MNC-LDC Investment: A Risk-Benefit Analysis

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Trends and Problems in the Study of Political Development

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There are in the world in 1974 almost 250 separate geographical entities, either countries or territories. Of these, the United Nations has classified 200, or roughly 80%, underdeveloped or developing. Although many of these entities contain fewer than one million people, their combined population is approximately 2.75 billion, or 73% of the world’s 3.75 billion people. In a world still shrinking due to advances in communications technology, the presence of so many people living in circumstances which inhibit their human development continues to complicate the international political, economic, and strategic environment. It also continues to irritate the moral sensitivities and to stimulate the intellectual curiosities of persons in the more developed regions. Surely the persistence of underdevelopment is one of the key dynamics in today’s world.

As a result, David Apter and S. S. Mushi could write recently that “social scientists are agreed that development is now a problem of universal concern,” a concern which dates, for several reasons, from the mid-1940s. The post-World War II decolonization movements throughout the Third World brought to power leaders who not only wanted to serve their new nations, but who were under pressure to legitimize their rule by bringing benefits to their constituents. Besides, the only pattern of leadership which these rulers had to follow was the experience of the older nations—hence, the imitative effort to catch up or develop.

This demonstration effect was enhanced by an acceleration in communications which circulated world-wide a graphic image of material and institutional progress; millions became aware for the first time of what they did not have, leading to the oft-labeled revolution of rising

1 Such classifications are, of course, subjective. For a brief summary of several widely used classifications of developing countries, see Adrian Moyes and Teresa Hayter, World III. A Handbook on Developing Countries (London, 1964), p. 2. For an alternative, Marxist classification, see Pierre Jalée, The Pillage of the Third World, trans. Mary Klopper (New York, 1968), p. 5.


expectations.\textsuperscript{5} Included, moreover, in this demonstration was the idea, increasingly popular in the more developed nations, that science and technology could solve any human problem. Development, therefore, required only the sufficient application of rational planning and technical know-how. Optimism, needless to say, ran high among leaders in all three worlds.\textsuperscript{6}

Helping to spread both the images and the optimism were the United Nations and a variety of international agencies. These groups not only worked to alleviate and to overcome the problems of underdevelopment. They also publicized to a universal audience the great disparities in the world's standards of living. In so doing they both stimulated the less developed nations to seek a higher standard and encouraged the conviction that the existing inequities were an issue of moral concern. The development question, thereby, came to possess ethical as well as political and economic overtones.\textsuperscript{7}

Finally, because of the atmosphere of the Cold War, strategic considerations further intensified the universalization process. The Third World became an ideological battleground for East and West, as each sought to play on the discontent and aspirations of the underdeveloped through propaganda campaigns and the promise—not always fulfilled—of foreign aid. In the new international game of numbers, the hope was to place one more country in "our column," or, at least, to prevent one from going into "theirs." If foreign aid did on occasion spring from humanitarianism, it was, nonetheless, convenient when humanitarian and strategic concerns overlapped.

Initially, this interest in development focused mainly on economic problems, but as it became obvious that development was a more complex form of social change than had originally been thought and as many Americans, under the pressures of the Cold War, easily confused economic and political concepts—the infamous Communism-democracy dichotomy—the interest quickly broadened to include political and other considerations.

Given the magnitude of these growing concerns it is not surprising that there was a parallel publication explosion. Although early theorists


\textsuperscript{6} For typical statements of the belief that development entailed spreading Western values and could be achieved through proper planning and administration, see Eugene R. Black, \textit{The Diplomacy of Economic Development} (Cambridge, 1960); Clark Kerr, \textit{et. al.}, \textit{Industrialism and Industrial Man} (New York, 1964); and W. W. Rostow, \textit{The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto} (New York, 1962).

\textsuperscript{7} Barbara Ward, \textit{The Lopsided World} (New York, 1968), presents a highly moralistic appeal for aid for the underdeveloped areas.
of social relationships, such as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Joseph Shumpeter, Max Weber, and Herbert Spencer, speculated about long-range patterns of societal development, social scientists in significant numbers did not view development as a specific, delimited area of study until (again) about the end of World War II. Arthur Kemp estimates that since that time the world’s technical economic journals have contained over 15,000 articles devoted in whole or in part to the questions of economic growth and development. This does not include books, nor articles in semi-technical and popular periodicals. The extent of writing on political development and the politics of modernization may not be so great, but it is surely large and equally overwhelming.

