Two Basic Conceptions of the International Political System

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Introduction

A recurring theme in the contemporary literature of international politics and foreign policy analysis concerns itself with attempts to identify the current and future status of systemic politics in the world arena. The prevailing view sees the international political system (IPS) of the present and the immediate past on the verge of breakup and replacement by a new one. At a minimum the view is that a major realignment is in the offering. To determine the accuracy of such an assertion is provocation enough to engage in some form of analysis of today's IPS and its apparent trends. It is also my contention that such an exploration will reward the student with a significant insight and perspective on the nature of the IPS, a necessary objective in its own right.

In seeking to identify the current and future status of the IPS, the investigator is invariably confronted by the existence of two fundamentally dichotomous conceptions of the nature of the system: a Hobbesian and a Lockean. This discovery in itself is important as a consideration for analyzing any general assertions as to the changes in the old and emergence of a new IPS. How much of any of the conclusions are attributable to the bias of one of these views rather than a careful accumulation, analysis and validating of data about the IPS?

There are of course a multiplicity of conceptions of the IPS, but they all derive their inspiration from the two basic views cited. The two views, regardless of the nomenclature employed, have time-immemorial influenced the descriptions, analyses, and prescriptions offered by academicians and public officials for the IPS. The conceptualizations have been employed sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, and sometimes only on the basis of a partial awareness, even by methodologically-oriented people. Driven to their respective extremes they become irreconcilable; offered in carefully qualified fashion there emerges some similarities and areas of overlap. Each conception has been the product of considerable intellectualizing and/or emotionalism, the distinctions between the supporting efforts frequently lost due to the intensity of subsequent personal commitment.

The Dichotomous Conceptions of the IPS: A Hobbesian View

To facilitate the identification of the Hobbesian View, it should be thought of as synonymous with "ordered Anarchy." The term is intended to convey a position on an IPS continuum as predominantly anarchic but subject to ongoing efforts to organize and stabilize the world, including some successful
past achievements. The invocation of Hobbes' name is somewhat misleading unless identification is made with his classical concept of the "state of war" in his writings. The reference here avoids Hobbes' ultimate solution, "absolutism," to achieve stability in public relationships. The contemporary Hobbesian excerpts the "state of war" aspect, stressing by analogy the fundamental shortcomings and inherent limitations of man's nature as fostering a permanent, ongoing social conflict in all human relationships. This assumption in turn becomes an underlying premise for further development of the Hobbesian conception of the IPS.

Human frailty, the starting point for theorizing, is usually inferred, compelling a reader to discern this suppositional thread appearing throughout the conceptualization. Those Hobbesians¹ who begin with an outspoken admission of their "human nature theory" have consistently attracted the interested student's attention as a basis for serious intellectual endeavor, whether for reasons of agreement or disagreement.

In addition to the fundamental causality attributed to the nature of man, the Hobbesian also focuses on the vagaries and uncertainties inhering in the IPS as well as the internal dynamics of individual societies that are linked to external behavior. It is these assumptions and systemic features that preoccupy Hobbesians in every day analysis and are used to validate their overview.

In recent history the Hobbesian View has been identified with "Realism" as an interpretation of international politics. In the writings of advocates and critics, synonyms such as "realpolitik, machtpolitik, power politics, Biblical realism, etc.," have been employed to characterize the viewpoints as well as to convey the central concepts. Students of the IPS must recognize that similarities among such views does not guarantee that each one truly represents a Hobbesian View. Too often they may reflect distorted variations derived from that basic conception.²

In an American context, the Hobbesian View has been the exceptional rather than the predominant interpretation of the IPS. Any overview of the intellectual traditions that have governed American thinking about the IPS evidence an overwhelming commitment to the alternative Lockean View. Aside from those moments of attentiveness shown "the founding fathers" (most particularly Alexander Hamilton), some influential advocates at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries (Mahan, T. Roosevelt), and some writers and policy-makers of the immediate post-World War Two period (Niebuhr, Kennan, Morgenthau, etc.), the Hobbesian View has held little sway in American behavior. Of course a prominent foreign affairs commentator, Walter Lippmann, sought to provide an ongoing dialogue for this view throughout 20th Century America. Significantly, the previously cited moments of Hobbesian influence coincide with an intense and broad American activism in the

¹Niebuhr, Morgenthau, Kennan, Lefever, etc.
²Especially is this true for the view labelled "protracted conflict," a form of deterministic or Lockean idealism popularly called "romantic conservatism."
IPS. The multifaceted activism spurred on by the Hobbesians has never precluded some specific forms of activism inspired by the Lockean View, incorporating them in their overall conception of the IPS.

