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The Failures of Intelligence Reform

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The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were a devastating shock to the United States. They alerted Americans to the new threat of non-state actors. National Security had been severely damaged, and the new threat provoked the U.S. to enter into a problematic war in the Middle East region.

Immediately after the attacks, the "blame game" began. Though there are seventeen organizations in the United States intelligence community, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suffered the worst criticism for their roles in failing to prevent the attacks. The Bush administration established the 9/11 Commission in order to investigate what went wrong and to determine how to fix it. Based on the recommendations provided by the Commission, various organizations were changed and/or created in the intelligence community. Out of many changes, two were the most significant. The Director of National Intelligence, who became the head of the entire intelligence community, both foreign and domestic, was created. Another major change was the creation of a cabinet-level Department dedicated to Homeland Security. There has been an ongoing debate since the 9/11 Commission's report about whether the changes to the intelligence community were truly beneficial or if they were in fact counterproductive. Many people argue that the recommendations were not enough and that there are more internal issues that need to be addressed in order to truly change the intelligence process.

Intelligence reform is the legislation implemented by the federal government that's purpose is to improve the effectiveness and success of the intelligence community. It would seem evident that intelligence reform has failed, but the more important questions lie in where it has failed and how to fix it. In this thesis, it will be argued that reform attempts have failed by

focusing on surface problems rather than addressing their sources. Future reforms should focus on the relationship dynamic between the intelligence community and the policymakers it serves.

There has been extensive literature published on the problems in the intelligence community and the flaws in the reform legislation. Scholars, generally, address the intelligence community issues according to the two major themes of internal organizational problems and inter-organizational relationships, although, there are many other scholars who critique additional aspects of the intelligence community. This literature is mostly in response to the most recent reform legislation, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) which was instituted as a result of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report.

Internal Organizational Problems

The CIA is the most widely recognized agency in the intelligence community, and with that popularity comes a lot of criticism. Robert Baer addresses the decline of the CIA in recent years by focusing on the failure of the U.S.to accurately predict Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. He suggests how to improve the CIA specifically in order to better the intelligence community. Baer claims that the CIA should reform the Directorate of Operations (DO), which is in charge of the recruitment of spies; in addition, the promotion system should be reformed, and the CIA should be more knowledgeable of source credibility. Furthermore, he argues that federal, state, and local databases should be integrated, recruitment on college campuses should be reinstituted, the retirement age should be lowered, and the U.S. should be less dependent upon foreign governments for intelligence information. His final suggestions are for the security clearance system to be altered and for the CIA to begin recruiting from the "dark side," which includes people who may be involved in illicit activities but whose connections and knowledge could help the intelligence process (Baer 2005).

Thomas Mahnken agrees about changing the clandestine function of the CIA. He argues that more attention should be paid to collection of information rather than analysis. He makes the point that outside contractors and commercial agencies are able to do the analysis, but only the government can do the collection. Mahnken argues that the clandestine function of the CIA needs to be refurbished. There should be greater emphasis on spy recruitment, which yields the best intelligence. The promotion system of the Clandestine Service needs to be changed so that it is based on the quality of information obtained, not the number of spies recruited. Mahnken also gives several suggestions for changing the way intelligence analysis is conducted. He thinks the current standards are not good enough and that the intelligence community should reevaluate the performance of its analysts (Mahnken 2005).

Apart from the CIA, the other most widely held criticisms are of the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Michael Hayden, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA), addresses one of the biggest issues concerning the DNI position, which is his budgetary abilities or rather inabilities. Hayden argues that the DNI has too much responsibility and not enough power. The DNI is supposed to be the head of the intelligence community, yet the Secretary of Defense still has a lot of power over him. The Secretary of Defense not only plays a big role in the budgetary process, but he is also the head of three major intelligence organizations (National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency). He has control over the military intelligence agencies and the defense agencies which make up about seven of the total seventeen organizations in the intelligence community. The IRTPA legislation was influenced by Donald Rumsfeld, who was the Secretary of Defense at the time. He influenced the legislation so that he would not lose any power. In order for the position of the DNI to be strengthened, the Secretary of Defense would

have to decentralize some of his power. One of the biggest ways for the Secretary of Defense to devolve his power would be to allow the DNI to have more budgetary capabilities. The budgetary capabilities are essential to the intelligence process because intelligence priorities can change in an instant. The head of the intelligence community needs to be able to change resources quickly in order to accommodate the emphasis put on new priorities (Hayden 2010). Also, Hayden argues that the relationship between the DNI and the DCIA needs to be enhanced in order to improve the intelligence community. The relationship tends to have issues because the DNI replaced the DCIA as the head of the intelligence community. The culture of the intelligence community is still based in history where the DCIA is the boss. Hayden believes the DNI and the DCIA should work at different tasks (Hayden 2010). The DNI should set policy and give direction, whereas the DCIA should "coordinate, conduct, and operate" (Hayden 2010, 44).

