The Impact of Democratic Party Reform on the South

Robert B. Denhardt
Jay E. Hakes

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol4/iss1/4
The Impact of Democratic Party Reform on the South

ROBERT B. DENHARDT
University of Kansas

and

JAYE. HAKES
University of New Orleans

Following its traumatic 1968 national convention, the Democratic party undertook a thorough revision of its guidelines for delegate selection. The now-familiar McGovern-Fraser reforms sought increased involvement of all elements of the party in the delegate selection process by requiring timeliness, openness, and non-discrimination. In 1968 many convention delegates had been chosen by processes beginning well before the presidential candidates had even announced their intentions. To discourage this practice, the timeliness doctrine required that delegate selection take place entirely within the calendar year of the convention. The guidelines also mandated an open process in which all party members had an opportunity to participate. This policy contrasted with earlier procedures in which party officials and officeholders dominated the entire process; for example, in Georgia and Louisiana, the governors hand-picked the delegates. The commitment to non-discrimination was intended to provide representation for groups traditionally under-represented by requiring that blacks, women, and youth be included among the delegates in numbers that "bear a reasonable relationship to the group's presence in the population."1

1The new rules required that state parties:
1. Adopt explicit written party rules governing delegate selection.
2. Adopt procedural rules and safeguards for the delegate selection process that would: a. forbid proxy voting; b. forbid the use of the unit rule and related practices like instructing delegations; c. require a quorum of not less than 40% at all party committee meetings; d. remove all mandatory assessments of delegates to the national convention; e. limit mandatory participation fees to no more than $10 and petition requirements to no more than 1% of the standard used to measure Democratic strength; f. ensure that in all but rural areas, party meetings are held on uniform dates, at uniform times, and in public places of easy access; g. ensure adequate public notice of all party meetings involved in the delegate selection process.
3. Seek as broad a base of support for the party as possible in the following manner: a. add to the party rules and implement the six anti-racial-discrimination standards adopted by the Democratic national committee; b. overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to encourage representation on the national convention delegation of minority groups, young people and women in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the state; c. allow and encourage any Democrat of 18 years of age or older to participate in all party affairs.
4. Make, where applicable, the following changes in the delegate selection process: a. select alternates in the same manner as prescribed for the selection of delegates; b. prohibit the ex-officio designation of delegates to the national convention; c. conduct the entire process of delegate selection in a timely manner, i.e., within the calendar year of the convention; d. in convention systems, select no less than 75% of the total delegation at a level no higher than the congressional district and adopt an apportionment formula which is based on population and/or some standard measure of Democratic strength; e. apportion all delegates to the national convention not selected at large on a basis of representation which gives equal weight to population and Democratic voting strength based on the previous presidential election; f. designate the procedures by which slates are prepared and challenged; g. select no more than 10% of the delegation by the state committee.

See Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandate for Reform (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1970). By the time of implementation, a few of the original guidelines were modified.
While the hope of the party was that these reforms would help alleviate the turmoil of the 1968 convention, the reforms themselves became a matter of serious controversy. Those who were less successful in gaining delegate votes in 1972 complained that the reforms hurt their campaigns, and even those who were successful argued that the reforms hurt their effort in the general election. This latter argument was reflected in a recent exchange in the *American Political Science Review* in which William Cavala claimed that “... in 1972, those rules and the dynamics of politics combined to produce a delegation which did not represent in either a symbolic or descriptive fashion the majority of those who have supported the Democratic party in the past.” However, as Austin Ranney, a member of the reform commission, pointed out, “The prime objective ... was not to make the party more combat-ready for November, but rather to ensure a more representative ... convention.”

The 1972 delegate selection experience provides an excellent opportunity for political scientists to comment on an important area of public policy. However, more broadly, this experience can be helpful in increasing our understanding of political parties and especially the dynamics of change within parties. In this article, we will focus on the compliance structure of parties as complex organizations; we will seek to demonstrate several ways in which local and state party organizations complied with the reform rules. We will examine the delegate selection process in the South (the area where compliance was supposed to be most difficult) and, then, using the delegate selection process in one state, we will analyze the state party - national party compliance relationship and the dynamics of politics at the local level.