The Hobbesian View of the contemporary IPS can be briefly summarized in terms of five attributes, their corollary dynamics and ramifications. Simply stated they are: 1) the absence of any central governance; 2) a multiplicity of goals sought by the participants and best fulfilled by a general strategy (see #5); 3) the prevalence and continuity of heterogeneity among the participants; 4) a multiplicity of strategies and techniques available to participants to achieve their goals; and 5) a reliance on “equilibrium politics” as the best control system (strategy) by which to attain and sustain goal fulfillment in the IPS.

By the absence of any central governance the Hobbesian describes on the one hand the non-existence of a single, world-wide authoritative, legitimate decision-making and enforcing body in the IPS. By contrast, the Hobbesian describes the situation of innumerable centers of authority as proof of a decentralized governance system. The lack of a single authority to foster and compel obedience has the effect of only guaranteeing each state’s command over their own internal policy-making process and simultaneously denying them absolute control over external behavior beyond their immediate jurisdiction.

The variety of actors, combinations, and recombinations occurring and possible in any IPS varies with different periods of history, although one actor form predominates with consistency as the key unit for explaining behavior over any extended period of time. For past historical eras central dominant actors have been clans, tribal units, city-states, or other types of principalities. The contemporary Hobbesian cites “the territorial state” as the most significant actor today and for the foreseeable future. Recognizing that novel actor formation is always occurring in an existing IPS supports the contention that there are varieties of participants and that the IPS is always in a state of flux (or potential transformation).

The contemporary IPS is described by an elaborate typology of actors dominated by the most numerous form, the territorial state, commonly referred to as the “nation-state.” The current IPS is usually anointed by the title of “the western nation-state system” because of its European-based origin in the 17th-18th centuries. Because of the fewness in number of actual nation-states in the world today, meaning a coincidence of a national identity conscious population with a distinct geographical territory, the unit represents more of an aspirational goal than reality for the states in the IPS. The appropriate term under these circumstances is the legal or political developmental status term “the territorial state.”

The current IPS also includes other actors such as “sub-national units,” “regional or supranational units,” “coalitions or alliances,” “dependent areas,” and intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s).
The Hobbesian usually differentiates between the authoritative-legitimizing segments of the population as the true functionaries in the IPS in contrast with the larger and more passive general populace. For the Hobbesian, all the earlier versions of the IPS were featured by an emphatically rigid separation between leaders and the public in external role-playing. In the current IPS, though accepting the gap as still pronounced for the great majority of states, the influence of the public has risen to a new prominence. The public now provides the "tolerable limits" beyond which policy-makers may not stray, or they face the consequences of either being toppled from rule or with the reduced prospects of an effective implementation of their policy choices. Past Hobbesians are prone to lament over the rise of the common man, whereas contemporists merely caution against any excessive reliance on public opinion as a factor compounding the difficulties of rational policy-making, producing an emotional roller coaster effect on external behavior.

With the presence of so many actors, the Hobbesian cites the *ad infinitum* number of relationships that do or can potentially exist, negating the prospects of conclusive calculations and choices. At any given moment the actor is engaged in bilateral, multilateral, hierarchical, committal, and transitory relationships, as well as being confronted by the alternative possibilities provided by each of these.

A ramification of the open-endedness of the IPS produces a consistent insecurity for each actor, compelling them to focus on the inexactness of payoffs regardless of what policies are adopted vis-a-vis others. Under these uncertainties, a "worst case" frame of analysis is adopted for each relationship, dictating overly cautious behavior, primarily self-reliance, and great skepticism about the prospects of momentous changes in the IPS. The preoccupation with flux conditions and inability to predict developments in the IPS produces the moral imperative to preserve the actor at all costs, a criterion by which all subsequent behavior is then judged. With this basic concern underlying all prescriptive policies, the actor must engage in a constant competitive struggle in all areas of human behavior to maximize survival. Survival is viewed as more likely when predominantly self-reliant as opposed to being dependent on other actors, although the latter remains a tactical option under negative IPS circumstances.

In developing the second attribute of the IPS, the Hobbesian views the numerous actors as expressive of a tremendous variety of goals that further condition and determine their very survival. Nationalism is accepted as the primary driving force to create and sustain actors. Other "cultural support" bases for actor formation have severely limited prospects for replacing what has been viewed the key energy force for 300 years in western societies and is being emulated today in the non-western world. For the Hobbesian the failure of this dominant loyalty-authority pattern to meet the needs of the actors would lead to a new "cultural support" base, and probably organiza-
tional basis, to fulfill satisfactions. This view would sustain the Hobbesian belief in the open-ended condition of the IPS and the abilities to transform itself as necessity demands. For the foreseeable future the Hobbesian does not anticipate any departure from the present dominance of the territorial state unit. The reasoning is based on 1) the paradoxical nature of nationalism serving simultaneously as a unifying force (at the territorial level) and a fragmenting force (within the territorial level and in external interactions), and 2) the need for nationalism to run its course as a fulfilled aspiration in the more numerous "developing nations" of the world which currently lack its pervasive impact, especially analogous to the older actors.