Derek Reveron is also skeptical of the ability of the DNI because of the authority of the Secretary of Defense. His article is an evaluation of John Negroponte's plan for transforming the intelligence community after IRTPA. Reveron argues that analysis needs to be more in depth and more accurate for the intelligence community to improve, which is contrary to Thomas Mahnken's point that collection is the most important aspect that needs to be improved. Negroponte's plan included an aspect of coordinating all the intelligence agencies, but Reveron does not see this as possible. He thinks the position of the DNI will only be able to coordinate the civilian agencies because the Secretary of Defense still holds more power over the military agencies. Overall, Reveron seems to agree with most of Negroponte's ideas for change, but he does not believe that they are actually practical. There would have to be a big change in the dynamic between civilian and military intelligence agencies for his ideas to work (Reveron 2007).

Helen Fessenden is skeptical of the power of the DNI because of his lack of budgetary authority. Though she agrees with Reveron about the limited power of the DNI, it is for different reasons. Fessenden analyzes the IRTPA specifically and provides suggestions for better improvements. She attributes the major problems of the intelligence community to the lack of inter-organizational cooperation and communication. She argues that the community can be improved by giving the DNI more budgetary power, which is also a major point that Michael Hayden has argued. They both see the need for DNI budgetary power to be able to foster a quicker transition of resources in the event of a new intelligence priority. Fessenden also makes an interesting point about the structure of Congressional budgetary committees. Congress created eighty-eight committees and subcommittees responsible for intelligence appropriations. The majority of control was given to appropriators, rather than authorizers, even though authorizers have more expertise on where the money is needed. The structure of the Congressional budgetary committees makes it difficult for the DNI to change budget disbursements and transfer funds from one organization to another. As stated previously, this is an important function because intelligence priorities change frequently. Fessenden argues that the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been a positive post-9/11 reform because of the interagency cooperation it stimulates (Fessenden 2005).

Nancy Tucker criticizes the DNI, the relationships, and the intelligence process in general. Although she agrees with Fessenden that the position of the DNI is flawed, she states it for different reasons. She focuses on changing the culture of the intelligence community as a means of changing the effectiveness of it. Though she recognizes changing organizational culture can be difficult, she believes it is still possible. She provides seven suggestions for changing the intelligence community. First, the relationships between the intelligence

community and Congress should be improved. Second, she suggests that there should be a

National Intelligence University that teaches the fundamentals of intelligence collection and

analysis without being partial towards one organization. This point has been implemented. There

has been an intelligence university for the last 50 years, but the school has been renamed many

times, and just became the "National Intelligence University" last year. Her third point is that

analysts should employ an evidence-based approach to their work, meaning that they should use

new analytical tools rather than relying on their past methods for analysis. Fourth, the

intelligence community should consult experts outside of its realm such as scholars working on

related topics. Fifth, records should be declassified more rapidly. Sixth, the Office of the Director

of National Intelligence (ODNI) should reassess its staffing problems. Lastly, the ODNI should

be less dependent on the CIA for its rules and regulations. Tucker uses personal knowledge of

the inner-workings of the intelligence community as evidence as well as testimony from other

officials within the community to come to these conclusions (Tucker 2008).

Mike McConnell agrees with Tucker about the need for a change in the culture. He

argues that the intelligence community did not reassess after the fall of the Soviet Union. The

new threats were from non-state actors which require different processes to combat. He gives

several suggestions for changing the culture including hiring more diverse people, instituting

policy that mirrors the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, opening up lines of communication by

ending the "need to know" policy, and increasing the production of technology used for

intelligence collection. The evidence used in this article is first-hand because he has experience

in the field. He does not cite other sources, but uses examples of situations that took place and

observations he made while working in the intelligence community. This article seems biased

because it makes no critique of the Office of the DNI which has been cited as one of the

important issues concerning post-9/11 reform. The reason for this could be because McConnell

served as a DNI. He would not want to be critical of his own position in order to preserve job

security (McConnell 2007).

Inter-organizational Relationships

Joshua Rovner and Austin Long argue about the relationships within the government.

The article is a response to previous work conducted by Amy Zegart. She has written extensively

on the intelligence community since the Cold War era. Zegart criticizes the intelligence

community for failing when 9/11 occurred, but Rovner and Long place the blame on

policymakers. They refute each of Zegart's arguments about where and how the intelligence

community failed. In her article, she argues the common reasons for intelligence failure, such as

turf wars and organizational problems. Rovner and Long, however, cite numerous examples of

how individual agencies warned policymakers about the threat of Al-Qaeda. Zegart accuses the

intelligence community of not paying enough attention to terrorist groups, but Rovner and Long

point out that the CIA had an entire unit devoted to monitoring Osama Bin Laden's movements

prior to 9/11 (Rovner and Long 2006).

Paul Pillar agrees with Rovner and Long in that he also argues that the issues stem from

the policymakers' role in the intelligence process. Pillar, who is a former CIA analyst, argues

that politicization and other issues occur that skew the intelligence disseminated to policymakers

or the information requested by policymakers. He specifically uses the Iraq WMD case in his

article to support the argument about the policymakers being flawed in their role in the

intelligence cycle (Pillar 2006)

The dissemination step of the intelligence process is also criticized by another scholar.