American political parties have been widely viewed as organizations in which compliance has been minimal. Parties have been seen as loose coalitions of independent parties, in part because of the limited number of sanctions that the national party can apply to state and local unit. V. O. Key said: “Viewed over the entire nation, the party organization constitutes no disciplined army. It consists rather of many state and local points of power, each with its own concerns with state and local nominations and elections.” Thus, state parties might be expected to resist following rules, such as the McGovern-Fraser reforms, established by the national party. The weakness of national political parties in America stems, in part, from their lack of what Etzioni called “utilitarian assets”, which are based on the ability to manipulate economic resources, including goods and services, wages, salaries, man-

---


3Austin Ranney, “Comment on Changing the Rules Changes the Game,” *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March 1974), 44.

power, and technical and administrative capabilities, etc. National parties have relied, instead, on "persuasive assets," which include the manipulation of symbols, rituals, or other such rewards and derivations often through the use of mass media, and the allocation of acceptance and positive response. The adoption of McGovern-Fraser guidelines indicated a desire on the part of the Democrats to promote compliance through both kinds of assets.

REFORMING SOUTHERN SELECTION PROCESSES

In April, 1970, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (McGovern-Fraser Commission) filed its official report, Mandate for Reform, with the Democratic National Committee. The Commission issued 18 "guidelines" concerning the selection of delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention. Although three of the guidelines were only recommendations, the Commission stated that it regarded 15 "as binding on the states." The rules were to be enforced at the Convention by the Credentials Committee, which would refuse to seat state delegations that refused to follow the guidelines. The stringency of the new requirements was indicated by the fact that every state was in violation of at least six of them.

The issuance of the report raised the issue of the extent to which state parties would comply with the norms of the national party. Besides the problems of any state parties adhering to national directives discussed above, there were special reasons to expect that compliance would be difficult in the South. Since the New Deal, Southern Democrats have frequently been at odds with the leadership of the national Democratic party. Noting the failure of Southern Democrats to be fully integrated into the national party, Key in 1949 remarked: "In national politics, . . . the party . . . is, or at least has been, the instrument for the conduct of the 'foreign relations' of the South with the rest of the nation." Although the South changed in many ways in the next two decades, the authors of The Changing Politics of the South characterized at least four of the Southern states (Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina) primarily in terms of protest and resistance to national norms.

Not surprisingly, there was some initial resistance to the concept of party

---

6V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 315. Key says in Politics, Parties, & Pressure Groups (p. 332) that "... the difficulties of the Democratic national organization with some of its southern state subsidiaries cannot be coped with by administrative sanctions. They are symptomatic of the existence in the party of an irreconcilable element rather than of defects of organizational arrangements."
reforms from the South. The four major credentials fights at the 1968 Democratic convention concerned Southern states (Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, and Alabama), and there was some feeling that Southern states might be the "target" of written standards for delegate selection. While the 1968 convention was mandating party reform by a 1,350-1,206 approval of the minority report of the Rules Committee, delegates from Southern states were opposing the proposal by a margin of more than four to one. To some extent, the new guidelines did affect delegation selection more in Southern states than elsewhere. As seen in Table 1, the 1968 plans of Southern states had somewhat more violations of the new requirements than those of other states, although the need for change was extensive everywhere.