Despite a lack of uniformities among actors the essentialness of meeting a vast number of needs creates a condition of interdependency for everyone with at least someone else. Therefore actor behavior has a penetrating or impinging effect on the internal affairs of other participants in the IPS. This tendency, in the final analysis, denies any actor a realistic choice of decision-making in terms of purely domestic considerations.

A further consequential outgrowth of this actor interdependency is an awareness that the very factors supporting their creation and survival are simultaneously sources of their vulnerabilities vis-a-vis one another. To adequately meet the actor's goals demands his perception of changing needs and priorities produced by both domestic and external factors, as well as a constant resort to multifaceted domestic and external managerial and collaborative efforts. Mismanagement of internalities in the society could undermine the unity and support of the public or cause the authorities grave concern that another actor might favorably exploit them to his advantage in their relationships. To the Hobbesian it is evident that a unified society stands a better chance of successfully conducting its external relations as well as buffering itself against any outside penetrations. It is equally obvious that for a divided society the dangers on both these counts increases immeasurably up to the ultimate prospect of complete subversion of the entire state. Failure to comprehend this whole situation would negate the prospects of an actor reaching his goals or even worse, injuring his security prospects.

To the Hobbesian the fallible and dual nature of men fails to guarantee either a correct or absolute perception of their needs, thereby intensifying their insecurities in externally-directed behavior. Internalities being diverse in number and possibly misperceived, forces the actor a) to pursue cautious and delimited external behavior to avoid damaging greatly the internal needs, b) not to resort to the wrong techniques for their policy implementations, and c) to avoid incorrect commitments abroad. Considerable risk-taking and an overly optimistic view of outcomes in the IPS suffer as a result of these considerations.

In explaining the third attribute of the current IPS, the Hobbesian asserts the primacy of a "cultural relativistic world." The external heterogeneity of
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Actors reflect the significance of nationalism or parochialisms as the key factor producing unit differentiation in the IPS. Because nationalism is based on a combination of distinct historical, psychic, and geographic factors, it produces a consciousness and behavior pattern for territorial states biased in behalf of these internalities. Effective leadership within each territory must cope with the chauvinistic overtones of this phenomenon by attempting to channel or control it for success in external relations. The best tactic seems to be a lip-service acquiescence while modifying it to accord with needs and systemic circumstances in the IPS that contradict its exclusive concern. The Hobbesian ends up stressing the critical nature of internal dynamics, governmental and cultural, as setting the tolerable limits for any leadership, but also a cause and sustaining factor in interstate conflict in the IPS.

A critical ramification of the heterogeneous nature of the external world is that its pervasiveness, paramountcy, and continuity, must serve as the starting point in the state's efforts at foreign policy analysis and choices. An equally important corollary must be the actor's recognition of the unresolvability of state differences in any absolute sense. Accommodations, agreements, and solutions are accepted as temporary at best, subject to considerable fluctuations caused by changing internalities and externalities. Differences persist because of cultural and physical distinctions as well as inherent shortcomings and limitations of actors. The Hobbesian concludes that conflictual behavior flows from these fundamental factors as well as consequential misperceptions, inadequate responses, communication breakdowns, and calculated or deliberate contradictory behavior by actors.

A fourth essential ingredient of the contemporary conception of the IPS recognizes the availability of a multiplicity of strategies and techniques by which actors may achieve their goals. Every aspect of human endeavor is viewed as a basis for interaction and interpenetration by one actor of another to induce favorable results. The Hobbesian supports this likelihood by citing the typological similarities of internalities, that is physical and human resource capabilities and of "will." While varying from actor to actor in their specifics, ultimately they are the calculated bases for broad strategy formation and choices of technique in implementing external policies. This view is adopted whether initiating, altering, or sustaining an existing relationship.

The classification scheme for both strategies and techniques may vary from one Hobbesian to another, but they generally agree as to distinguishable categories such as political, economic, psychological, ideological, legal, military, and cultural factors. Classification efforts do prove that considerable standardization exists and is so accepted by the actors in the IPS. However, standardization in the long run is subject to change reflecting the dynamic qualities of the factors. The revision of previous typologies of strategies and techniques is either due to deliberateness or the uncertainties of actors operating in the IPS. Current examples include the deliberate misuse of...
semantical commonalities to gain at the expense of other actors, or the dubiety over the strategic ramifications that flow from changes in the nuclear delivery technology. Variations and new emphases in strategies and techniques employed are constantly dependent upon a variety of inputs, resource capabilities and levels of will, available. Actors on both sides of any continuum of "have" and "have not" capabilities must adjust their strategies and techniques according to these prevailing circumstances.