Apart from sheer quantity, the bulk of the political science literature of the post-war decades differed from earlier writing on development in several important regards. Sidney Verba has summarized those trends:

The revolution in comparative politics started with a number of brave principles: look beyond description to more theoretically relevant problems; look beyond the single case to the comparison of many cases; look beyond the formal institutions of governments to political processes and political functions; and look beyond the countries of Western Europe to the new nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

It was those principles, emanating from the older and at that time narrower field of comparative politics, which gave rise to the scientific study of development as a universal phenomenon.

This rejection of the so-called traditional-institutional approach to comparative politics was, in fact, part of the larger behavioral movement which challenged the discipline of political science in the 1940s and 1950s, and reached its peak in the early 1960s. Although probably misnamed, behavioralism, in its broadest and most general usage, encouraged the application of scientific empiricism rather than intuitive or

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8 For an introductory discussion of the concepts of development and progress in Western thought, see Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History. Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (New York, 1969).
impressionistic techniques, objective rather than subjective perspectives, inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Political behavior replaced legal forms as the focus of study. Drawing on the methods of other social sciences, behavioralists began to look at both the role of the individual political actor and the relationship of all actors in the context of a total system. Ultimately, behavioralism looked to the construction of theory based on reality rather than on arbitrary standards of normality or morality.

Another quality of the new development literature was that same optimism which characterized the thinking of politicians and planners. However, the optimism of the post-war era differed from earlier beliefs in inevitable progress based on the mechanistic operation of natural laws. Disillusioned by the two World Wars and the Great Depression, theorists and planners alike now made development contingent on the intelligence and will of men rather than the inexorable wave of social evolution. Nevertheless, as Irving Horowitz has pointed out, "the development concept at a significant level is a 20th-century equivalent of the 19th-century notion of progress. Development is a shared belief that men and nations not only change but somehow change for the better." In short, the assumed bases for the optimism were different, but the faith in eventual success was the same. The clash between this native optimism and claims to scientific objectivity is obvious.

But, as Gabriel Almond observed in 1969, "a mood of disillusionment appears to be sweeping the field of comparative politics and political development." This disillusionment stems, in part, from the failure of the various programs for development, applied with inconsistent vigor, to make an impact on rates of world economic and political improvement. It also stems from the fact that, at least as regards comparative politics and the study of political development, it has become evident in recent years that, despite their many contributions, the practitioners of behavioralism have not really achieved the objectives implicit in their approach. Consequently, during the last five years, especially since we entered the "second development decade," much of the conventional wisdom on all aspects of development has been subjected to

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extensive criticism, modification, and, at times, outright rejection. This is not to imply that development thinking was devoid of variations prior to the late 1960s. Rather, it suggests that in the mainstream of political science such variations were more a matter of degree than of substance.

In the first place, despite an emphasis on scientific precision, there has occurred, in Geoffrey Roberts' words, "a long-term debasement of political terminology," producing a "variety of unintegrated vocabularies of political language" and a "growing inability to communicate." Although Roberts may be unduly cynical, it is undeniable that many integral terms and concepts in the field of development have no universally accepted or scientifically rigorous definition. "Conceptually the critical notions of capacity and differentiation and specialization are exceptionally vague, if not tautological, in their referents and difficult to operationalize." The same can surely be said of such idealistic forms as independence, freedom, and democracy, and of more delimited, yet popular, concepts such as traditionalism, stability, secularization, and political system. Not surprisingly, there is great inconsistency and imprecision in the use of the concept of development itself.

Numerous authors, for example, insist that we apply the word developing, rather than backward or underdeveloped, to the countries of the Third World, because, they argue, all nations, including the more advanced, "are, or should be, developing, and no country is fully de-

21 In a widely-cited article, Lucian W. Pye analyzes ten frequently used definitions of political development; see "The Concept of Political Development," *The Annals*, 358 (March 1965), 1-13.
veloped,” inasmuch as development is an infinite open-ended process. Although this view is preferable to the older advanced-backward dichotomy, it still assumes a process of linear movement and gives too little attention to the fact that all nations are not in the process of developing, as, in recent years, some appear to be at best stagnating (e.g., Colombia and Saudi Arabia), while others appear to be in fact regressing (e.g., Uruguay and Nigeria). Also, a few writers have of late introduced the term overdeveloped to describe nations whose economies abuse their environments, whose institutions dehumanize their members, and whose bureaucracies no longer serve their clients. Of course, as Charles Taylor reminds us, not all significant political changes need be considered either progress or regression. In other words, there is no agreement as to what development—be it political, economic, social, or cultural—really is and who is, or is not, actually developed. In fact, there is now no agreement among social scientists as to the possibility or even desirability of development, at least not on the terms in which development has been most generally perceived.