To effect the mandated reforms, state parties followed the common pattern of (1) establishing study commissions to suggest particular plans in compliance with the guidelines, (2) adopting such plans, and (3) if necessary, asking state legislatures to make appropriate changes in state laws. These steps produced extensive changes in the rules for delegate selection in Southern states. Whereas no Southern states used presidential preference primaries in 1968, Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee did so in 1972. Louisiana and Georgia used committees dominated by Democratic governors to pick delegates in 1968, but no state attempted to use such closed procedures in 1972. Although the predominant method of selecting delegates in the South remained, as it was in 1968, the convention system, all eleven states made extensive efforts to conform with the guidelines. According to the reform commission itself, Alabama and North Carolina achieved full compliance in 1970; Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia met the requirements in 1971; and Arkansas, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas did so in 1972. At the opening of the 1972 national convention, Florida and Georgia were judged to be in "substantial compliance," meaning they had made most of the required changes, but were still deficient in one area. Thus, by 1972 the written plans of the Southern state parties had, with only minor exceptions, come into compliance with the national requirements and had done so at a rate quite similar to those of other states. (See Table 2.)

Political scientists do not need to be reminded that there may be important differences between written plans for delegate selection and formal compliance on the one hand and the actual process of selecting delegates and operational compliance on the other. Judgments on the process of selecting delegates were rendered by the Credentials Committee and ultimately the convention as a whole. Although political strategems played a part in the deliberations of the Credentials Committee, its manifest function was to determine whether delegates had been elected according to the rules of the national party and whether the various delegations were representative.
Many of its decisions were based on field reports from its staff of 34 hearing officers.\(^8\)

The Credentials Committee heard challenges to all of the Southern delegations, except that from Arkansas. Challenges in the South accounted for 10 of the 26 disputed states considered by the committee. The large number of Southern challenges is difficult to explain, however, since the bulk of them were denied by the committee. Only in Georgia were extensive adjustments in the delegation required. In Louisiana and Virginia, changes involving only a few votes were made. The delegations of the eight other Southern states were accepted \textit{in toto}. The convention delegates upheld all of the judgments of the Credentials Committee, except they reversed its unseating of 151 California delegates pledged to George McGovern.

The results of action by the Credentials Committee and on the floor of the convention are tabulated in Table 3. As can be seen, a high percentage of delegations and delegates were accepted by the Credentials Committee and the convention, indicating a high rate of compliance with national guidelines by state parties in the process of delegate selection. In addition, the rate of acceptance of Southern delegations and delegates was similar to that for the rest of the nation, indicating that there was no special resistance to national norms in Southern state parties.

While the reforms were directed toward changing procedures, they were also substantively concerned with the representation of previously under-represented groups (demographic representation) and the responsiveness of the resulting delegations to the wishes of the Democratic electorate (preferential representation). The first of these concerns is particularly appropriate to study in the context of Southern politics, since the failure of earlier Southern delegations to include significant representation of blacks was in large measure responsible for the consideration of this issue by the reform commission. The second issue — the responsiveness of the resulting delegation — is of special interest in the South since it was here that the resulting delegations seemed to deviate most markedly from the anticipated political preferences of the voters.

\textit{Demographic Representation}

The changes in the rules governing delegate selection which required that blacks, women, and young people be represented among the delegates in proportions that “bear a reasonable relationship to the group’s presence in the population” were largely brought about in response to the previous transgressions of Southern states. For years, black voters in the South — a group probably providing the majority of those supporting Democratic presidential candidates — were systematically denied access to the delegate selection.

process and, as a result, were not represented on the delegations finally chosen. Where the formation of delegate slates or the direct selection of delegates rested solely with white (often blatantly racist) politicians, there was little hope or expectation that there would be black delegates to the national convention.

At the 1964 convention, the Democratic party endorsed a strong platform position in support of civil rights legislation; however, at that same convention, there were a total of only four black delegates from all the Southern states combined. Some progress was made between 1964 and 1968, and all the Southern states had black delegates in 1968. Only one state, however, had as many as ten blacks on its delegation. None had a percentage of black representation which would approximate the percentage of the state’s voters who were black. However limited this progress, it is important to note that stronger black representation was obtained in 1968 without the imposition of quotas. The strength of the civil rights movement and the diffusion of this national norm through the South was enough to bring about some changes.