Since strategy formation and technique utilization are dependent on capabilities available to the actor, they seek to maximize capability development in order to enhance their range of flexible choices and effectiveness with regard to goal attainment. No actor, according to the Hobbesian, ever possesses a sufficient reservoir of capabilities to facilitate any strategy it wants. Each actor stands in a relative or delimited position of capabilities vis-a-vis other actors, dictating a need to ascertain their respective differences and what strategies and techniques are most feasible under these circumstances. Generally the Hobbesian insists that the actor with the greater relative capabilities is in a superior position to influence and/or achieve its objectives. Historical record has demonstrated the reverse is equally true.

The Hobbesian admits that throughout the course of history there have been misperceptions by actors. Efforts to go beyond an actor's capabilities, a strategy of bluff, usually lead to poor results because someone always refuses to submit to such chicanery. Unconscious behavior that leads to errors are attributed to the inherent shortcomings of man or a lack of awareness. Although not assuredly resulting in the devastation of the actor, persistent errors in calculations and policy choices, have a damaging impact on the security and/or relative independence of actors. To the Hobbesian, fluidity in the typology of influential factors and their relative impact in the IPS, force the actor to exercise a constant vigilance and reaction pattern to enhance or even sustain their very existence. Attempts to rigidify strategies or techniques as permanent, or to disregard them altogether, have usually led to the downfall of actors in history.

From the Hobbesian perspective the most extreme technique available for use is organized violence, the *ultima ratio*, commonly referred to as military power. Existing military power can be employed either as a threat or as an operationalized technique to achieve specific objectives vis-a-vis another actor. Its very existence, proper deployment, plus the "will" to employ military power, has the paradoxical effect of bringing about its nonutilization or at worst a minimal application in an interacting relationship. The "will" to employ such capability is critical and is commonly conceived of as conveying the image of "credibility." Without it the greatest collection of military might is rather meaningless. If employed intelligently in conjunction with other techniques, or as the ultimate backup to the more pacific techniques, the Hobbesian anticipates less dysfunctions and breakdowns in the IPS.
The overriding shortcomings of men and actors make total avoidance of contradictions or breakdowns inconceivable. Because the variety of possibilities range from minor contradictions to major breakdowns among actors, military capabilities must be equal to each task. Survival as well as helping reconstitute new security relationships are at stake. The Hobbesian insists on the use of a delimited and calculated organized violence only in behalf of the security objective in the IPS. This consistent awareness is also emphasized to avoid misconstruing the technique as an end instead of as a means towards achieving security in the IPS. The increased concern with organized violence, due to the growth of its destructiveness, reenforces the Hobbesian insistence on its proper management and the appreciation of its concurrent limitations. The maximum form of violence, nuclear warfare, is viewed as having considerable limitations because of its inherent destructiveness and prevailing spatial conditions between actors. Despite this, the Hobbesian in recognizing technological change as the basic law of life, refuses to absolutize this as a permanent situation for the contemporary IPS. Some writers insist that the nuclear era is but in its infancy as of now.

Although actors desire to preoccupy themselves with one particular technique or strategy, usually military or economic, the Hobbesian critiques this overreliance severely. Individual man and the actors are viewed as having innumerable needs which correctly perceived militate against such singular dependency or outlook. Successful participation in the IPS requires the actor to operate on the basis of multiple techniques and strategies. All are interrelated on a continuum permitting optional choices, momentary emphases, combinations, and intensities of application.

The final ingredient of the Hobbesian conception of an IPS is for the actors to rely on "equilibrium politics" as the best management strategy to attain and sustain goal fulfillment. The key goal of any actor, prerequisite to any other, is the maximization of security, a relative and dynamic rather than an absolute posture. Security becomes synonymous with such conditions as survival, continuity, independence, internal sovereignty, or the preservation of one's own decision-making abilities. Additional actor objectives, specifically intended to meet particular needs, can only be met in the course of or after the fulfillment of the priority goal of security. The Hobbesian rules out any particularistic approach, such as invoking moral or legal precepts, at organizing and controlling the IPS as inadequate to the complexities, diversities, and uncertainties in international relationships.

Equilibrium politics, traditionally labelled "balance of power politics," for the Hobbesian means a calculated perception and deliberate management of all change variables that affect actors at the local, regional, and universal geographical levels of interaction. By resorting to a judicious concern and selection of techniques and strategies under the fluctuating conditions of the
IPS, an approximate equilibrium of actors at each level of interaction should ensue. Since actors are oriented towards a maximization of security, escalatory efforts by one must be met by an equal response from the other to preserve the equilibrium. Because of restraints built into systemic circumstances and the inherent limitations on the capabilities of every actor, the prospect for stand-offs or deescalation of specific activities are always present, as long as the end result is the retention of an equilibrium.