Reflective of this confusion has been the inability to distinguish between political development as a distinct process and the development of other sectors of the social system. Helio Jaguaribe, for example, maintains that “development is a total social process, and only for methodological convenience or in a partial sense can one speak of economic, political, cultural, and social development.” By contrast, Taylor insists that “the first order of business in political development studies is to isolate and give substance to the separate dimensions in political terms.”

24 Nash, “Pollution, Population, and the Cowboy Economy.”
Because there is no consensus on an objective definition of political development, the assignment of developed, developing, or underdeveloped (sometimes modern, transitional, or traditional) status to a political system is, in truth, a function of individual, subjective preferences. Yet, there is a surprising consistency in the classification schemes employed by scholars using different working definitions, in that the same countries appear repeatedly in the same relative positions regardless of the taxonomic criteria. These classifications, in turn, correspond quite highly to standard categories of economic development. Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that students of political development are not studying political development as an independent phenomenon, but rather the politics of nation-states that are relatively more or less economically and technologically developed or modern. The relationship is probably symbiotic rather than causal, though this remains unproven. Either way, the principal justification for a separate study of political development apparently lies in the unique relationship of the political process to the broader milieu of underdevelopment. Even if they consider political development to be a distinct and separate process, most students of the subject work from the assumption that political development is a "historically identifiable set of political changes associated with the onset of industrialization in any given society" and that "some pattern of political modernization . . . must inevitably accompany the process of social and economic modernization." 28

Related to the lack of consensus on the meaning of development has been the post-war predilection to formulate universal models of development based on European and North Atlantic experiences and values. 29 Again, despite the commitment to culture-free objectivity, social scientists internationally have worked from methodological and theoretical assumptions adopted often uncritically from the environment of the First and Second Worlds. The result has been a "problem of malanalysis based on general propositions without proper linkage with concrete data, of faulty generalizations, of inadequate mastery of data, of selecting the wrong issues, [and] of redundant repetition of accepted propositions." 30

28 Roger W. Benjamin, et al., Patterns of Political Development (New York, 1972), p. 11; Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics (New York, 1971), p. 25. Marion J. Levy, Jr., begins with the assumption that "the measure of modernization [is] the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power." For a provocative and entertaining examination of the comprehensive implications of the modernization process, see his Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors (New York, 1972). (The quote is from p. 3n.)


Octavio Paz, Mexican essayist and critic, speaks for many in the less developed areas, when he laments that his country's development model "fails to correspond to our true historical, psychic, and cultural reality and is instead a mere copy (and a degraded copy) of the North American archetype. Again: we have not been able to create viable models of development, models that correspond to what we are." He also correctly describes a rising trend among social scientists in the nominally more developed areas when he observes that "not only capitalist development but also the very notion of development has come under fire. In the East as in the West, the criticism of society that is taking shape is leading to a search for viable models of development different from those predominate today." We must, Paz concludes, reject an approach "with more of slavish thoughtlessness in it than of scientific rigor."

This should not be taken to mean that the prior experiences of older societies are of no relation to the development of newer ones. Talcott Parsons and the structural-functionalists, for example, have cogently argued the validity of comparing both common systemic needs and some broad developmental patterns in all or most modernizing societies. The concern is that "even if we do discover a configuration we can all 'industrial man,' or 'modern man,' the existence of such a configuration should not be permitted to obscure the important cross-cultural variations which exist simultaneously with the similarities." As F. Stirton Weaver has shown, through an examination of the Chilean case, "the changes in industrial arts and organization in the last two hundred years have so radically altered the social impact of industrialization that the application of theories generalizing from earlier successful industrialization must be used with extreme caution in analyzing economic change in


33 Paz, *The Other Mexico*, p. 72.

contemporary poor countries.” This caveat can surely be extended to models of political development as well.