The 1972 delegations from the South did have significant black representation (see Table 4). All the Southern states but one (Texas) had delegations with black representation exceeding the percentage of black voters in the state. Although the dominant concern in the South was with racial balance, women and young people also increased their representation in 1972. Female representation in Southern delegations went from 13% in 1968 to 36% in 1972 (see Table 5), while the number of young delegates also jumped substantially. The obvious question is whether the increases in the delegate strength of blacks, women, and young people were caused by the implementation of the new rules on delegate selection, specifically quotas, or whether they were the result of changing political norms of a more diffuse sort.

Preferential Representation

The increase in the number of blacks on the Southern delegations to the 1972 convention — as striking as it was — was equalled in terms of surprise by the liberal leaning of many Southern delegations. While support for the candidacy of George Wallace was obviously high in the South in 1972, George McGovern received a substantial number of delegate votes from the South. Specifically, at the convention, of those delegates from the South voting for either Wallace or McGovern, McGovern received well over a third of the votes. In fact, in three states, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, McGovern received more delegate votes than Wallace. This occurred in spite of the fact that many black delegates from the South, who might have been expected to add to the McGovern vote, supported the candidacy of Shirly Chisholm.

The question of whether Southern delegations were reflective of the political preferences of Southern Democrats rests on one's definition of
"Democrats." In the South, it is helpful to distinguish between "local Democrats" and "national Democrats." Local Democrats constitute the great bulk of the population, as can be seen in registration figures and election results for state and local offices. Party identification surveys and results in national elections indicate that national Democrats have decreased in number in recent decades, include only a minority of Southern voters, and are largely black.  

In primary states, where large numbers of voters participated, the results of delegate selection reflected the preferences of local as well as national Democrats. In the three Southern states holding presidential preference primaries in 1972, George Wallace received 73% of the delegates, while George McGovern received only 5%. In convention states, however, local Democrats were not motivated to participate, leaving decision-making to the national Democrats. The national Democrats in the South were those intensely interested in the outcome of delegate selection and most acquainted with the fact that the rules had changed. In the convention states, McGovern received 32% of the delegates, compared to Wallace's 25%. Although organizational inputs affected greatly these variations in candidate strengths, the differences between the results of primary and non-primary states seem to indicate that changing the rules changed the players. From whatever system they were selected in 1972, the delegates were reflective of the preferences of those who identified with and participated in those particular systems. In some cases, they represented local Democrats; in other cases, national Democrats.

On the whole, there was a high level of compliance by Southern state parties in 1972 with the guidelines of the McGovern-Fraser Commission. Such compliance is indicated by the adoption of new rules for delegate selection and the representative character of the delegations, particularly as measured by demographic variables. Given the traditional view of the rule-making power of national parties and of Southern politics, this finding is significant. This macroscopic view, however, does not help us to discern very well the reasons for compliance or the political dynamics of delegate selection.

THE CASE OF LOUISIANA  

Very little detailed information exists on delegate selection in the Southern states. This gap in the literature of political science is particularly acute for


10 The study of Louisiana is based in part on the participant-observer method. Both authors worked in the McGovern campaign in Louisiana: one was a McGovern delegate to the national convention. Both during and after the process of delegate selection, the authors had numerous occasions to discuss the events at length with participants from various camps. To test our observations, a questionnaire was mailed to the 40 delegates elected at congressional district conventions. Since the questionnaires were not sent until 1974, the response of 11 was not surprising. Although the delegates returning questionnaires were a good cross section in terms of geography and presidential preference, their perceptions of the selection process did not vary greatly among themselves, now did they differ greatly from those of the authors.
the convention states, for convention states in the South, as those elsewhere, have been virtually ignored by journalists, practitioners writing memoirs, and political scientists. For this reason, case studies in particular states are necessary for analysis of the impact of national party rules.

