strategy is a competitive campaign technique where one party points out the disadvantage of voting for other parties. There exists a tendency to dramatize the adverse implications of voting for the other party. An extreme example of this approach is an all out attack on rivals without revealing the source of the attack. The effectiveness of such strategy will be discussed.

Negative strategy is instrumental in setting the tone and the pace of the electoral race. A party wishing to affect the order of issues that are considered in the public agenda could initiate it through negative strategy. Thus, for example a small party who has little to offer to the public beyond what is already being offered by large parties, may concentrate on the personalities of the other parties leaders. The leader’s character and conduct may become an issue of high priority in the competition. The initiators may benefit from this development.
The competitive strategy is more prevalent in politics than in business. This is because there exists less restriction on the nature of campaigning in the political arena. In politics there is no regulation equivalent to "truth in advertising" which sets restriction on the content of commercial advertising.

The principle target population of competitive strategy is the floating voters, i.e. potential voters not allied strongly with one of the competing parties. By effectively presenting its position, the party attempts to lure the floater to cast his vote for it. It is easier, however, to affect the F.V. that leans toward you. Hence, by attacking others, the party increases the solidarity among the ranks of her potential supporters. These floaters may decide to vote for the party because of the threat from the "common enemy." The images of such an enemy helps individuals who lean toward the party to close the gap between their differences. They realize that they share more common interest than not.

The floaters leaning towards a party may realize because of information transmitted to them, that personal change incurred by supporting the rivals would be greater than a choice for the party.

Comparison of Strategies

Research conducted in the area of commercial advertising showed that positive and negative strategies have similar effects on consumer choice of products. Since these studies did not differentiate between the various characteristics of the purchasing individuals, it is possible that different people are affected differently by alternative types of advertising.

For the analytical purpose of this study a distinction between types of campaign strategies is drawn. The aim of the positive campaign strategy is said to strengthen the loyalty of party supporters. Individuals identifying and relating to the party even in a weak sense ("leaning toward") receive continuous information from the party. This increases the probability that the supporters will continue to be loyal to the party on the decisive day.

Conversely negative political campaigning is aimed primarily at turning floaters against the other parties. It is designed to make other parties supporters disloyal to their parties. More specifically its main purpose is to make the indecisive voters who lean toward other parties even more indecisive. If effective, then, floaters may decide to cast their votes for the party that initiated the attack. The positive strategy will pull them into voting for it.

In extreme cases, a party may be under attack without knowing who generated it. The logic behind such an approach is not always clear. It is aimed presumably at creating an atmosphere which is generally negative concerning the attacked party. The vote maximizer manager, using such approach, often fails to realize his investment into votes. Yet, if resources are excessively available and the party wishes to maintain a "clean" image while weakening the others, then this method seems reasonable.
Preference Distribution of Floating Voters

As mentioned before the main purpose of negative strategy is to affect the choices of the floating voters in the direction of the initiating party. The resources that will be directed toward this sector, and the nature of the campaign depends on the preference distribution of these voters. In order to advance through the analysis certain assumptions concerning the preference distribution of the floating voters has to be made.

First, it is being assumed that the preferences of the F.V. are not uniformly distributed across the political space. People choose a party for a variety of reasons: ideological stands, specific issues, social and economic status, education and other relevant variables. This constitutes a multidimensional space of attitudinal variables relevant to voting behavior. In this space preferences are grouped by one or another dimension or by their crossroads. In the broadest sense these crossroads of dimensions constitute a political market. If, for example, voter emphasis is primarily economically orientated, then a political market for parties from the right, center and left is identified. On the other hand, if the relevant dimension is the orientation towards the issue of state and church, it constitutes a market of secular voters and one of religious voters.

Parties may wish, of course, to compete in each market. Yet, the vote maximizer manager cannot usually provide an adviser for such an approach. This is because some of these markets have opposing stands, hence, with given resources the party has to concentrate in these markets where it can establish relative advantage over other parties. The manager thus tries to win most of the voters in each market that he chose to compete. It follows, that in reality Down's vote maximization assumption is identical with Riker's plurality maximization assumption. Few parties, however, were able to play in relative success in contradictory markets, most notably the National Socialist German party, and the Italian Fascists. The movement of voters in the market, is mainly within the boundaries of the given market. In time, of course, voters may decide to cross boundaries.