Approximate equilibrium in the IPS is identified by the Hobbesian with maximum actor control over events and a diminution of conflictual relations and its prospects. While never precluding reduced numbers and minor levels of conflict, equilibrium politics negates the chance of a major conflagration as long as the equilibrium is consciously sustained. The contemporary Hobbesian, in contrast with earlier exponents, stresses that equilibrium cannot be attained or sustained as an automatic process or as some natural tendency at work in the universe. Ongoing positive commitment and choice is necessary to both achieve and sustain the balance.

Actual equilibrium formation and preservation can occur by such formal means as negotiations, or by such tacit means as unilateral inducements to obtain a *quid pro quo* response, or any combination of the two. Failure by actors to follow the prescriptions laid down by the Hobbesians leads to "disequilibrium." This alternative condition becomes synonymous with gross conflictual behavior, multiplying instabilities, manifest insecurities, decline and eventual subordination by one actor of another. It is within the realm of choice of an actor to opt for a non-cooperative course of action or to veto others seeking to create an equilibrium. When an approximate equilibrium already exists, non-cooperation then becomes a form of deviant behavior. Efforts to prevent the emergence of an equilibrium in the first place are also labelled deviant behavior. Usually such activities are associated with hegemonic aspirations of an actor, which requires a response of equal or superior proportions by other actors to keep the threat to equilibrium in check. Where there is failure to react to such threats in time or adequately, then a superordination-subordination pattern emerges between the actors. Hierarchical patterns vary greatly because of the variety of techniques that can be employed to achieve this relationship. Territorial occupation and governance by an outside actor is usually the most extreme version of such a subjugation. However it is not the automatic choice because the determination as to the most efficient subordination pattern rests with the actor engaged in the subjugating function.

Hierarchical patterns between various actors in the IPS are not avoidable. At any given moment the discrepancies between actors in terms of capabilities can be at great variance. Understood by the weaker actors as part of their capability calculation, it propels them into coalitions to enhance their security. Even voluntary membership in a coalition can mean a hierarchical pattern for the weaker actor. However, since equilibrium is dependent on all
its parts, even the weakest actor in a coalition has some leverage vis-a-vis the strongest actor. Voluntary association means the subordinated actor can disassociate at opportune moments to join some other coalition to recreate the equilibrium in a somewhat different form. In these circumstances, the weaker as well as the stronger actors, tend to agree that their vital interest in security based on a coalition serves as the best means to attain and sustain equilibrium.

The Dichotomous Conceptions of the IPS: The Lockean View

The other fundamental conception of the IPS, the Lockean View, can best be characterized as "Order in Search of More Order." The underlying reasoning determining such a terminology is that on a continuum classification the IPS is currently accepted as predominantly organized. Though not totally void of anarchic tendencies, the Lockeans believe the IPS is moving towards more complete and effective organization. Additional and novel ordering efforts are conceived of as both likely and increasingly successful. This movement does not preclude setbacks, but they are viewed as temporary occurrences since the overall progressive development of the IPS is well established, if not irreversible.

The invocation of Locke's name is somewhat misleading because in normative political philosophy he ultimately accepts the imperfections of men in their relationships. Locke is therefore employed in this essay to denote one critical aspect of his political philosophy — his social contract theory is identified with the calculated ability of men to undertake and consummate orderly arrangements to control their relationships. Among the IPS theorists influenced by this viewpoint the emphases are on the growing integrative and cooperative relations between interacting actors transcending their internal jurisdictions. Usually the Lockean View is applied to the internal dynamics of a society, but the exponents have always felt it was equally applicable to the IPS, especially because of their acceptance of the linkage of internalities and externalities.

The Lockean View focuses on the ability of men to resolve their conflictual relationships, or at least to diminish them to a point of minor consequence in the total spectrum of human relations. Hobbesian concepts such as anarchy, primacy of flux, ungovernable by institutions, continuing contradictions, etc., are unacceptable to their version of the IPS. This is largely attributable to a very optimistic conception of human nature — fundamentally or potentially rationalistic and as a consequence permitting highly cooperative behavior. In the Lockean View the present and future IPS, while evidencing continuity in many particulars, will eventually be radically different from the past.

In contemporary analysis the Lockean View is more readily identified with "idealism" as an interpretation of international politics. In the various writings of specialists, supporters and critics, synonyms such as "moralists, legalists,
functionalists, futurists, etc.,”\(^3\) have been employed to identify this viewpoint for the student of the IPS. As noted earlier, in regards to the Hobbesians, readers should be aware that similarities in such views do not necessarily or adequately depict the Lockean View. Variations derived from the Lockean View of the IPS abound in current literature.\(^4\) These exponents demand very careful scrutinization to avoid misconceptions about the core position of the Lockean View.