Adopting the Rules

Louisiana was one of the states where resistance to national party guidelines might have been expected to occur. The state’s previous methods of selecting delegates to national conventions were in direct violation of some of the reform commission’s most important requirements. Delegates had previously been picked by the Governor rather than chosen in any kind of open process, and blacks, who comprised approximately 30% of Louisiana’s population, were grossly underrepresented in previous delegations. Moreover, an acceptable plan had to be produced by a Democratic State Central Committee that had long been reluctant to cooperate with the national party. In 1948 the Democratic Committee almost kept the name of Harry Truman off the ballot in Louisiana. Although politics in Louisiana changed greatly in the next two decades, the actions of the State Central Committee in 1968 ousting the loyalist national committeeman and denying the Democratic presidential candidate the rooster, traditional emblem of the party in Louisiana, suggested that the committee was still in a state of semi-rebellion against the national party. Moreover, the membership of the Democratic committee had been elected in 1971 from districts that favored small rural parishes, that included a number of multi-member districts and that had been declared unconstitutional for 1971 legislative elections. Only three of the committee’s 117 members were black.

The Democratic Committee did not rush to adopt a plan satisfying national party requirements; the 13-person study committee, which included one black and one woman, that was supposed to develop Louisiana’s plan was not selected until December of 1971. The study committee adopted a “two-tiered” plan of delegate selection. The process of selection was to begin with party caucuses open to all registered Democrats in the state’s 105 legislative representative districts. These 105 caucuses elected delegates (15 from each caucus) to eight congressional district conventions, which in turn selected 40 of the 44 delegates to the national convention. Four delegates were elected at

13 No blacks were included in Louisiana’s 1964 delegation. In 1968 the delegation contained 9 blacks (out of a total of 52) with 5½ votes (out of 36).
15 Stanley A. Halpin, Jr., and Richard L. Engstrom, “Racial Gerrymandering and Southern
large. After the study committee made several adjustments in its plan requested by the national Democratic headquarters, the full State Committee on February 19 approved the two-tier plan, bringing Louisiana into full compliance with the requirements established by the Reform Commission. The State Committee chose to work within the guidelines of the national party, since to do otherwise could well have meant that the Louisiana delegation would not be seated at Miami.

The Democratic State Central Committee later printed and distributed an official plan for delegate selection and selected chairmen and sites for the representative and congressional district caucuses to be held on April 15 and May 13.

The Issue of Representation

The adoption of new party rules, while meeting the formal requirements of the Reform Commission, in no way guaranteed that a "representative" delegation would be selected, nor did it answer the question of what a representative delegation should look like. The official plan pointed out that blacks in Louisiana comprised about 30% of the population, females at least 50%, and young people between the ages of 18 and 30 about 20% and recommended that "every effort be made to select delegates truly representative of all Democrats of Louisiana in the respective caucuses and congressional district conventions including youth, women, blacks and other ethnic minorities." But blacks were skeptical that the new system would produce sizeable increases in representation for them. To comply with national requirements, the selection plan banned winner-take-all provisions at the state level, but not at the representative district or congressional districts levels. Since blacks did not approach a majority in any congressional district and since previous Louisiana elections demonstrated a reluctance on the part of whites to vote for black candidates, it was not unreasonable to expect that the Louisiana delegation would continue to include few, if any, blacks. An ad hoc, but effective state-wide organization of blacks known informally as "the black challenge," planned initially to run an alternative system of delegate selection and present its case for seating at the Miami Convention to the credentials committee.\(^{18}\)


\(^{16}\) The new rules also required, *inter alia*, that (1) the caucuses and conventions be widely publicized, (2) the call should stress that the invitation extended to "all Democratic voters of any color, creed, sex, and age, young and old," (3) those who wished to run as candidates in the caucuses or conventions had to submit written notification along with five dollars to the respective chairman at least five days prior to the meetings, (4) candidates at local caucuses would be allowed to speak in their own behalf, (5) voting would be by secret ballot, and (6) a majority of votes cast was necessary for election at all levels. See Democratic State Central Committee of Louisiana, "Official Plan for Delegate Selection to the 1972 Democratic National Convention."