Disagreement also plagues the search for the analytical level on which meaningful generalizations can be constructed. This failure to recognize the most appropriate level is, according to Hah and Schneider, “the main methodological impediment to the progress of development studies.” If social scientists at one time anticipated the construction of explanatory and predictive models of development applicable to all nations and peoples, their efforts in that direction have been markedly unsuccessful. “the general theoretical works float well above reality, and they often are so abstract as to suggest no clear problem focus.”

To counter this fault some theoreticians are suggesting an intermediate, or middle-level, approach based on segments of systems and subsets of nations. The problem then becomes one of selecting criteria for grouping. Lawrence S. Graham, contemplating the role of bureaucracies in the development process, proposes “the identification of distinct culture areas, beyond the confines of the individual states, where distinct perceptions and expectations . . . point to shared norms and values at the supranational level.” Applying such a standard, however, is harder than it sounds. Douglas Chalmers, for example, asserts the universality of an identifiable type of sociopolitical structure within the Latin American area and its distinctiveness compared with other parts of the world.


In contrast, Charles Arnade and Eugene Genovese, both historians, contend that all or part of Latin America should be linked on a higher level of analysis with other regions in the Third World. Consequently, students of political development, whatever their regional specialty, can share in Henry Bienen's lament that "we have not been able to say what political development in Africa means or to decide whether or not we ought to mean something by 'political development' which is sui generis." If there is now a movement to postpone the search for universal theories, there is at the same time in some quarters, as the above comment by Graham implies, a desire to get away from the nation-state, in its comprehensive, systemic sense, as the primary unit of analysis. This is true, in part, because an emphasis on whole systems makes meaningful comparison very difficult; it also underscores the fact that many nations are not homogeneous or highly integrated. Recognizing, therefore, the great disparities in wealth, values, and behavior among persons and regions within individual countries, it seems useful to examine the development role of a variety of environmental factors (e.g., urbanization, industrialization, population, pollution and resource depletion) and social institutions (e.g., businesses, bureaucracies, professional and occupational groups) which either cut across national lines or exist within most countries and can be analyzed comparatively.

To achieve this, for example, John Walton has employed a "standardized case comparison" procedure to study subnational regions simultaneously within and across national boundaries. At any rate, an emphasis on ecological vari-


44 Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development Decade."

45 Walton, "Political Development and Economic Development." See also, Benjamin, et. al., Patterns of Political Development, and Audrey C. Smock, Comparative Politics: A Reader in Institutionalization and Mobilization (Boston, 1973).
ables—including the world physical and biological environment—and international linkages is one of the important innovations in recent comparative studies. 46

One theoretical outgrowth of these perspectives is the concept of structured underdevelopment which has gained considerable popularity in recent years especially among neo-Marxist economists and sociologists. According to this view, underdevelopment, rather than being a given or natural state from which all societies evolve, is a product of the expansion of the North Atlantic capitalist system and the establishment of a dependent relationship between the peripheral and metropolitan areas. While this dependency may be linked at one point to a colonial empire, it does not necessarily end with the demise of official colonialism. Underdevelopment, in other words, derives from the presence, not absence, of capitalism and other so-called modern institutions and values. In the political realm, underdevelopment is maintained by an alliance between those international forces and local elites which benefit from the status quo. 47

If this interpretation has any value, we are forced in turn to re-evaluate the dual society thesis which pictures transitional societies as having a modern-urban sector and a traditional-rural sector, the latter resisting the spread of the former and thereby inhibiting development, which is tautologically defined as the decline of traditionalism. Recent investigations not only refute the basis of this dualism, but question the whole concept of traditionalism as the reverse of development. The corollary theories of disruptive migrants and radical marginals also appear to lack empirical substance. 48


If the research of the post-war decades has not often been truly comparative, neither has it been truly developmental. What we have, in many cases, is actually comparative statics, the enumeration of successive stages and a contrasting of characteristics of each stage. How a system moves from one stage to another has been too rarely considered. Even Gabriel Almond recently conceded the failure of his earlier writings to treat this problem and formulated his own model of “developmental episodes” to facilitate explanation of systemic change. Nevertheless, it will surely be a long time before we can determine if change is more likely to come dialectically, “in spurts, with definite ascertainable conditions,” possibly accompanied by violence, or through processes in which conflict, even where it exists, is incidental, and in which the central pattern is cumulative, evolutionary, and continuous.