Kenneth Luikart blames the dissemination (communication between policymakers and

intelligence officials) process for the failures of the intelligence community, which is a clear indication of the weak relationships between the bureaucracy and policymakers. He argues that the intelligence community should have been reassessed after the fall of the Soviet Union, as Mike McConnell also pointed out, so that it could combat the new threats from non-state actors. He provides several suggestions for changing the intelligence community in terms of a new "indications and warnings cell." Although he does not specifically define this term, he does map out how this would be achieved. Luikart believes that many of the intelligence failures of the past are a result of the breakdown of the dissemination process. His suggestions for reform would strengthen the dissemination process as well as other weak aspects of the intelligence community. One of his suggestions was for analysts to work closer with policymakers (Luikart 2003).

Glenn Hastedt also makes the argument that the relationships between the branches need to be strengthened in order for intelligence to flow effectively. This article is a response to the Schlesinger Report, which was a study undertaken by the Office of Management and Budget during Nixon's administration and a response to Michael Warner's evaluation of the report. The purpose of the report was to analyze the intelligence community because Nixon did not trust it. Hastedt uses a literature review to solve the question about how to change the intelligence community. Hastedt expands upon the suggestions of Richard Betts, Amy Zegart, and Richard Russell on how to change it. He argues that the relationships between Congress and the intelligence community and between the executive and the intelligence community need to be assessed. He then argues that the most common reform proposals have to do with strengthening managerial leadership and lines of authority (Hastedt 2009).

John Gentry argues that the relationship problems in the intelligence community are between the individual agencies. He says that turf wars within the intelligence community are the major issue. He argues that the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) failed to solve the problems of the intelligence community. His main argument is that adding more layers of bureaucracy does not solve communication problems. He suggests that agencies and organizations be combined or eliminated, therefore fostering more communication as a result of less turf wars. He also includes a section about where the executive and legislative branches went wrong in pre-9/11 intelligence affairs (Gentry 2008).

In a later article, John Gentry expands upon that point and places all blame for intelligence failures on Congress and the President. He argues that there are issues within the intelligence community, but not all of them are the fault of the bureaucracy itself. Gentry analyzed eight case studies of counterinsurgency wars in various countries to find common patterns among them. Through his study, he concludes that the other branches in the federal government are predominately responsible for intelligence failures and that the intelligence community is often made the scape goat (Gentry 2010). This article does not directly refute his claims from his previous article. It just puts more emphasis on the relationship between the branches rather than the relationship between the intelligence community organizations.

David Goldman and Stan Taylor also view layers of bureaucracy as contributing to turf wars, which disable the intelligence community. They question whether America still needs intelligence agencies, if new agencies are needed, if funding needs to be increased, if agencies need more personnel, and what changes need to be implemented to help the intelligence cycle in general. The authors argue that intelligence is still necessary because it seems that there will always be threats to national security, no matter how big or small. They take the common

viewpoint that adding more bureaucracy to the intelligence community does not solve any of the problems. They also refute the argument that the community needs more funding or personnel. Goldman and Taylor provide suggestions for how to better the intelligence community without adding more layers of bureaucracy. There should be better correlation between strategy and intelligence, more collection redundancy but less analytical redundancy, improved analysis through better training and recruiting methods, and collection practices should be reassessed. This is the first time, in my research, that anyone has addressed the redundancy issue in this way. They argued that multiple collection disciplines should be used on one area of interest, but multiple analysts should not be used to evaluate the information (Goldman and Taylor 2004).

Additional Problems in the Intelligence Community

Douglas Hart and Steven Simon take a completely separate approach to intelligence reform by arguing about the educational system and its failure to produce adequate people for the needs of the agencies. They contend that in order for the intelligence community to combat the jihadist movement, the educational system needs to be reformed. They cite a lack of emphasis on foreign language/culture and critical thinking as the problems with the education system. Their basic conclusion is that colleges and universities need to put greater emphasis on critical thinking and development of cultural knowledge so that the intelligence community has a better pool of people to recruit from (Hart and Simon 2006).

Stephen Flynn argues that there are issues in the secrecy aspect of the intelligence community. He believes that if the public is made more aware of intelligence information, they will be able to play a role in preventing national security disasters. The major evidence he cites for this point is the Christmas Day Bomber incident where a street vendor detected the bomb and

alerted officials. Greater transparency will provoke the public to play a more active role in protecting the homeland (Flynn 2011).

The most comprehensive evaluation of the mistakes of 9/11 were produced in the 9/11 Commission report. The 9/11 Commission provided details on issues with the Transportation Security Agency and the flight services, as well issues within the major organizations of the intelligence community. The report is an overview of everything that went wrong. The conclusion of this report yielded the recommendations carried out by the Bush administration such as the institution of new agencies/positions (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). Although this report goes over many of the problems that were evident that day, it does not provide the most effective recommendations for the future. Much of the other scholarly work that has been published recently is in response to this report and the legislation that was implemented based on the recommendations from it.

Overall, the scholars and the people in the intelligence field agree that intelligence reform needs to be improved. According to these academics and experts, the main areas in need of improvement are the ODNI, the relationships between the branches of government and the intelligence community, the problem of turf wars, lines of communication, and the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. The arguments of these scholars cover almost every aspect of the intelligence community. Though scholars provide great analysis of the problems, they generally recommend ideas that are unrealistic in practice. They have not worked in the intelligence community and cannot understand what changes can actually be implemented. The people that have worked within the intelligence community are more likely to provide realistic recommendations though their analysis of problems may be bias.