\(^{18}\) The "black challenge" was organized by a black New Orleans attorney, who maintained communications with the Center for Democratic Reform in Washington, D.C., as well as with black political leaders throughout Louisiana.
The group participated in what it considered a defective plan (i.e. the plan adopted by the State Central Committee), in part because it viewed this step as a necessary prerequisite for a successful challenge.

The question of black representation continued to be an important issue throughout the delegate selection process. Few people connected with the selection process denied that blacks should receive some representation. The Reform Commission’s guidelines seemed to require that blacks constitute about 30% of the state’s delegation, since that was their portion of the state’s population. Members of the “black challenge” argued that blacks were entitled to 50% of the delegation because of their heavy support of previous Democratic candidates for president. Many people in the McGovern organization accepted the black challenge’s view of racial balance, but many others in the state viewed the demand as unreasonable.

Although racial balance was the dominant issue concerning representation, other aspects of the problem were not ignored. The Women’s Political Caucus publicly demanded equal representation for women and organized orientation sessions for potential female participants in several areas of the state. Young people did not organize as a group, although many were active in the process and argued as individuals that they should be included in the delegation because of their age.

Participation

Exact figures on participation in Louisiana’s first step in delegate selection, the 105 representative district caucuses, were not kept. Attendance at the local meetings varied from about 20 to 1000 people. Although the meetings were open to all registered Democrats, less than one percent of those eligible attended their caucus. Each district was to elect 15 delegates to the congressional district caucuses, but in some areas less than 15 people filed the necessary papers to run, although doing so was quite easy. One reason for low attendance was undoubtedly the low visibility of the new system. The caucuses did receive some publicity, but nothing like the political advertising that might go into a local campaign for a judgeship. In addition, the system was new and unfamiliar to voters. Another reason for low attendance may have been the length of the meetings, as compared with the time needed to simply cast a vote. At least one stormy caucus lasted 10 hours. 19

19 The delegate strength of individual states at the national convention was determined by population and by Democratic vote in the previous presidential election. Since blacks had cast over 70% of the votes in Louisiana for Hubert Humphrey in 1968, the demand by blacks for 50% representation was an approximation of the average of these two factors.

20 Two factors contributed to the length of the caucuses. First, candidates were allowed to give speeches. With the number of candidates ranging as high as 43, this part of the meetings consumed considerable time. Second, where many candidates were running, run off ballots were usually necessary. Since efficient methods of counting the first ballot results had generally not been developed, this process too often took more time than had been contemplated.
A key factor in the operation of caucus politics was that few of the people who attended the local meetings did so without some organized encouragement. Groups urging their supporters to attend caucuses included the black challenge, supporters of George Wallace, supporters of George McGovern, the women’s political caucus, and a number of elected officials and their followers favoring delegates uncommitted to any presidential candidate. None of these groups were monolithic, nor were they mutually exclusive. Yet the activities and interactions of these groups provided the major inputs into the dynamics of delegate selection. Winners at the caucus level were accused of “packing” them, but attendance would have been even lower if organized groups had not worked on turnout.

The success of the above groups in getting supporters to the caucuses was largely dependent on their investment of time and energy in organization. A coalition of elected officials favoring an uncommitted delegation had been expected to dominate the selection process at all levels, with the strongest opposition coming from supporters of George Wallace, who carried the state in 1968. However, turnouts at caucuses produced results in which elected officials won only a part of the delegation, and the Wallace people made a strong showing in only one of the state’s eight congressional districts. With the Democrats having only a slim chance of winning the presidency, the benefits for elected officials of working on national politics did not seem high. Moreover, the enthusiasm of elected officials for the new selection process was, at the most, limited, since one of its purposes was to open up the system to other groups. The Wallacites seemed handicapped by their lack of knowledge about and attention to delegate selection in non-primary states. By contrast, McGovernites, the black challenge, and the women’s caucus expected to benefit from the new rules, invested a great deal of effort in turning out voters, and achieved greater success in the caucuses than expected by the news media or by elected officials.