A partial explanation of these shortcomings in political development studies has been the frequent inability to transcend traditional disciplinary barriers—“interdisciplinarity is in the air, though it is more often preached than practiced.” For example, in a subject area which is by its nature implicitly historical, it is tragic that “political scientists seem to believe that history has no place in their discipline.” Although that assessment may be less true today than it was five years ago, students of development still approach the past with less precision than they supposedly treat the present. The absence of any explicit conception of time eliminates the possibility of constructing those developments.
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

This failure to achieve a comprehensive historical perspective also explains the confusion of Western development experiences with those of the present Third World.

History is not the only discipline from which, until recently, political scientists too often neglected to draw. If our earlier generalization is correct—that behavioralism provoked a dual interest in individual political actors and collective political systems—then the bulk of that interest, at least in the Third World, has focused on the systemic rather than the individual level. This is basically true whether the focus has been national, regional, or universal.

Although commendable advances have recently characterized the application of psychological and sociological insights to problems of political development, many scholars continue to pay only lip service to the axiom that "it is the actors, rather than the institutions or the systems, that make the choices." Institutions, systems, and their environments certainly set limits on alternatives and the methods of implementation, but that does not negate the importance of understanding how values and knowledge are acquired nor how choices are made.

In sum, the parochialism of the practitioners of the various disciplines concerned with development has deprived scholars and planners alike of the balanced and integrated perspective that they need to properly do their jobs.

Overarching all of these inter-related criticisms of postwar development literature is the feeling that the concern of development studies


57 Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development Decade."


60 A recent book by Taketsugu Tsurutani places welcome emphasis on political leadership as a crucial element in national development. However, the author probably carries his argument too far when he contends that any political leader is theoretically capable of bending any environmental circumstances to his own advantage; see, The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Societies (New York, 1973).

“cannot be simply with description, however complex,” but should give greater attention to human needs and values and be more directly related to feasible development planning for the actual achievement of a better life for the people still living in an underdeveloped state. True, behavioral techniques have always carried with them the capacity to promote normative judgments and to encourage the formation of human values. There emerges the impression, however, that students of political development, in their devotion to scientific objectivity, have not been aware of the normative assumptions which underlie their own work nor willing to admit that their research, if only through the topics studied and methods employed, communicates certain value judgments.

Undoubtedly, the prevalence of Western norms in post-war models designed for Third World development is not only a reflection of ethnocentrism but also an attempt, subconscious or not, to keep things quiet—‘to keep the restless natives in their places’—for the protection of (most-often) American economic and security interests. Hence, the emphasis on such concepts as stability and equilibrium, the preference for stagnation over violence, the acceptance of military regimes as reform agents, and, when the early post-war optimism went unfulfilled, a tendency to blame this on the institutions, mentalities, values, and supposed incapabilities of the Third World peoples and nations themselves rather than on the historic relationship between these nations and the developed areas of the world.


65 Western social scientists have dominated development studies since their beginning; within the Western world, the United States has produced the majority of scholars in the field. See, Alatas, “The Captive Mind in Development Studies.”

If we assume that planners and "political leaders can be active agents in the process of making change," then the research and theories from which they draw will lead to decisions of considerable human importance: "development implies goals and the positing of goals requires values." Research, in other words, is not carried out in a vacuum. As a result more writers are saying, with Mark Tessler, that "no theoretical discussion is worthwhile unless it provides, in addition to tentative explanations, realistic and practical answers to the question—what should be done next?" The construction of general theory should be only one of the preoccupations of the social scientist. The scholar should continue to seek the ideal of scientific objectivity, but must likewise recognize his own assumptions and come to grips with the practical consequences of his work.

This abbreviated survey of recent trends in development studies probably justifies Almond's reference to a mood of disillusionment. Yet it remains a fact that, whatever development is, many people want it, for themselves or for others, and are often willing to go to great lengths to get it. Past failures to achieve precision in the study of development or progress in the attainment of development should not dissuade us from further attempts at both, even though we have no guarantee of success. Development remains an exciting field of intellectual inquiry and a pressing concern of international reality.

67 Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" 135.
68 Taylor, "Indicators of Political Development," 105.