These scholars and insiders that have written on the topic of intelligence reform have had a tendency to be quite critical of it with the only positive opinions being about the institution of the NCTC. Experts on intelligence are aware that recent reform has done little to make the organizations work in a more effective and efficient manner. Although they make valid points about their limitations, the majority of them neglect to address one of the biggest issues plaguing the intelligence process over the last several decades.

Though this literature critiques IRTPA for what it did implement, there are key elements missing from the reform legislation. These scholars have tended to focus on organizational issues such as stovepipes and turf wars. Although these are common problems within any organization, these are not the most important issues in this body of organizations. The need for multiple organizations within the intelligence community is the source of the turf war problem, as suggested by Helen Fessenden (2005). Organizations naturally compete for approval because it can lead to a greater allotment of the intelligence budget. The issue of stovepipes is also natural in the intelligence community because of the necessity for hierarchy. Michael Hayden (2010) advocated for hierarchy between the DNI and the DCIA, yet this relationship has seen conflict as a result. One of the fundamental concepts in the intelligence community is secrecy. If everyone in the intelligence community were allowed to have access to all information, there would likely be many more leaks and breaches of security. Both of these issues are embedded in the community and have the ability to be improved, but it is clear that they are not the direct cause of intelligence failures.

Reform attempts have failed by focusing on surface problems rather than addressing their sources, and future reforms should focus on the relationship dynamic between the intelligence community and the policymakers it serves. The intelligence community is mostly responsible for

collecting and analyzing information in order to assist policymakers in their decision-making processes. It is the job of the policymaker to make the appropriate decisions based on the information they are given. It seems that on at least two major occasions a breakdown in the process has occurred during the dissemination step. The Vietnam War and the Iraq War are the two solid examples that have had major ramifications as a result of a faulty dissemination process.

Joshua Rovner, a professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote a book on the politicization of intelligence that offers case studies of this problem. In his book, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence*, he covers several topics pertaining to the politicization issue including, the ideal relationship between policymaker and intelligence officials, where the breakdown in the relationship generally occurs, and examples of when this breakdown has led to dramatic outcomes (2011).

Rovner suggests that the ideal relationship between policymaker and intelligence official is rarely achieved. The ideal relationship is one in which the intelligence community must feel free to work objectively and the policymakers need their intelligence to answer the right questions. This relationship is rarely achieved because the two positions are not naturally compatible. Analytical objectivity and policy relevance are seen as opposing principles, yet these are the two goals at work. If there is going to be an ideal relationship, however, the intelligence community must feel free to work objectively and the policymakers need the intelligence community to answer the right questions. The hope of the analysts is to be free from political pressure about what policy their analysis needs to support. The policymaker wants intelligence that is relevant and timely to the issues at hand. This dynamic means that analytical objectivity and policy relevance need to be at work at the same time. It is easy to see how objectivity can be

sacrificed if it is not meeting the needs of urgent issues that the policymaker may want to address (Rovner 2011, 20).

As stated previously, the ideal relationship is rarely met. Thus, there are some common tensions in the relationship that do not always lead to politicization of intelligence. Some policymakers do not trust the intelligence community so they request the raw data themselves and try to interpret it. For example, President Lyndon Johnson was a fan of raw signals intelligence and would try to analyze it himself. The intelligence community is against the bypassing of the analytical process because a lot of information is misleading without professional interpretation (Rovner 2011, 21).

Rovner argues that a related issue to the policymaker's mistrust of the intelligence community is his lack of interest in what is being produced. Policymakers are only in office for a relatively short amount of time. Their primary interest is in current intelligence rather than long-term predictions. They have various other priorities in their agendas, and for this reason they favor short reports to long ones and raw data over speculation (Rovner 2011, 24). President Lyndon B. Johnson preferred short, informal briefings on intelligence. John McCone, the first DCI under Johnson was unable to provide this style of briefing so their relationship suffered. Richard Helms, the second DCI, was able to provide this style which led to a positive relationship with Johnson (Rovner 2011, 84). Short reports on current raw data are not the most informative or detail-oriented. The intelligence community would prefer to be able to forecast, give context, and provide longer reports so that they can explain each issue in depth. If the policymaker is not interested in the intelligence official's report, there is not much else that can

be done. Therefore, intelligence officials generally tailor their reports to fit the desires of the policymaker, whether that is the most effective option or not (Rovner 2011, 24).

According to Rovner, another issue that causes friction in the relationship is the need for secrecy. The intelligence community has two incentives for guarding their secrets from policymakers: professional and bureaucratic. On the professional end, intelligence officials do not want to reveal the sources and methods they used to obtain the information for fear that those sources may be leaked and therefore jeopardized. On the bureaucratic end, each intelligence agency wants to show how valuable it is, so guarding secrets allows it to have an advantage over other agencies. This issue relates to the problem of turf wars, also addressed by Helen Fessenden (2005), where agencies want a greater portion of the intelligence budget, so they compete with each other instead of helping each other out. The friction between the two positions is inevitable, but it does not have to lead to unethical actions (Rovner 2011, 22).