All delegates to the Miami convention returning questionnaires attributed the success of various groups to their efforts to promote participation at the initial caucuses. Their interpretations of the events differed according to success of their group. A black female McGovern delegate elected from Louisiana’s Second Congressional District attributed the patterns in participation to “real grass roots campaigns [that] got the voters out.” A white male Wallace delegate elected from the Sixth Congressional District attributed the turnout to the fact that the “left wing and blacks . . . were schooled and drilled

21Billy Joe Camp, Wallace’s national press secretary, has since said: “I think the reason that Wallace did not go more heavily into the non-primary states was because of a lack of knowledge about the reform rules of the party on the part of the people directing the campaign. There was a feeling that if we got good votes out of the primaries, some of the non-primary states would fall into line.” Ernest May and Janet Fraser (eds.), Campaign ‘72: The Managers Speak (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 100.
in tactics to disgust others with the whole situation. It was a conspiracy from
the beginning.”

Although participants in the 1972 systems varied in their enthusiasm for
the new reforms, the vast majority had been supporters of Hubert Humphrey
in the 1968 general elections. Noticeable by their relative absence in the
selection process were the many Democrats that voted for Nixon and Wallace
in 1968.

**Bargaining and Negotiation**

The caucus-convention system used in Louisiana proved to be a stimulus
to bargaining and negotiation. The exchange process began at the local cau­
cuses on April 15. Slates of 15 candidates who pooled their support had a great
advantage in the caucuses over candidates who ran as individuals; it was
unlikely that one individual could bring as many supporters to his or her
caucus as could a coalition of 15 people. Many candidates ran as individuals,
but when full slates were formed — some in advance of the meetings, others
on the spot — they were usually successful. Many of the winning slates were
balanced according to age, sex, and, in mixed areas, race. Balanced slates were
achieved in part because some participants feared a challenge before the
Credentials Committee if blacks, women, and young people were not in­
cluded, in part because blacks were threatening to boycott the process if not
given adequate representation, in part because many of the participants were
committed ideologically to the idea of balance, and in part because slates
including diverse groups were able to attract broad support.

Supporters of George Wallace were unable to coalesce with other groups.
Their lack of sympathy with racial balance and their image with other groups
handicapped efforts at joint slates. In areas where Wallace support was strong,
it frequently served to encourage cooperation between McGovern and non-
McGovern national Democrats, groups that often had trouble cooperating in
the absence of the “Wallace threat.”

A similar pattern evolved in the congressional district conventions of May
13 and the election state-wide of the at-large delegates on May 20. It was
advantageous for candidates to run on slates, and groups other than the
Wallace supporters were hesitant to support slates that were racially and
sexually unbalanced for reasons both pragmatic and ideological.

The Louisiana delegation, which in the end was 43% black, 34% female,
and 27% under 30, was produced in large part by negotiated slatemaking.
None of the identifiable groups — blacks, women, McGovernites, Wallacites,
and uncommitted candidates usually organized by elected officials — had
enough strength to elect delegates by themselves. Hence, their success in the
selection process depended to some extent on their ability to negotiate and
compromise. Women were very successful at early stages of the process but
could not translate their early strength into a large number of delegates. Women could not retain a unified bargaining front, because they were divided by other loyalties as blacks, McGovernites, and by ties to elected officials. By contrast, blacks became increasingly successful as the selection process progressed, because they retained cohesiveness in negotiations. McGovern supporters found it relatively easy to enter into coalitions, because they had been committed from the start to substantial representation for blacks and women.