In the American context, the Lockean View has dominated the intellectual tradition of interpreting the IPS and foreign relations. It has been most commonly found in the policies of Jeffersonians, Wilsonians, and the foreign policies of the Roosevelt “New Deal.” This has been true whether the reference points have been periods of activism or inactivism in American external relations. The basic tenets of the Lockean View, as will be elaborated, have been utilized to explain and justify the choice of these diametrically opposed policy patterns for Americans or the world-at-large.

The Lockean View of the contemporary IPS is best summarized in terms of three basic attributes, their corollary dynamics, and vital ramifications: 1) an increasing coincidence and awareness of self- and mutual interests between actors; 2) the growth of transnationalism and transactionalism as the major patterns of international relationships; and 3) the preva lency of and increasing governance of international relationships.

The increasing growth of self- and mutual interests between the actors in the IPS is attributed in the Lockean View to a combination of factors, essentially the technological and communication revolutions. The technological revolution is recognized for both its intensification and acceleration of positive content and multilateral impacts on the actors in the IPS. The communication revolution, which is also seen in intensified and accelerated terms, is credited with the new transnational consciousness of the actors. Neither of these developments is conceived of as novel in the history of the relationships of men and their organized activities in any IPS. However, the Lockeans insist that the impacts of both revolutionary factors has led to the more recent triumph of the “necessity principle,” an indicator of a new urgency and paramountcy in current human relationships. Actors are viewed as being at a critical stage of interdependency that must foreclose anarchic and self-interest policies as damaging to everyone in the IPS. Problem intensities confronting actors have reached a frightening plateau that demands both their recognition and multilateral universal responses oriented to serving everyone’s common needs. Particular focus is on the destructiveness of military and non-military technology and the inadequate responses to the existing economic and social interdependencies of the actors in the IPS. In the latter case the Lockeans

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\(^3\) Mitrany, Falk, Mendlovitz, Overseas Development Council, etc.

\(^4\) Especially is this true for such views as neo-Marxism, New Left revisionism, and isolationism. These respective views are substantially different from the Lockean in their emphasis on "non-activism" in a nation's foreign policy behavior, especially for the United States. Their inward-directed orientation reflect a primacy of concern with radical or reform transformation of the society, despite its ramifications for the IPS.
specifically refer to the dangerous population-resource ratios, the ecological consequences of economic development, and the unstabilizing consequences of the failure of the underdeveloped world's modernization revolution. Summarily the emphasis is on the dangers inhering for all in the "have not" nation predicaments.

For the Lockean external and internal relationships are inextricably entwined. The fate and destiny of each actor is embodied in each other's actions. The distinction between internalities and externalities are to the Lockean an artificial division since the domestic and international spheres are viewed as one jurisdiction and concern. The social consciousness of the Lockeans is epitomized in a paraphrase of Lincoln's famous remark "A world half deprived cannot long endure."

For the Lockean the correct perception of the current trends in the IPS would lead to the assertion that the Hobbesian prescriptions will not meet the basic needs of the actors. A correct perception would encourage an ever-increasing growth of transactional flows between the various actors. In turn this would evolve into trusting relationships and an eventual convergence of all interests and behavior. Such a convergence is understood by the Lockean to be coidentical with the predominance of the cooperative spirit and a careful delimitation of the acceptable modes for conducting any conflictual relationships. At a particular point in this development of convergence, never spelled out by all Lockeans, the prospects of a major conflagration or a reversal of the transnational integrative pattern would become impossible.

As part of the verification of the developments and expectations within the IPS, the Lockeans devote considerable descriptive efforts to "the growth of transnationalism and transactionalism as the major patterns in international relationships." Although acknowledging such an evolution as evident time immemorial in international relationships, the intensity and acceleration taking place in today's IPS is heavily accentuated among the current Lockeans.

A variety of causal and explanatory factors are introduced to substantiate these developments. The communication revolution not only makes peoples aware of one another, but it serves as a basis of transmitting values that lead to an acculturation process among the impacted peoples. Ultimately it results in a universal recognition of commonly shared problems and similar solutions for them. The technological revolution, as a dynamic in its own right, creates common problems and offers similar opportunities and solutions for all the actors. In addition to these two variables at work, there is also a cross-national fertilization of views and values taking place because of the large transmigrat-ion of humanity over the entire globe. Out of this event comes a further acculturation process whereby populations increasingly share and act out a common value system. The three developments simultaneously complement and reinforce one another in evolving the IPS in the direction anticipated by the Lockeans.
With the novel consciousness of populations, a whole new set of loyalties and authoritative decision-making centers emerge as central to the workings of the IPS. Each problem, reflecting a transnational need as opposed to a particular actor’s needs, generates organizations and leaders oriented to these specific concerns. Some Lockeans envision a developmental progression, either actual and/or desirable, citing a regional orientation as a prior step towards a full-scale universal orientation. Such distinctions as found among Lockeans, while not undercutting their core concepts, indicate a range of views exists. The emergence and growth of the transnational-problem-oriented organizations and leaders provides an additional mechanism for the eventual socialization of peoples in the direction of the integrative developments.