The aforementioned assumption is extended somewhat by permitting the number of F.V. included in each of the political markets to vary. Variation in size, i.e. the density function of the F.V. according to their preference depends on the size of the parties included in a given market category. The size of a party in a given market, is in turn, determined by the subjective estimation of party managers and followers concerning the number of voters for the party on election day. In a relatively stable political system, an indicator for party size could be the number of votes received in the previous election, other size indicators could be the outcome of public polls, the results of primary elections etc.

The concept of political market need not be based on the common assumption of normality in the distribution of preferences over the entire political space prevalent in many of the voting behavior studies. On the contrary, the universal convention that places, for example, communist parties

139
in the extreme left edge of an ideological spectrum is not necessarily empirically meaningful. It is the subjective perception of party managers and followers that determines the boundaries of a given political market. To be more specific, the ICP in Italy is for all analytical and practical purposes located in the same market with the Christian Democrats. Some observers see little difference between the ICP and a conventional Social Democratic party such as those prevalent in Western Europe. In Israel the situation is similar, the Labor-leftist and the Likud-rightist labeled parties, are both center parties which attempt to appeal to the same voters with the aid of different labels.

The distribution of preference of floaters is then dynamic in nature and varies in accordance with the probability estimation of the size of the potential voters for each party. Since in reality, political spaces are multidimensional, party managers are faced with the problem of estimating precisely the size of the preference groupings. However, it can be deduced that the size of the F.V. stands in direct relation to the number of the party's potential voters ("bandwagon effect"). Above a large party there exists a large cloud of F.V. and above the small party a small cloud.

Based on the above assumptions and their logical implications, four working hypotheses are defined in order to aid in the construction of a rational choice model for the selection of campaign strategy. The hypotheses are as follows:

1. F.V. will tend to abstain from voting for a party that according to objective estimation her future impact on the political system is low.
2. The larger the party the more floaters will lean toward it. F.V. are low in their ideological articulation. This constitutes a tendency among them to join large parties—‘supermarkets’ of ideas, values, personalities, etc., and refrain from joining small parties which offer “special services.”
3. The more floating voters there are over a large party the higher the probability that they may be convinced to vote for other parties, i.e., other than the party that they originally ‘leaned towards.’
4. The reverse hypothesis is true for a small party. The fewer the number of F.V. over a small party, the less frequently they will tend to cross the boundaries of their market.

A Rational Choice Model for Campaign Strategy

The discussion thus far provides the basis for a definition of several generalizations concerning the direction and the scope of utilizing the negative strategy.

Independent of the amount of resources allocated for the competitive strategy the resources would be distributed in accordance with the following decision rule: you attack the largest party which is positioned nearest to you. We can probably demonstrate this rule best by an analogy with an apple tree. One shakes the closest tree with the most apples so that they will fall next to him.
Therefore, the proportion of resources directed to negative and positive advertisements is a function of the size of party x, the size of the competitor y, and the distance between them in the political space. Again, the apple tree analogy could assist in understanding the extent of effort (resources) invested by the shaker (party x) depends on the shaker’s strength (size), the size of the tree (party y) and the location of the tree in relation to x’s territorial location. If the tree is located far away from x’s territory, then it may be the case that while x is shaking it (negative advertising) the apples may fall on others’ territories (parties z, v, w, ...). It is clear then that the subject of the attack should be a member of the same political market as the party that initiates the attack.

This principle of “minimal campaign effort” may be generalized as follows: each party according to its size would spend more resources attacking the largest party which is nearest to it. This implies maximum efficiency and rationality in the selection of campaign target. For convenience we label this rule as “rational competitive strategy (RCS).”

A small party, for the point of view of potential supporters, that invests resources in attacking another small party located in a different political market, violates this principle. If rationality is defined as a goal oriented behavior, and the goal is as posited in this study—vote maximization, then the small party behaved in an irrational manner. This conclusion is also reinforced earlier by results of low probability for large numbers of F.V. joining a small party. Likewise, the result holds for a large party. A large party that attacks another party located far away from it also behaves irrationally. Parties should attack each other if and only if they identify themselves as located in the same market. That is, a party should attack only if it is expected that it will benefit by the numbers of additional voters, as a result of the attack.