Elected officials were handicapped by a large number of previous commitments for delegate slots that inhibited compromise with other groups. At several points in the selection process local McGovern leaders and representatives of elected officials attempted to put together compromise slates. Despite the use of intermediaries in Washington, D.C., these negotiations always broke down. As a result, the forces of McGovern and elected officials often competed with each other for the support of black and female delegates. Elected officials were not as successful in forming coalitions with blacks as they might have been had they devoted more attention to delegate selection. The night before the selection of at-large delegates in Baton Rouge, the Governor failed to attend a scheduled appointment with the black delegates already chosen. This lack of effort by the Governor ended any chances for a coalition between the Governor and black delegates. In the end the Governor himself was selected as a delegate, but the rest of his slate for the at-large positions, consisting of the Democratic national committeeman, the state president of the AFL-CIO, and the chairman of the Democratic state central committee, was defeated by three black candidates supported by black and McGovern delegates.

The Louisiana experience demonstrates that the balance in its delegation was not simply the result of the new party rules, or what Etzioni refers to as "utilitarian compliance." The reformed selection system established a context in which balanced representation could be achieved. Representation was achieved in part because many of the participants in the process were national Democrats in sympathy with the requirements of the reform commission. In addition, the symbolism associated with the new rules was particularly attractive to blacks, women, and non-professional politicians. Since these groups turned out in relatively heavy numbers for local caucuses, compliance with

22 The situation in Georgia contrasted sharply with that in Louisiana. The distribution of McGovernites, blacks, and those tied to elected officials in the delegation after congressional district conventions there was roughly the same as in Louisiana. But in Georgia, after the Governor expended considerable effort meeting with black delegates, a working coalition was formed between blacks and elected officials rather than between blacks and McGovernites.

23 If representation was achieved simply because of the new rules, women would have been as successful as blacks in winning seats, since the rules applying to the two groups were similar. Yet blacks comprised 43% of the delegation and women 34%. In addition, if utilitarian compliance fully explained the changes in representation, levels of representation would have been uniform throughout the state. Yet the three congressional districts including parts of metropolitan New Orleans produced delegations that were 53% female and 47% black, while the delegations from the other five districts were 35% black and 22% female.
national norms of representation occurred because most participants wanted it to occur. Thus, representation was achieved by normative as well as utilitarian compliance, as well as by the dynamics of political bargaining and negotiation.

CONCLUSION

Southern states clearly did comply with the requirements of the McGovern-Fraser Commission in 1972 delegate selection. This adherence to national party norms occurred despite the severity of the rules, the common notion that national parties cannot control state parties, and the historic position of the South as a dissenting region with the national Democratic party.

The reasons for compliance are difficult to pinpoint. To some extent, compliance was utilitarian, in that it resulted from the threat of sanctions. The ultimate sanction was that delegations chosen in a manner considered improper would not be seated at the national convention. Even Democrats disenchanted with the national party desired seating at the convention, so they were obliged to adhere to the new guidelines.

In the caucus-convention state of Louisiana (and probably in a number of other non-primary states) participation in the delegate selection process was dominated by national Democrats, supporters of George McGovern, and blacks, all of whom sympathized to varying degrees with the new national rules. As a result, compliance by those who participated was largely voluntary, and in some cases, such as the representation of blacks, the local state delegations surpassed the minimal requirements of the national rules.

For some time, there have been two complementary trends in the development of the Democratic party in the South — its decreasing share of the electorate in national elections and its "nationalization." The national norms of the party have, to a large extent, been responsible for a drop in the loyalty of many Southerners to the party. The decreasing size, however, has meant in turn that the remaining core of Democrats are increasingly likely to sympathize with national norms. The delegate selection process in the South in 1972 probably exaggerated these trends, because of the importance of motivation for participation in non-primary systems. Yet the 1972 results were consistent with these long-range trends.

TABLE 1. Changes Required by Guidelines of Reform Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Violations in 1968 Plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 2. Rates of Compliance with Reform Commission Guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>not in full compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from *The Party Reformed*.

TABLE 3. Compliance and Southern Delegations to the 1972 Democratic National Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Credentials Committee</th>
<th>On Floor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unchallenged Delegations</td>
<td>Delegations accepted in toto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 4. Black Presence in Southern Delegations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 5. Presence of Women in Southern Delegations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>1964 Total</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1968 Total</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1972 Total</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44.07</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.69</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>