Rovner describes the breakdowns that can occur in the policymaker-intelligence official relationship that surpass the acceptable "bounds of friction" (Rovner 2011, 25). The three main types are excessive harmony, neglect, and politicization. Excessive harmony is when the policymaker and intelligence official are too close. This leads to the policymaker's willingness to accept the intelligence official's reports as doctrine. They have too much confidence in the results. The intelligence official is also more likely to have "tunnel vision" where they are only looking at the issues that relate to the policymaker's wishes. Rovner uses the example of the Bay of Pigs operation. President John F. Kennedy was skeptical about the operation, but DCI Allen Dulles urged him to accept the intelligence based on the success of similar operations from the past (Rovner 2011, 25).

Neglect is the second breakdown in the relationship. This occurs when policymakers refuse to acknowledge or act upon the intelligence they are given. It is one of the mechanisms a policymaker can use when they flat out disagree with the intelligence. Policymakers are rational human beings, and therefore have a capacity for self-interest and bias towards their own predispositions. Elections are one of the factors in whether a policymaker will neglect unfavorable intelligence or not. They would not want the public to view them unfavorably if they are seeking reelection, so they would not want there to be any negative perception of their foreign policy or national security strategy. Policymakers have a natural bias towards their own predispositions, which can deter them from wanting to accept intelligence as valid if it goes against their own thoughts (Rovner 2011, 26).

The third breakdown in the relationship is the politicization of intelligence. This element can go both ways in the relationship. The intelligence community can politicize their intelligence in order to influence favorable policy outcomes or they can provide favorable intelligence to be able to have greater access to the policymaker in the future. The policymaker can politicize intelligence in order to use it to support policies he is trying to pursue. Although both sides can politicize intelligence, the policymaker plays a greater role because he actually has the authority to make and change policy as a result (Rovner 2011, 29).

Within this breakdown are multiple types of politicization. First, there is direct manipulation where policymakers pressure agencies to deliver specific findings. Policymakers often manipulate intelligence by appointing people who have the same views and are loyal to the administration. Once they are appointed, these people can influence what the intelligence community produces. Second, there is indirect manipulation. This occurs when policymakers reject intelligence products until they find the answer that supports their policy intentions. This

can also be conducted by asking the intelligence community questions that are worded in a specific way to yield a specific type of answer. The third type of politicization occurs on behalf of the intelligence community. It is when intelligence agencies submit estimates specifically designed to undermine policy decisions. These three types of politicization can lead to drastically inaccurate intelligence reports and thus to unjustified policy actions (Rovner 2011, 30-33).

Rovner uses several examples to illustrate the breakdown in the relationship throughout the last century. The two examples I would like to focus on are the Johnson administration and the Vietnam War, as well as the more recent example of the second Bush administration and the Iraq War. Both of these examples show how poor policymaker/intelligence community relationships can lead to negative consequences, worst of all being the loss of American lives over wars that may not have been justified to begin with (Rovner 2011).

Other scholars, including Paul Pillar whose work was referenced earlier and Michael Warner who is a historian for the Department of Defense, have acknowledged the flaws of the intelligence community/policymaker relationship during the Vietnam era. Paul Pillar argued that the administration placed more weight on its own perceptions and agenda than on the raw data on the war. He also notes that the intelligence was there and that it was solid enough to base a decision against conflict on, yet the administration ignored it. Lastly, he argues that once the war had begun, the administration pressured the intelligence community to produce casualty estimates that would support the cause (Pillar 2012). Warner argues that the initial politicization occurred in the way that the administration was seeking information. They requested intelligence that supported their current strategy rather than asking for objective intelligence. He also acknowledges the politicization that occurred between the military and intelligence community over the casualty numbers which will be addressed in detail later (Warner 2010).

Lyndon B. Johnson took the office of the Presidency upon the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Shortly thereafter, Johnson was faced with a dilemma about how to further the U.S.'s containment policy. It was evident that communism had spread to Vietnam and some perceived this as a threat to American power in East Asia. The Johnson administration and its supporters used the "domino theory" to explain why the United States had to prevent Vietnam from being consumed by communism. The "domino theory" said that if Vietnam succumbed to communism, other states in that region would fall to it as well. This theory would suggest that the containment policy would be at risk if these events did occur. In 1964, President Johnson requested a report by the Board of National Estimates on this theory. The Board came back with two reports. The first report said that the domino theory was incorrect and that the U.S. position in Asia did not depend on the defense of South Vietnam. The second report said that the U.S. had no pressing interest in Vietnam and little chance of success. Both of these reports were ignored by President Johnson (Rovner 2011, 49-50). He neglected these reports as a form of politicization. Johnson was able to neglect them rather than influence them because the public was not interested in the policy strategy for Vietnam at that time. He did not need to use the reports to support his agenda because he had not made a definite decision on the U.S. strategy and the public did not care (Rovner 2011, 87-88).