The ultimate expectation of the Lockeans is that the evolving functional areas, such as economic, social, technological, etc., will have a spillover effect resulting in a political institutional integration pattern. The latter occurrence would be viewed by the Lockeans as the culminating and most comprehensive fulfillment of human relationships in the IPS.

It is in regards to the third basic attribute, the governance of international politics, that the Lockeans expend their greatest effort. Reflective of their optimistic outlook, the disposition towards futuristic expectations, and the need to provide a better IPS, the Lockeans are uniformly preoccupied with the blueprinting of “social contracts” that fulfill these anticipations. The prevailing view is that the IPS is well organized, but lacking at present in both the scope and intensity of policies essential to a most efficient operation in behalf of its affected populations. Empirical data are usually presented to support the organized aspects of the present and immediate past IPS. Most particularly are they employed to support the Lockean contention of the increasing progression towards the organization and governance of the IPS.

No less than five⁵ “social contracts” are discernible among Lockeans as having been historically operationalized for the governance of the IPS. All of them are traceable backwards into the distant past, additional proof that a progressive development towards an ultimate scenario has been taking place. The five “social contracts,” each expressive of a specific aspiration of men, are linked in the Lockean View as either a pre-condition or complementary reinforcement for one another. Therefore no priority is attached by the Lockeans to any single social contract, although misguided dogmatists have misled students of the IPS by their stress on one to the exclusion of the others. They are all viewed as essential and contributory to the overall dynamic of the increasing organization and governance of the IPS.

One of the social contracts is popularly referred to as “international law,” a system of rules on the rights and duties of states towards each other. Some

⁵The number varies among Lockeans according to each one’s emphases and analyses. Thus the social contract labelled intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s) splits into a universal and/or regional variation for different Lockeans. Similar examples exist for other social contracts.
Lockeans trace the content from both the Roman concept of "ius gentium (the law of the people)" and their adaptation of "ius naturale (the natural law)" from the Greeks. The more common starting point to demonstrate the lengthy influence of modern day international law has been Hugo Grotius in the 17th century.

More recently Lockeans have sought to expand the application of these essential standards downward to govern the behavior of individuals. Some Lockeans have accepted the best prospect for progressive development lies in the prior evolution of legal precepts based on regional cultural and geographical factors. The universal impulse has been reliant on the further growth of international law through various complementary means such as: 1) the United Nations' International Law Commission; 2) law-making treaties; 3) adjudication and advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice; 4) the use of the equity concept of ex aequo et bona; and 5) pacific settlement of disputes. Success for this social contract has been based on the existence of prior and evolving legal principles as the criteria for judging and controlling actor behavior in the IPS.

A second social contract, exercising both a restraining influence as well as promoting more governance of the IPS, can be labelled "international morality and world public opinion." In the case of international morality, the Lockeans focus on the growth and intensification of a consensus of ethical values among the peoples of the world. The progressive development of a mutuality of attitudes, beliefs and aspirations is attributed to the combined communications-technological revolutions and other cross-national fertilization factors already mentioned. Because of their belief in a growing consensus of values, a regional and/or universal consciousness merges which focusses on the achievement of common goals. As a substantive development, the Lockeans perceive of the community idea as a precursor and/or reenforcer of further institutional and legal principle formation while simultaneously creating criteria by which to judge and control activities in the IPS.

The closely related concept of "world public opinion" is viewed by Lockeans primarily as a restraining force on actor policies. Although recognizing considerable diversities in public opinion on a daily basis, the Lockeans feel that world public opinion has progressed to the point of indicating what is intolerable as well as permissible by actors in the contemporary IPS. The major vehicle for operationalizing world public opinion has become the United Nations in general and the General Assembly and Secretary-General specifically. The restraining dynamic is carried out by appeals to mass publics over the heads of state or to selectively transnational and influential opinion elites in each society. In these mechanics lies a Lockean recognition that there is a vital linkage between the internal and external behavior of any actor.

A third social contract, reflecting the pervasiveness and increasing governance of the IPS, is the "arms control/disarmament movement." To the
Lockeans, history is replete with spasmodic and continuing efforts at both general disarmament and control agreements. Although the ultimate inclination is towards total disarmament, elimination of all armed forces and arms, there has been considerable accommodation to a prerequisite step of arms control, the partial reduction and/or stabilization of arms and force levels. It is only by these means that human and physical resources are emancipated for other Lockeian expectations.