Model (A) is a translation of the above principle:

Where: \( A_{ij} \) = the amount of resources directed by party i to attack party j.

\[
M_i = \text{the size of party } i.
\]

\[
M_j = \text{the size of party } j.
\]

\[
R_{ij} = \text{the distance between } i \text{ and } j \text{ as perceived by the party campaign manager.}
\]

\( A_{ij} \) increase in linear relation to the size of \( M_i \) and \( M_j \) and adversely with the size of \( R_{ij} \).

Constraints on the Value of the Model Variables

Model (A) summarizes the RCS Rule. Yet, at least two situations limits the scope of its selection. They involve the size of parties in the competition.

1. The manager of \( M_i \) may conclude after calculating the costs and benefits of the attack that it is not warranted to allocate the resources for the additional votes; at the same time denying free advertising to the small party.
2. If party $M_i$ is dominant in size and location in the political space it will not employ the negative strategy. $M_j$ may decide against providing free exposure to smaller parties. Model (A) is thus constrained by marginality calculations. Its limits are: $M_j \leq M_i \leq M_k$ where $j$ is a value for a very small party and $k$ a value for a very large (dominant) party.

Alternative Rational Choice Strategies

Reality is often too complex to be captured by a parsimonious model. The choice of RCS is aimed at the maximization of voting returns. Parties in reality may have other goals while campaigning. Three such possibilities are presented next.

1. A small party $M_i$ may attack a large party $M_j$ even if campaign managers estimate that they will not directly benefit from the attack. The reason for such behavior involves post-election calculations. $M_j$ may think about joining a coalition with a large third party ($M_k$). Therefore they would help advance this common interest by attacking $M_j$, another large party. $M_i$ and the third party $M_k$ may get closer to their goal merely by affecting choices of the F.V.'s of $M_j$ and causing them to abstain from voting.

2. When the political system is constructed by two big parties $M_i$ and $M_j$ and several small ones, the big parties may present the competition among them as a 'zero sum game.' They thus ignore all other parties in an attempt to convince the voters that their competition is the 'only game in town.'

3. A party may not behave in accordance with the RCS simply because its campaign manager erred in his judgment, when estimating the size of the parties, his own and the opposition. He may also be mistaken in identifying the location of the other parties relative to his own, thinking that they are located in his own political market.

Model (A) is an attempt to rigorously specify a decision rule for a political manager. It answers the questions, who to attack and what portion of the resources to allocate for that purpose. The manager may decide, of course, not to attack any of the competing parties and utilize only the positive campaign strategy. But, once he decides to go on the offensive against the others we expect that he would follow the RCS.

The purpose of the following examination is indicative in nature. It should support the validity of our argument. We have therefore selected the 'most difficult test case': the Israeli political system, with the supposition that if the model applies there, it would be easier to support it in other cases.

Model (A) includes three concepts: party size, distance between parties, and negative campaigning. We define them as follows:

*Party size:* The number of potential voters for a party at the time interval nearest to election day. Information for size could be acquired
through public opinion polls. In a stable political system the size of the party in the last election may indicate size in coming election.

**Distance**: A hypothetical position of a party relative to their parties as it is perceived by the public at a given time. Indicators for distance are problematic in nature since they usually rely on information that reflects cardinal evaluation of the positions of parties. For our purpose a simple ordering will suffice.

**Negative campaign**: Defined nominally as a form of political advertising in which one party attacks the others by referring to the latter’s disadvantages.

In addition a **political market** is defined as a group of parties perceived by voters as possible substitutes for each other. Usually they appear in the voters’ order of preference, consecutively in the first, second, and third place.

Two election races to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) were examined, the 1969, and the 1981 competitions. While many parties (up to 36 in 1981) usually qualify for the national race, no more than 12 parties were able to gain more than 1% of the votes as required by the threshold percentage. None of the parties were ever able to receive an absolute majority in the Knesset. The labor Alignment together with its Arab affiliated parties came closest in 1969 with 60 seats out of the 61 required for an absolute domination.

The two cases selected are structurally different. In 1969 the political system was modeled in what was labelled as “a dominant party system.”

The Labor Alignment was the largest in size and was located in the center of the political space. Its size was twice the size of the second largest party GAHAL forerunner of the Likud party, which in turn was twofold greater than the third largest party the National Religious Party (N.R.P.). None of the other parties represented in the Knesset was able to capture more than 4% of the electoral support.