The second time a form of politicization occurred in this administration was in 1967. The country was already at war at this point and the administration was on a public relations campaign to win over those in opposition. The U.S. strategy in Vietnam was to kill or capture more Viet Cong soldiers than could be replenished. This would eventually weaken them to the point of surrender. In order for this strategy to work, there had to be a crossover point where more Viet Cong were being killed than sent. President Johnson requested a report on the Order

of Battle. The Order of Battle would show how many current militants there were. The Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the joint command in charge of military operations in South Vietnam, produced an Order of Battle with favorable numbers. The CIA, however, produced an Order of Battle with completely contradictory numbers that were not favorable to Johnson's policy on the war. The CIA Order of Battle suggested that enemy strength was double what the MACV report concluded. The administration pressured the CIA and MACV to meet in order to sort out the discrepancies. The CIA and MACV argued over who to count as the Viet Cong forces, and in the end, DCI Richard Helms was pressured into accepting the MACV numbers. Johnson used the MACV numbers to show the public that the crossover strategy was effective. He also began requesting only good news from the field and reports on what the U.S. had accomplished in Vietnam (Rovner 2011, 66-70).

Both of these examples show how domestic politics can lead to the politicization of intelligence. The reason Johnson neglected the 1964 reports was because his administration had not committed to a strategy for Vietnam and the public was not very aware of what was going on. He did not have to use the intelligence to justify any action because no action had taken place at that point. Yet, he did not want that information to be made public during his presidential campaign and as an unelected president he did not think the public would respond well to him sending the country into war. In 1967, he needed the intelligence to support his strategy in order to win over the public who were generally in opposition to the war. He had to make sure intelligence was consistent with his policies and therefore had to influence what was being produced. Both circumstances show that the relationship was damaged because the intelligence community was not allowed to provide objective analysis on the Vietnam War (Rovner 2011, 87-88).

Though scholars have argued that there were problems outside of the policymaker/intelligence community relationship during the Vietnam era, this issue has superseded them. The major problems that scholars and insiders have discussed in regard to intelligence reform are the relationships between the organizations within the intelligence community, the flaws of those individual organizations, and the lack of power vested in the head of the community. These issues have varied over time and have actually been addressed in reform legislation. The issue of the policymaker/intelligence community relationship is the primary common thread between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War.

The Iraq War is the second major case of politicization of intelligence in the United States. Since the 1990s, it had been U.S. policy that Iraq needed to undergo a regime change. The 9/11 attacks created a new feeling in the country about the threat from states and non-state actors in the Middle East. The Bush administration played upon this fear in the public to try to justify a war with Iraq. President Bush's famous speech on the axis of evil included Iraq as a serious threat to U.S. national security. In the aftermath of the war and the end of that administration, it has become clear that the intelligence community was manipulated into supporting a war that may not have been justified (Rovner 2011, 137).

According to Rovner, the integrity of the intelligence products was jeopardized in four ways. First, policymakers attempted to manipulate intelligence directly. Second, the politicization of intelligence was in response to the public's opposition to the war. Third, policymakers used the distorted intelligence to support their policy decisions by playing on the secrecy aspect. Fourth, this politicization prevented any organization from truly reassessing the estimates. The Bush administration made a strong commitment to a controversial policy and it was met by public opposition. They needed to win the support of the American people and the

Democratic Senate, so they chose to politicize intelligence to support their policy decisions (Rovner 2011, 139).

The relationship between the Bush administration and the intelligence community went through three phases. The first phase occurred before 9/11. The intelligence products were cautious estimates about Iraq's capabilities and intentions and were not based on solid evidence. The Bush administration chose to ignore these products, which is understandable because they were not substantiated claims. The intelligence community, however, did warn the administration on the threat of Al Qaeda, yet Bush thought it was just a ploy to "cover their asses" (Rovner 2011, 146). The second phase was the year following 9/11. Policymakers asked the intelligence community to find links between Iraq and terrorist groups, specifically Al Qaeda. The intelligence community came back with inconclusive results, which were also ignored by the Bush administration. The final phase occurred after the summer of 2002. The White House began to pressure the intelligence community to join the policy consensus on the need for military action (Rovner 2011, 142-144).

Despite the lack of evidence from the intelligence community, a big part of the administration believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in both World Trade Center attacks. When the intelligence community was unable to prove this, the administration turned to the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) which was an ad hoc organization designed to give the administration what they wanted. The PCTEG began using information from Iraqi exiles who sought revenge against the regime to show links between Saddam and terrorist organizations. Though this information was not used as intelligence, it was a big component of the public relations campaign (Rovner 2011, 146).

The administration still needed the support of the intelligence community, so it used other indirect politicization tactics to pressure them. The administration repeated the same questions to the intelligence community over and over as if to suggest they were not getting the answers they wanted. Vice President Cheney began to make regular visits to the CIA, where his presence made analysts feel uncomfortable and pressured (Rovner 2011, 149).

Direct politicization occurred when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged DCI George Tenet to show his support for the President. He obliged and contacted *The New York Times* pledging that the intelligence was consistent with the President's plan. Furthermore, Tenet later admitted that he declassified intelligence that would make the administration's public statements more convincing (Rovner 2011, 153).

The indirect and direct politicization led to the publishing of a declassified white paper based on a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) by the CIA. The white paper was missing caveats and qualifying phrases and suggested that the information was conclusive. This was used by the administration in their public campaign. A major issue with the NIE itself was that it was requested by the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly prior to their vote on military action in Iraq. In general, NIEs take about six months to produce; this one took three weeks. The drastically shortened period of time did not allow for proper collection and analytical work to be conducted (Rovner 2011, 158).