The Lockeans view the current period in history, the nuclear age, an urgency unparalleled in previous times. While urging more rapid developments in a general disarmament, they emphasize the evolving arms control progress as proof of this ultimate direction in the IPS. The progressive thesis of the continuity and consistency of the arms control/disarmament movement tends to begin with the Hague Conferences at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. Then they go on to insist that there has been an acceleration and intensification of the movement since World War Two by citing a vast array of specifics, especially in the nuclear weapons control field.

The fourth social contract, “intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s),” have been particularly attractive to the “free world have nations” and the “third-fourth world have-not nations.” Both groups have been optimistic as to the possibilities of such an approach achieving increased improvement and stability for the underdeveloped actors, a requirement for a better functioning IPS.

The lengthy history of the “international public union movement,” the modern version of which originated in the 19th century, has become a world-wide economic and social functionalism movement in the post-World War Two period. The Lockeans view functionalism and neo-functionalism as a building-block process whereby cooperation in economic and social affairs intensifies a community consciousness regionally and world-wide.

The functionalists stress the transnational nature of the economic and social problems besetting the peoples of the IPS, thus demanding a coordinated and organized supranational attack on them to achieve effectiveness. The vehicle for this assault is the IGO, although there are also nongovernmental organizations engaged in a complementary effort. The creation and further growth of the IGO’s represents a progressive development towards a common horizontal problem resolution basic to all men, the growth of habitual cooperation, and an increasing governance of relationships in the IPS. Every aspect of human endeavor is viewed as vital and susceptible to organization as well as cooperation. The cooperative spirit is assumed to have transferability from one activity to another, including politics, producing an accelerating impact in the IPS. The ultimate expectation is that these processes will lead to a political community consciousness and organization paralleling the horizontal economic and social activity patterns. For the Lockean the final proof lies in the vast multiplication of regional and universal IGO’s exercising an increasing jurisdiction over virtually every human activity.
The fifth social contract takes the form of "collective security systems" operating in the IPS. The basic requirements and expectations are that the actors will join in a formal system, cooperate as a unified group in the face of a potential or actual common danger of aggression, and thereby maximize their individual security as the payoff. The formal aspect, a regional and/or universal organization, provides the actors the means to keep abreast of the current or emerging dangers inhering in the IPS. It also affords the actors a continuous decision-making and implementation apparatus to deal effectively with these dangers. The actors are expected to subordinate their narrow self-interests to an overriding group interest of preserving their mutual security. Prior commitments to this goal sets up a situation whereby the deviant actor would not likely challenge the combined strengths of the group. In this situation the collectivity becomes identifiable as the moral and legal will of the world community, a powerful deterring force in the IPS. If an actor persists in violating existing norms, the group via the organization's mechanics, activates a coercive action against the aggressor to restore the status quo ante.

For the Lockean the collective security idea has been the major innovation of the 20th century. Starting with the imperfect League of Nations, it has been superseded by the United Nations, an improved and constantly evolving version of the original idea. Optimism as to its growth and effectiveness are derived from the additions of regional collective security systems. The subsequent techniques of "preventive diplomacy" and "peacekeeping operations" add to the vision of collective security as an adaptive and innovative approach to increasing the governance of the IPS. The emergence of a third-fourth world dominance in the United Nations as a whole and in the General Assembly specifically generates the feeling that international standards, regulatory behavior, and diminished independence of Great Powers are taking over the IPS. Continued application of collective security mechanics is supposed to enhance habitual cooperation and the pacific format for conducting the relationships between all peoples and nations in the IPS.

Conclusion
The author has deliberately avoided rendering a critique of these two basic views of the IPS despite their vulnerabilities. The effort would require a separate essay of equal or greater length. Much of the debate today in academic and official circles really revolve around the strengths and weaknesses of these two views, usually activated by specific events and/or policy choices. Too often the coherent aspects and the unstated assumptions are missing in these debates. This essay has sought to close the gap by providing a systematic, but brief overview, by which to follow and analyze such controversies. As part of this objective, a summary table is presented by which to compare and contrast the respective views. Like all such efforts, it must resort to oversimplifications.
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Similarities

1. The IPS is comprised of a variety of needs that produce a multiplicity of relationships, possible and actual.
2. The functional interdependence of actors (or coalitions) links the internal-external behavior with others.
3. Functional interdependence precludes the policy option of internalization of internalities (isolationism).
4. Functional interdependence and need fulfillment dictates some form of collaborative activities.
5. Conflict in the IPS is manageable under specific circumstances (which vary however between the two views) as a zero-sum game.
6. Techniques of violence (military particularly) in the contemporary IPS are inherently delimited by their very technology and spatial applications.
7. Failure to instigate proper prescriptive behavior, although different for each conception of the IPS, leads to a non-zero sum game, with systemic breakdown and pessimistic pay offs.