The system in the October election of 1981, was more similar in structure to the British two-party system. Two major parties almost equal in size, 48 seats for the Likud and 47 for the Labor party, dominated the race. The other parties shared amongst themselves the remaining 24 seats.

To establish an indicator for distance based on orderly information we follow Axelrod’s method utilized in the Italian context and Zelikter’s applied to Israel. The setting presented in table one reflects ‘political markets’ located in two spaces. The first space is defined by left/right dimension which includes orientation towards the economy and security of Israel. The other market defined by a religious/secular dimension. This location presented in table one is consistent with the observation of several students of Israeli politics. Table 1 also presents the sizes of the parties in each of the markets identified in the two elections examined.
Table 1. Distribution of Knesset Seats by Political Markets, 1969 and 1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SECULAR PARTIES</th>
<th>RELIGIOUS PARTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialist-Liberal</td>
<td>Liberal-Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1981</strong>: Communists</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Ratz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969: Com. Maki Az</td>
<td>Labor + Arab Affiliated</td>
<td>IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: (1) MAKI—Zionist Communist Party  
(2) Haolam Ha'ze  
(3) IL—Independent Liberals  
(4) NRP—National Religious Party  
(5) PAI—Poalei Agudat Israel  
(6) AI—Agudat Israel

Data for the negative campaign was compiled from party advertisements in the largest evening paper ‘Yediot Archronit.’ We have measured in square inches the area of the advertisement devoted to attacking the other parties relative to its total press advertisement outlay. There were two reasons for selecting the press on the sole representative of negative expressions. First, in 1969 there was no political advertising on the Israeli television. Second, there are regulations restricting the time and content of political advertising. Since the press is freer than the television and the radio from such restrictions it reflects more accurately the allocative decision of party managers.

The 1969 election was less intensive than the one in 1981. Intensity was lower because the winner was certain from the onset and the rivals tried only to increase their margins. Also, most of the Israeli parties participated in a “wall to wall” coalition, a national unity government, and had planned to continue this arrangement after the election. During the month that preceded the election, the Labor Alignment directed only 3% of its resources toward the negative strategy. It ignored all other parties except the right wing GAHAL. This small percentage was spent only during the last two weeks of the campaign. Clearly, the Labor campaign managers had followed F.D.R.’s advice of not providing to the public free information on small parties. Conversely, the GAHAL bloc spent more than half of its resources attacking the Labor. In the first two weeks it utilized 75% of that period advertising budget for negative campaigning. During the last two weeks no less than 50 percent was directed towards that goal.

GAHAL, located in the same corner of the market as the Free Center, behaved as a major party should with a minor party—they ignored them totally. The Free Center also behaved according to our decision rule, it attacked GAHAL with almost half of its negative campaign resources. The Free Center, however, an opposition party outside the national unity coalition, attacked the Labor party with the remainder of its resources. According to our analysis, such an attack was a mistake and therefore a waste. The Alignment although big is located too far from the Free Center, for it to benefit from the fruits of a successful attack.

The State list, a splinter party of the labor bloc, headed by Ben Gurion formerly Israel’s prime minister, employed their negative strategy as predicted, concentrating exclusively on the Alignment. Other parties in the race followed a different rational counter to the vote maximization goal. The Independent Liberals and the HaOlam He’ze parties attacked the N.R.P. while the first invested only 10% of its campaign resources in the negative advertisement leaving 90% for positive presentation of themselves. The latter invested all of its resources against the religious party. It utilized its weekly magazine published under the same name HaOlam Ha’ze as an organ for publicizing their advantages. It is clear, that these two anti-religious parties tried to score points by emphasizing their secular uniqueness. Yet, the logic of our analysis indicates that they played ball in the
wrong field, since the returns for their investment could not come from voters affected by their campaign.

The 1981 election race was probably the most intensive race in Israel's short democratic history. Six months before the election it was predicted that the Labor, now the opposition party, would regain its strength and win decisively. As election day approached its margin of victory gradually withered away, and certain polls indicated a possible loss. The party had invested 42% of its campaign resources in the press, using the negative strategy. The Likud, now the incumbent invested only 12.2% for that purpose. Both parties behaved as predicted by model (A), attacking each other and ignoring all small parties in the race.