The key judgments portion of the Iraq WMD NIE, the only part that has been declassified so far, has many flaws. There were several judgments made based on the absence of evidence. The CIA used the concepts of denial and deception to allude to the presence of more information rather than the lack of information. For example, they state, "We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts" (CIA

2002, 5) While it could be true that Iraq was able to hide their WMD efforts, it is also a huge possibility that they were not pursuing WMDs and that is why there was no evidence to support the claim that they were. The CIA uses the deception concept again when addressing the expansion of Iraq's chemical and biological infrastructure by saying that it is under the cover of civilian production. Once again, they could have been using the materials to produce civilian goods. Many of the materials that Iraq sought had dual uses and were not necessarily for the production of WMDs (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2004, 180). The NIE also states that Iraq had a development program for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). They speculate that the UAV would be used to deliver biological warfare agents. The purpose of a UAV is not necessarily to deliver weapons. Many are used for reconnaissance and the Air Force as well as a few other agencies believed that that was the purpose of this one. The report makes note of Iraq's acquisition of high-strength aluminum tubes for the purpose of uranium enrichment to pursue nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy and the State Department's Intelligence and Research bureau both disagreed with this point. They argued that the tubes were not of the appropriate quality for nuclear weapons production and were more likely to be used for artillery rockets (CIA 2002, 6-9). The way the NIE was constructed with the misleading judgments and even the use of bolded words, help support the point that the administration was seeking to prove. There are some opinions that suggest otherwise listed within the NIE but it was not made public until July 2003, which was four months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Additionally, the NIE's conclusions were heavily based on information provided by a human asset referred to as "CURVEBALL". CURVEBALL was an Iraqi defector who worked as a chemical engineer in the regime prior to 1999. The German Intelligence Service (BND) had him in their custody and refused to allow the US direct to access him. The inability of the US

intelligence agencies to interrogate him on their own should have raised flags about the credibility of his statements. Furthermore, there was a lot of evidence that he had a drinking problem which should have also jeopardized his credibility (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2004, 154). In the aftermath of this debacle, it has been reported that the allegations CURVEBALL made about the Iraq WMD program were false (Pidd 2011). If the intelligence community had been executing better analytical work, they would have made note of the lack of credible human intelligence on the WMD program.

The administration used the NIE-based white paper to downplay dissent among analysts, exaggerate uncertainty of future events, exploit the element of secrecy, and argue that policy options were self-evident. The problem with the secrecy of intelligence is that the public is unaware of the information that is classified because they do not possess appropriate security clearances. The government will share one part of an intelligence report to invoke the perception they want from the public and then warn them that the classified information further supports their cause. When they are trying to invoke fear in the aftermath of 9/11, warning the public that the content in the classified intelligence is threatening to national security has a profound effect on their perception of danger (Rovner 2011, 177-179).

According to Rovner, there was intelligence on Iraq's capabilities and intentions, but the intelligence community had to ignore it in order to meet the wishes of the administration (2011). Iraq's Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, was recruited by France and acknowledged that Iraq had no operational biological weapons facilities, that it would take them at least 18-24 months to build a nuclear warhead, and that the regime had no relationship with Al Qaeda. Although his statements needed to be corroborated, they are a good base of evidence and would refute some of the claims made by the administration (Rovner 2011, 183). The intelligence community also made a huge

mistake when they implied that information gaps were the result of Iraqi concealment and deception. The information gaps were actually gaps of information, where they had not collected or analyzed information. If this point was acknowledged, it would show how inconclusive their findings truly were (Rovner 2011, 181).

The Bush administration's relationship with the intelligence community mirrored that of the Johnson administration. They both ignored intelligence reports when the public was not interested in the policy strategy and then politicized it when they needed the information to support their plan. These two situations show that factors such as political party, intelligence reform legislation, and world order have no bearing on how heavily intelligence can be politicized (Rovner 2011).

Unfortunately, this problem was not addressed in the post 9/11 reform legislation. On September 11, 2012 another terrorist attack occurred against Americans. The U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi, Libya suffered an attack on the anniversary of the worst terrorist attacks to happen to the United States. During the attack, four Americans were killed including U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens. On this same day in Egypt, protests ignited in response to an anti-Islam video that was produced in America. The Obama administration attributed the attacks on the consulate to the protests over the video. Nearly, three months have passed since this incident and it has become evident that the Benghazi attack had no relation to the video and that it was a pre-planned terrorist attack. Uncovered emails have shown that the administration and many other government agencies were made aware that it was a terrorist attack only two hours after it began, yet the administration continued with the video story until intelligence officials publicly said otherwise. This prompted people to question the administration's role in the attacks (Hosenball 2012).

There have been numerous reports exposing the mistakes made by officials within the administration. First of all, there had been several requests for more security in Benghazi, yet those requests were ignored. Secondly, Ambassador Stevens sent cables back to the State Department explaining the growing threat in Libya as a result of the increasing influence of terrorist groups in the area (Lee 2012). The change in threat level should have alerted the State Department to the absolute need for more resources to protect the consulate. Thirdly, when the attack began, President Obama claims that he issued a directive to secure the personnel. Though he may have actually issued the directive, it did not go through the chain of command because forces were not deployed (Bennett 2012).

This incident is still new and much of the information has not been released yet. It would seem that some part of the administration had a role in politicizing intelligence by neglecting the reports that they were receiving. The state department was made aware of the growing threat and the need for more resources, yet they ignored it. Eric Nordstrom, one of the witnesses in the Hearing on Security Failures in Benghazi, noted that he requested additional resources to protect the consulate in Libya but Charlene Lamb, senior State Department official, told him to stop making such requests because "there would be too much political cost" (McGreal 2012). This example shows that at least on this level, government officials were neglecting intelligence because of the effect it would have on domestic politics. The Benghazi attacks occurred close to the 2012 Presidential Election and could have jeopardized President Obama's reelection efforts. It seems that the administration was trying to protect President's Obama's reputation throughout this process. The malfeasances that occurred in this situation have not been directly tied to President Obama, but the information that has yet to be released could show that he may have also played a role. Even so, a big part of the administration, the State Department, was partially

responsible for this attack and the cover up that followed. Furthermore, former CIA director David Petraeus testified at the Hearing that he was aware of the terrorist involvement in the attack from the beginning. He also said that the Al-Qaeda affiliated group's involvement in the attack was originally on the document of talking points but before being declassified, it was taken off (Cornwell and Zakaria 2012). The party that removed that point is still unknown, but this shows that somewhere in the federal government the document was altered to prevent the public from knowing the truth about the attack. Politicization of intelligence is suspected in this case, which if proven, would show that even after IRTPA was implemented, the problems between the intelligence community and the policymaker still exist.

Although Rovner (2011) argues about the importance of the relationship between the policymaker and the intelligence official, he does not go as far as to say it is the most important issue plaguing the intelligence community today. Yet, it is the primary common thread between the two massive intelligence failures and is a likely cause of the third intelligence failure. There have been several attempts at reforming the intelligence community in the wake of tragedies. As mentioned earlier, they range from creating new organizations to changing the way students are educated. Creating new organizations and thereby adding layers of bureaucracy has actually added problems to the intelligence community by fostering an increase in turf wars. Organizations are still competing with each other to obtain the biggest portion of the budget (Goldman and Taylor 2004). Many scholars have argued that the DNI needs to be strengthened. While this is true, it is not the primary concern. He will still have the problem of not being able to oversee the tasks of each organization in the intelligence community. Because the position is new and the community is rooted in tradition, it will probably take several years for him to have the authority and prestige he needs to operate successfully (Tucker 2008). Other issues such as

the recruitment and training process for people in the intelligence community are not necessarily fixed through legislative reform. Each organization should be responsible for hiring the most diverse people and training them accordingly so that they can collect and analyze intelligence in the most effective way.

This issue of the relationship between policymaker and the intelligence community is the most important because this is where policy actually comes into play. The communication between the two has to be solid and sincere for appropriate policies to be implemented based on objective intelligence products. The breakdown in the relationship can only lead to poor consequences. The function of the intelligence community is to produce objective products and the function of the policymaker is to implement policies based on those products. If both are doing their jobs correctly, the government will be doing its best to protect U.S. national security.

Conclusion

This research study is essential because national security is the top priority of the United States. If the intelligence community is incapable of protecting the homeland from future terrorist attacks, Americans will be in grave danger. This research shows how the government has attempted to reform the intelligence community on numerous accounts since its establishment as a permanent institution, yet has failed to see that it might actually be a part of the problem.

Other scholars have criticized intelligence reform in various ways, including the policymaker-intelligence official relationship, yet none have come to the conclusion that this problem is the most significant of all. A primary focus on this problem is essential to lasting reforms. Once this problem can be addressed, other reforms will have greater impact on the functionality of the institution.

To further this research, scholars and experts should look for possible solutions to the problem. My research has been focused on acknowledging and assessing the problem, but not necessarily solving it. I have a couple suggestions for fixing this issue, but they need to be further researched. For example, it may be advantageous to get rid of the DNI position and return the DCI as the head of the intelligence community. According to my calculations, the average term for a DCI is about three and a half years whereas the average term for a DNI is less than two. I think this statistic could show that the DCI was a better position to have longevity in than the DNI is. It is important that the head of the intelligence community holds the position for several years so that they have enough time to build a relationship with the President. There are limitations to this suggestion because the frequent change in DNI could be due to that fact that it is still in the early stages and the kinks need to be sorted out. If it appears that that is not the case, the federal government should consider returning to the pre-IRTPA status quo.

Additionally, there could be a congressional committee established to oversee the relationship between the intelligence official and the President. This committee would have to monitor the intelligence provided by the community and the President's response to it. The committee would be able to make sure that politicization does not occur because the dissemination process would become somewhat transparent.

Other than solutions, scholars should also look into the role of the other people in an administration related to this issue. Secretaries of State and Vice Presidents are heavily involved in intelligence decisions, and the politicization of those decisions, as well. It would be helpful to analyze how their predispositions or policy goals affect the way a President acts towards the intelligence community. Furthermore, research on the Libya case should be extended. As I am conducting my research in the beginning of the investigation there is likely much more

information to be discovered. This case should be able to show that even post 9/11 reform

legislation has not addressed the true problems plaguing the intelligence community.

<p style="text-align:center">References</p>

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