The small parties with the important exception of N.R.P. also behaved as predicted. Shinui, for example, attacked the Labor which is the largest party closest to it with 86% of his resources used for the negative purpose. The rest was spent against the Likud. Telem, headed by Dayan a prominent leader of the Labor bloc, who also served as Begin's minister of foreign affairs, led a campaign against the Labor with 59% of its resources and against the Likud with 41%. Tami, a splinter of the N.R.P. who draws its support from the oriental religious voters, concentrated exclusively on attacking its big sister the N.R.P.

The N.R.P. which lost half of its power in the election is the major exception to the decision rule described in this study. The N.R.P. split its negative campaign resources attacking three parties: Tami (36%), Tchiya (36%) and Shinui (28%). The first target is predictable. The second target could hardly be explained by the N.R.P. motivating fear that the Tchiya—an ultra nationalist party would draw support from the traditional voters of the N.R.P. Attacking the third party was a mistake. The N.R.P. could not possibly gain any vote from defectors from Shinui. Moreover, the N.R.P. who started the campaign was the third largest party of Israel (after the collapse of the Democratic Movement for Change, DMC) should not have paid so much attention to its new rivals who became major.

Conclusion

The foregoing study provides a logical formalization of a party's campaign manager decision rule. In essence it argued that while political campaigning need not be negative, when it is, the manager should follow the guidance of our model identifying his targets. The analysis, however, ignored an important question: How effective is a campaign through the media in general, and by utilizing the negative strategy in particular?

We know what many variables including the campaign affect peoples' choice of a party. We also know that commercial advertising is usually designed for market share competition. This knowledge applied to the context of our analysis means that negative strategy if effective, would be so only when utilized in relevant political markets.
It cannot be argued, however, that parties that did not use the guidance of the manager’s rule were affected negatively, i.e. lost popular support. Yet, the two election cases examined consistently provide indications in this direction. Parties erring in identifying their relevant rivals wasted resources and lost or at least did not gain additional voters support.

Moreover, since the electoral competition in the political market resembles a zero sum game, it can be argued that the effect of a successful utilization of the negative strategy by the various parties is to a large degree being cancelled. This is because parties applying this strategy against each other may attract some support from floating voters of the other parties, while at the same time losing some of its potential voters to them.\textsuperscript{18}

This situation could clearly be considered as a waste in resources. Yet the involved parties, even if aware of this cancelling effect, may not be able to arrive at an agreement to stop utilizing this strategy. There is always a strong incentive for one of the parties to break the agreement and try to get additional votes by attacking the others. The purpose of campaign regulation is to put a legal lid on the intensity of the competition.

In such a situation measurement of effectiveness is limited in value. For our analytical purpose it was enough to assume that if party managers believe that the negative strategy is effective, then our decision rule would assist them in the selection of their targets.
\[ \text{NOTES} \]


2That the purpose of advertising is the competition over market shares is a prime hypothesis in the Marketing literature. See, for example, Richard Schmalensee, \textit{The Economic Value of Advertising} (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1972), and Dan Horsky, \textit{Optimal Advertising Strategy Under Dynamic Market Conditions} (Lafayette: Krammet Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1974).


5For an analysis of the effects of such restrictions, i.e. public regulation, see Gideon Doron, \textit{The Smoking Paradox: Public Regulation in the Cigarette Industry} (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1979).


10For a comparison of the major Israeli and Italian political parties see, for example, Asher Arian and Samuel Barnes, ""The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability,"" \textit{Journal of Politics} 36:3 (1974). See also Ariel Levite and Sidney Tarrow, ""Delegitimation and Legitimation in Dominant Party Systems: The Cases of Israel and Italy,"" Paper delivered at the 1981 Annual Meeting of APSA, New York, September 3-6, 1981.


14See, David Nachmias, ""Coalition Politics in Israel,"" \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 7,3 (1974) and also Asher Arian and Samuel Barnes, op. cit.


16Robert Axelrod, \textit{Conflict of Interest} (Chicago: Markham, 1970), and Ofira Zelikter, ""Theories of Coalitions and Coalition Formation: The Israeli Case Study,"" \textit{State, Government and International Relations} 8 (1975), pp. 117-129.

17Emanuel Guttman, ""Some Observations on Politics and Parties in Israel,"" \textit{Indian Quarterly} 17,1 (1961); Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lisak, \textit{From Yishuv to State} (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Press, 1972); Ofira Zelikter, op. cit.